[Kabar-Irian] Irian News - 2/22/06 (Part 2 of 3)
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- Conflict dogs Papuan peace chance
- Vanuatu: Internal Affairs Minister Ordered To File Sworn Statement Over
Deportation Order
- Shouldn’t This Convicted Thug Be In Jail?
- The Tragedy Of Maluku
*****************************
Australian News Network
Conflict dogs Papuan peace chance
From: AAP by Ahmad Pathoni in Jakarta
February 19, 2006
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is eager to halt the
low-level insurgency in eastern Papua after ending a decades-long
separatist conflict in Aceh, at the other extremity of the sprawling
archipelago nation.
But analysts say the poorly-armed Free Papua Movement (OPM) is split,
disorganised and lacks a leadership with any capacity to represent Papuans
in negotiations with the government of the world's largest Muslim nation.
The OPM has waged a sporadic guerrilla offensive against Jakarta's rule
ever since Indonesia assumed control of the resource-rich former Dutch
territory in the 1960s, as Indonesia's military has been accused of human
rights abuses.
Full details of violent incidents in jungle-clad Papua, which is
off-limits to foreign media, rarely emerge and it can be difficult to
confirm who is behind them.
The plight of the Papuans, who unlike most Indonesians are of Melanesian
descent and predominantly Christian, hit international headlines last
month with the arrival of 43 asylum seekers in Australia by boat.
The group accused the Indonesian military of perpetrating genocide in the
province, charges countered by the Indonesian government as "rubbish".
"The problem with Papua is: who has the legitimacy to negotiate on behalf
of Papuans with the government?" said Dewi Fortuna Anwar, an analyst with
the Habibie Center think tank.
"GAM (the Free Aceh Movement) has a clear leadership hierarchy, but Papuan
separatists are fragmented," she said, referring to Aceh's rebels, who
inked a peace pact with Jakarta last August after a nearly
three-decade-long conflict that killed 15,000.
Ms Anwar also noted that the Aceh peace initiative was spurred on by the
devastating December 2004 tsunami, which left some 165,000 Acehnese dead
and brought massive international attention to the province.
While not on the scale of the Aceh bloodshed, several prominent incidents
in Papua have been blamed on OPM, including a 2002 ambush that killed two
US citizens and an Indonesian, dogging relations with the United States
since.
The group's leader Anthonius Wamang, who was arrested with seven others
last month, admitted they fired on the vehicle, but he also accused the
military of being implicated in the attack near a mine owned by US giant
Freeport-McMoRan.
While the military has denied a connection, the allegation highlights the
often murky nature of the conflict.
Indonesia banned foreign media from entering Papua in 2003, a move again
defended by Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono this month.
"We feel that Indonesian unity and cohesion would be threatened by foreign
intrusion and concern," he said.
Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group predicted that it would
"take a long time" to resolve the conflict in Papua.
Papua is "a much more complex place" than Aceh, with many different tribes
and a generally low level of education, she said.
Indonesia won sovereignty over Papua, then called West Irian, in 1969,
after the United Nations allowed an integration referendum that involved
just 1,000 hand-picked tribal leaders and was widely labelled a sham.
Papua is on the international radar today due to a natural gas project
there led by energy giant BP as well as Freeport's gold and copper mine,
the world's largest.
Jones noted that the outside interest has not resulted in much action.
"There has been a lot of international concern, but it hasn't led to
political support for a referendum," she said.
Jakarta has offered special autonomy for Papua, giving it a greater share
of its oil and gas revenues among other concessions, but its clumsy
implementation has failed to curb local discontent.
In August, Yudhoyono promised to seek a peaceful end to the Papuan
conflict, rejecting international interference after a US congressman
called for unfettered access to investigate how Jakarta gained control of
Papua.
Not everyone, however, is convinced OPM are a major concern.
"Sometimes they are active but most of the times they are dormant," said
Albert Rumbekwan, a Papua-based member of the National Commission on Human
Rights which is investigating claims by the Papuans in Australia.
"Outsiders may think Papua is a dangerous place, but it is actually safe
here."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Pacific Magazine
Vanuatu: Internal Affairs Minister Ordered To File Sworn Statement Over
Deportation Order
Monday: February 20, 2006
Vanuatu’s Minister for Internal Affairs has reportedly been ordered to
file a sworn statement in court about his reasons for deporting Papuan
independence activist Andy Ayamiseba.
The minister, George Wells, ordered Mr Ayamiseba’s sudden deportation
earlier this month, which failed when neither Australia nor Solomon
Islands would accept him.
No official reason was given for the order, made under a recent amendment
to the Immigration Act, which gives the minister the power to deport
anyone without notice if they’re considered detrimental to national
security or public order.
Mr Ayamiseba’s lawyer, Felix Kabini, says that as the minister responsible
for making the order, Mr Wells must state his justifications.
“I made an application on Friday morning to summon the minister to appear
and testify in court as to why he wants to deport Andy.
-- RNZI/PNS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paras Indonesia (formerly Laksamana)
Shouldn’t This Convicted Thug Be In Jail?
February, 18 2006 @ 11:42 pm
By: Roy Tupai
Former East Timorese pro-Indonesia militia leader Eurico Guterres,
currently appealing his five-year jail sentence for crimes against
humanity, has been elected chairman of National Mandate Party’s (PAN)
chapter in East Nusa Tenggara province.
He claims he will help PAN win greater support in the 2009 general
election. Does he intend to do this by issuing death threats to the
electorate, as he did in the months prior to East Timor’s referendum on
independence? PAN should wise up and ditch this dangerous thug, who has
already served time with rival parties Golkar and the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle.
It appears PAN’s leaders are grateful to have Guterres on board. He won a
landslide victory in the party’s provincial leadership election on
February 11, picking up 50 of the 67 votes cast at the conclusion of a
two-day congress at the Kristal Hotel in Kupang, the main city of West
Timor. (West Timor is part of East Nusa Tenggara, which is known locally
by the acronym NTT).
Guterres (34), who is close to influential senior Indonesian generals, is
the former leader of the feared Aitarak (Thorn) militia group, which
unleashed carnage in East Timor in the period surrounding the territory’s
1999 vote to secede from Indonesia.
Under strong pressure from the international community to bring Guterres
to justice, Indonesian authorities arrested him a couple of times in 2000
on various charges. In April 2001, he was convicted of inciting violence
in West Timor and sentenced to six months imprisonment, but ended up
serving only 23 days under house detention thanks largely to his powerful
military friends. Human rights activists continued to demand he be tried
for war crimes, but the military lauded him as a heroic patriot.
In November 2002, Indonesia’s special human rights court convicted
Guterres of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 10 years in jail.
Jakarta High Court in July 2004 reduced his sentence to five years. He
still remains free pending the Supreme Court’s decision on his current
appeal. Some reports have said he is supposed to be under city arrest in
Jakarta, yet he seems free to travel where he pleases.
Human rights groups in August 2003 accused Guterres of going to remote
Papua province to establish the ‘Merah Putih’ (Red & White) pro-Indonesia
militia group to oppose the separatist Free Papua Organization. Media
reports last year alleged that Guterres had visited tsunami-hit Aceh
province to assemble a unit of his Army-backed militia to combat the
separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The thug strongly denied the reports,
saying he was confined to Jakarta while continuing his appeal against his
jail sentence.
Former Parties
Guterres had initially been a member of Golkar, the former political
vehicle of Suharto. In June 1999, Golkar had selected Guterres to stand
for election in the national parliament.
He left Golkar in March 2000 for then vice president Megawati
Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), which he
felt had done the most of any party to help keep East Timor within
Indonesia. Megawati in August 2000 appointed him chief of PDI-P’s
paramilitary youth group, Banteng Pemuda.
Panning For Popularity Or Controversy?
So why has PAN now wooed Guterres? Is the party so desperate for votes
that it thinks he will bolster its popularity in predominantly Christian
eastern Indonesia?
PAN was founded as a pluralistic and secular party by reformist Muslim
leader Amien Rais after the 1998 downfall of former dictator Suharto.
Although well known for its consistent anti-corruption stance, the party
has failed to become a dominant force in the political arena due to a lack
of strong military and populist support.
Appealing mostly to educated urban voters, the party came fifth in the
June 1999 general election with just 7.1% of the vote. It fared worse in
the April 2004 general election, coming seventh with 6.43% of the vote.
The party now holds 52 of the 550 seats in the House of Representatives.
Analysts say PAN has lost its pluralist roots over recent years and
developed almost exclusively into the political vehicle of the nation’s
second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah.
Rais is known for shifting his stance on East Timor to suit his political
purposes. He resigned from politics after his failure in the 2004
presidential election and was replaced as PAN leader by Sutrisno Bachir in
April 2005.
PAN does not seem concerned that it might scare away voters by having
Guterres as one of its members. On the contrary, it seems the party feels
he will bring greater support and internal unity.
Deputy secretary general of PAN’s central executive board, Muhammad Najib,
said Guterres was welcome in the party as long as he followed its rules.
He said the former militia leader had long been close to Rais and Bachir,
but had only recently joined the party.
He said it was up to the public to determine whether Guterres’ involvement
in the 1999 violence in East Timor should be seen as a problem. “In my
opinion, Eurico was a hero for integration. But the assessment is up to
the public.”
Najib said PAN was not worried of possible criticism for opening its doors
to Guterres. “PAN is an open party. We do not ban anyone from joining.
Anyone who wants to exercise his/her political rights in our party is
welcomed by us, as long as they have not been legally punished by the
courts. We obviously cannot restrict the rights of a citizen to be
politically active and become a member of a political party.”
When opening the PAN-NTT congress on February 10, party chairman Bachir
expressed hope it would take place smoothly without internal conflict. "We
must promote the feeling of peace in the organization. PAN-NTT has been
small. Don't let there be conflict again that could cause dissent among
us,” he said.
He emphasized that PAN is not a religion-based party, but is open to all
elements of society. “Party members are recruited not only from a certain
group [Islam] but from all religions and cultures.”
Bachir said PAN’s goal is not to seize power but to work in the interests
of the people. Therefore, the party’s leadership and management should be
closer to the people, especially rural communities, rather than focusing
solely on urban dwellers, he said.
NTT Governor Piet Tallo, in a speech read out at the congress by his
assistant Djidon de Haan, said PAN plays an important in making “positive
corrections” to the provincial government. "In the political situation in
NTT, PAN plays a very important role in guarding the implementation of
democratization," he said.
All That Swagger
Prior to the election in Kupang, Guterres had attended a PAN cadre
training program in Bogor, West Java, over January 27-29. At the end of
the program, he told reporters that Rais had personally invited him to
join the party that best represented Indonesia.
"Since the onset of reform, I have often been directly involved and
studied much with friends of Amien Rais since 1998," he said.
After his victory, he said the election had taken place “very
democratically” – possibly implying it was not influenced by death threats
or bribes. The election was witnessed by central executive board secretary
general Zulkifli Hasan.
Guterres said his main priority in his first six months as PAN-NTT
chairman would be to improve relations among the party’s officials
throughout the province. "So far the wheels of the organization have not
been turning because the management is not sufficiently harmonious. In the
future, I will try to fix this by making it my priority to hold regional
meetings for all local PAN branches in NTT. At the latest, by the middle
of this year, all of the local branches will have completed regional
conferences.”
Guterres expressed confidence that PAN-NTT would help the party to win a
greater number of seats in parliament in the 2009 general election. He
bragged that most of the more than 100,000 former East Timorese citizens
living across the border in West Timor would support him.
"I think that in the next general election, PAN will gain big success by
receiving a significant number of votes, especially from East Nusa
Tenggara,” he was quoted as saying by the Media Indonesia daily.
"Not because I am conceited, but at least 104,000 ex-Timor Leste citizens,
who remain loyal to the Indonesian people, will likely follow my tracks by
channeling their political aspirations through PAN,” he said.
Guterres and other former militia leaders in November 2005 formed an
organization to “protect the rights and privileges they feel the
government they fought for is now denying them”.
The organization is chaired by Guterres, who complained that Acehnese
rebels were granted amnesty and financial aid after the August 2005 peace
deal with GAM, whereas East Timor’s former pro-Jakarta fighters have been
largely abandoned since 1999. "They fought to keep Indonesia intact,
risking their lives, but the Indonesian government has ignored their
sacrifices," he was quoted as saying by The Jakarta Post daily.
He has announced plans to visit East Timor to promote friendly dialogue
with Indonesia, but the trip might not happen given that his old country
has indicted him for rights abuses.
Guterres was also in the headlines when he condemned the January 6 killing
by East Timorese Police of three ex-militiamen in East Timor. "On behalf
of thousands of former East Timorese refugees in Indonesia, we strongly
condemn this brutal and inhumane act by the East Timor border patrol," he
said.
He said the shootings were a violation of human rights and must therefore
be resolved under prevailing laws.
Indonesia seems to be under little international pressure to put Guterres
in jail. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer back in June 2001
said it was “essential for Indonesia’s credibility that it moves quickly
and decisively against Guterres”. He has since dropped such rhetoric.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[Although this article was written over 5 years ago, the information
contained is important-MNS]
The Tragedy Of Maluku
May 6, 2000
By George J. Aditjondro, Ph.D.
(Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Newcastle Australia)
The orgy of violence in Timor Lorosa'e (East Timor), last year, has
reminded the world of the plight of the Melanesian peoples who live west
of the 141st Meridian East. The standard belief is that a third of the
pre-invasion 600,000 East Timorese people have died during the Indonesian
occupation.
This is, unfortunately, only one part of the plight of the Western
Melanesian, or "Indo-Melanesian" peoples who have lived under the wings of
the Republic of Indonesia. Or, are still living under the Indonesian
colonial yoke, which consist of three other groups, namely (a) the West
Papuan people who inhabit the western half of the island of New Guinea,
which consists of abour 240 ethno-linguistic groups; (b). the Maluku
(Moluccan) people, who inhabit the more or less thousand islands of Maluku
(Moluccas), west of New Guinea, among whom there are distinctions between
North Maluku, South Maluku, and Southeast Maluku; and (c). the Eastern
Nusa Tenggara people, who inhabit the western part of the island of Timor
and the adjacent island groups of Flores, Sumba, and the smaller islands
off Flores, such as the traditional whaling island of Lembata.
Public knowledge of the plight of these Indo-Melanesian peoples is very
limited, in Indonesia as well as abroad, for the following reasons.
Firstly, according to standard anthropological knowledge, Melanesia (= the
islands, or archipelago of the black-skinned peoples) end at the western
tip of the island New Guinea. Secondly, the international community of
nation-states, as represented by the United Nations, has only supported
Timor Lorosa'e's claim to nationhood and had never accepted Indonesia's
annexation of the former Portuguese colony. On the other hand, the
annexation of West Papua by Indonesia in 1963 has been 'legalized' by the
UN General Assembly when on September 21, 1962, it recognized the results
of the so-called 'Act of Free Choice' in West Papua a month earlier.
The third reason is that the international community has religiously clung
to two myths about the Indonesian nation-state. Firstly, the myth that
Indonesia is the legitimate 'successor state' of the Dutch East Indies
colony, and secondly, the myth that the Indonesian people -- with the
exception of the Chinese ethnic minority -- is a homogenous nation, like
Japan, for instance.
The first myth is supported by many Indonesian citizens as well as all
nations which consists predominantly of people of European descent.
Rejecting this 'successor state' myth may force many nation-states in the
world to reject their own post-colonial boundaries, which may consequently
force them to recognize the pre-invasion boundaries of all the indigenous
political entities which have been brushed over by the European settlers
and their descendants.
The irony of this 'successor state' myth is that many post-colonial
nation-state in Asia and Latin America have broken down the existing
colonial boundaries. Spain's American colonies do not consist of a single
state with its capital somewhere in Bogota, but consists of dozens of
independent yet Spanish-speaking (not Mayan or Incan speaking, sic!)
nation-states.
Likewise in Asia, the former British colony of India now consists of
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and, lest we forget, Burma. Its British
counterpart in Southeast Asia consists of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei
Darussalam. In other words, the existence of the archipelagic republic of
Indonesia which stretches from Sabang on the northern tip of Sumatra to
Merauke near West Papua's border with Papua New Guinea, is certainly not a
God given, natural construct. It is a historical construct and most
probably, a historical mistake if its defenders are too stubborn to
transform it into a more democratic construct, where all the
ethno-linguistic groups and 'supra-tribal groups'(1) could live in harmony
with each other with none dominating others.
Speaking about 'supra-tribal groups' we are touching on the second myth,
namely that Indonesia is a homogenous nation(2), which is certainly
incorrect. One can even say that apart from being multi-ethnic, Indonesia
is also a multi-racial nation, if we classify the Melanesian peoples as
belonging to a different race than the Malays.
Apart from the recent migrations of Arabic, Indian, Chinese and Europeans
and whose ancestors have no geographical links with any place within the
Nusantara archipelago, the Indonesian peoples basically consist of three
'supra-tribal groups' who migrated to this archipelago hundreds or
thousands of years ago.
The first 'supra-tribal group' are the Melanesian peoples, to be followed
by Proto-Malay, and finally came Deutero-Malay peoples who linguistically,
belong to the Polynesian 'race'. The waves of Malay migrations have pushed
the Melanesian people more and more to Eastern Indonesia, from where they
eventually migrated to the South Pacific. In Eastern Indonesia itself,
inter-marriages of Malay migrants with the indigenous Melanesian peoples
have resulted in the Maluku, Flores and Timorese peoples who are lighter
skinned with more curly hair than the darker and more frizzy haired
Melanesians of New Guinea.
These intermarriages between Malay and Melanesian peoples in Eastern
Indonesia have also resulted in Melanesian peoples adopting many
Polynesian cultural traits, which have been transferred to the South
Pacific. Austronesian languages, is one example, and maritime knowledge --
from canoe building(3), astronomy, navigation, to fishery -- is another.
In fact, I believe that it was the adoption of many Polynesian skills that
enabled the Melanesian peoples to migrate and settle down in far away
archipelagos in the Pacific such as Tahiti.
Unfortunately, while the Melanesian peoples are the oldest, indigenous
peoples in Nusantara (4), they are also the most culturally, politically,
and economically the most oppressed peoples in this archipelago. This
brings me to the focus of my presentation, which is the tragedy of Maluku.
-------------------------------------
FIRST of all, let me focus on cultural oppression. There is a popular
belief among the people of Java and Sumatra, that favours a lighter skin
colour. Centuries of European domination, as well as the Indian Ramayana
and Mahabharata epics from India, which have been indigenized by the
Javanese, are probably the origin of this 'pro-light skin' favouritism, as
well as its opposite pair, namely disfavour of dark skins.
In addition to this antipathy to darker skin colour, the Javanese also
look down on peoples from the Outer Islands who live more closer to
nature, such as the Dayak people of Kalimantan. The term 'ndayak ' in the
popular Javanese language practically means 'barbarian'. So, combining
these two beliefs, one would certainly not expect much appreciation to the
highland or Asmat peoples of West Papua among the Javanese people. Popular
jokes are also abundant in Java, about the hair body of the Papuan people
(as well as of Caucasoids), or subtle or non-subtle references to apes,
which are also darker skinned and hairy.
Religious and historical facts also contribute to the low esteem of many
Javanese -- intellectuals included -- for the Melanesians of Maluku and
West Papua. Many Ambonese (5) from Maluku were recruited into the Dutch
colonial forces, and their role in assisting the Dutch to crush the
independence movement in Java and Sumatra had resulted in the negative
nickname, "Belanda hitam " or "Londo ireng ", which means, "Black
Dutchmen" to those colonial soldiers (6). As in many other stereotypes,
the Ambonese were not the only Indonesian ethnic group to join the Dutch
colonial army, or KNIL (7). However, prejudice of many elder Indonesians,
who had been traumatized by the raids of the indigenous KNIL soldiers
during the independence war from 1945 to 1949, seems to last long.
This prejudice against the Ambonese is the strongest among Muslim Javanese
and Sumatranese against Christian Ambonese, due to the stereotype that
they all joined the Dutch colonial army, KNIL. Like all stereotypes, this
is only a half-truth, since the first ethno-linguistic group to rebel and
raise arms against the Dutch colonial forces were the Ambonese, under the
leadership of Thomas Matulessy, also known by his title, Pattimura, and
Christina Martha Tiahohu, who were both Christians.
The prejudice of mainstream Indonesians from Java and Sumatra against the
Ambonese was reinforced by the fact that the first 'ethnic' rebellion
against the newborn Indonesian Republic also occurred in Ambon, with the
declaration of the South Moluccans Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan , or
RMS) on April 25, 1950, soon after the Dutch recognition of Indonesia's
sovereignty in December 1949. This declaration of Central Moluccan
independence was mainly triggered by two factors. First, uncertainties
about the demobilization of the former Moluccan soldiers of the colonial
army (KNIL), and secondly, the fear of South Maluku -- formerly a district
within the East Indonesia state of the short-lived federal structure, the
United Indonesian Republic (Republik Indonesia Serikat = RIS).
This second factor was predominantly strong among the Christian-dominated
Ambonese elite (civil servants, teachers, and church personnel), who
rightfully feared that the Ambonese would become a powerless minority
within a Java-centred and Muslim-dominated Indonesian state. However, to
avoid being seen as an elite group, the RMS initiators sought the support
of the village chiefs (raja), and obtained that support from Ibrahim
Ohorella, the Raja of Tulehu, a Muslim village which was also the main
source of sago on the island of Ambon. In fact, the entire preparations
for the declaration took place in Tulehu, to escape from both Indonesian
as well as the remaining Dutch security apparatus' eyes (for the history
of the RMS, see Chavel, 1990).
The flames of hatred of the 'Christian Ambonese traitors' is currently
being fanned by certain Muslim groups, who have popularised a conspiracy
theory that the religious riots in Maluku were initiated by the Moluccan
Protestant Church (GPM = Gereja Protestan Maluku), in colaboration with
RMS militants from the Netherlands (8) and Megawati Sukarnoputri's
Christian-Nationalist party, PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia -
Perjuangan) (9).
-------------------------------------
LET us now move on from cultural to economic oppression. While upholding
the political structure of Indonesia as a unitarian republic, the late
President Sukarno was much willing to accomodate the rebellious regions in
Indonesia, after those rebellions had been crushed (10). In the case of
Maluku, Sukarno decided to locate certain development projects of national
-- or even, international -- in the 'thousand islands' province, namely
the Wayame shipyard on Ambon, the Oceanography Research Institute at Poka,
Ambon, and the huge sugar mill at Makariki, on Seram. Also, during
Sukarno's presidency, several top Ambonese Christian intellectuals raised
to national prominence. Indonesia's first research nuclear reactor was
named after an Ambonese engineer, Siwabessy (11).
After Sukarno had been topled by Suharto in a military coup, which was
followed by a purge of between 500,000 to 2,000,000 suspected Communists
and members of the mass organizations of the Indonesian Communist Party,
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia ), the central government's attitude towards
Maluku changed radically. One by one, Sukarno's 'prestige projects' in
Maluku, as the New Order liked to frame them, were dismantled and
re-assembled on Java. The Wayame shipyard was moved to Surabaya, East
Java, and became the Navy-controlled shipyard, PT PAL. The Makariki sugar
mill was dismantled and re-installed at Jatiroto, also in East Java.
Finally, the status of the Oceanography Institute in Ambon was reduced to
become simply a station of the Jakarta-based National Oceanography
Institute (LON) under the Indonesian Academy of Sciences. Construction of
the institute's main laboratory in Ambon, which was previously a Soviet
grant project, was discontinued (Aditjondro, 1990).
Next, instead of trying to please the Moluccans, Suharto-linked
conglomerates began to feast on Maluku's abundant natural resources. The
Banda Sea, abundant with its tuna fish, was at one stage leased out for 25
years to a Japanese fishing cooperative, which after 8 years was
discontinued after numerous protests by local fisherfolks,
environmentalists, and nationalists, who disagreed with the extent to
which the Suharto regime seemed to please the Japanese creditors. This is
when the Moluccan intelligentsia began to feel deprived and marginalized,
becoming stepchildren of progress, and guests in their own house.
Nascent Moluccan nationalism, or to be more accurate, regionalist feeling
began to emerge, and Ambonese intellectuals began to join environmental
watchdog groups, after Suharto since 1978 began to push the environmental
line to woo young campus radicals away from campus-based and
Jakarta-oriented politics.
Unfortunately, what in Jakarta seemed to be well accepted, and was fully
endorsed by Suharto's Minister of Environment, Emil Salim, was in the
TNI-controlled province the opposite. Academics from the Pattimura
University of Ambon, who assisted local villagers to defend their land
rights vis-a-vis the powerful Djajanti Group, which was 10% owned by
Suharto's cousin, Sudwikatmono, were arrested by the local military
officers and accused of being RMS symphatizers (Fakta, July 15, 1988: 44,
December 1, 1988: 47).(12)
In addition to the economic exploitation by the Suharto-linked forestry,
fishery, cement and sago conglomerates, Maluku's wealth was also syphoned
to Jakarta through the corruption of three consecutive military governors
from Java (13) and the civil service.
However, corruption on provincial level was basically only the concern of
the educated elite in Ambon, especially university-based idealists. What
was more of concern to the local, grassroot Ambonese was the massive
influx of settlers from other provinces, namely from Java, South Sulawesi,
and Southeast Sulawesi. These much more entrepreneurial migrants began to
dominate the city life, from the markets to the public transport. In
addition, the numerous extractive industries that flourished in South and
North Maluku also imported their workforce from Java, Lombok, and South
Sulawesi. Consequently, with this massive influx of migrants, the
religious Balance between Muslims and Christians in Ambon began to tip in
favour of Muslims, a powder keg waiting to explode.
-------------------------------------
FROM the previous description of the cultural and economic oppression in
Maluku, one can easily understand that these could only happen under
strict military control by Jakarta. Apart from three consecutive governors
which were appointed by Jakarta from the army, the Pattimura army command
in Maluku was also under tutelage of the Brawijaya command of East Java.
After Suharto was forced to step down by the student movement in Java,
which were smartly manipulated by Ret. General Wiranto for his own
political agenda, there was also hope for political and economic reform in
Maluku. Following the steps of their comrades in Java, student activists
in Maluku also became more militant in opposing corruption as well as the
military's 'dual function' (dwifungsi) doctrine.
Unfortunately, General Wiranto who had been able to survive the transition
from Suharto to Habibie, certainly was not willing to relinquish the
military's power, especially with so many business links between military
foundations and the Suharto family businesses.
Habibie, whom some expected to be more sensitive to the aspirations of the
non-Javanese provinces, basically only catered for the aspirations of his
own cronies from South Sulawesi. And, since with Suharto's blessing he had
already built his power base among Muslim academics and bureaucrats who
had joined his state-sanctioned association, ICMI, Habibie began to fill
in as many governmental slots with his Muslim friends and followers.
This seems to be the spark that blew up the powder keg in Ambon, where the
Christian intelligentsia began to see themselves as custodians of the
grassroot, indigenous Ambonese and blamed their Muslim brothers for simply
following the national, Muslim lines.
This conflict can also be seen as a centre-periphery conflict. Or, a
conflict between the transformationists and the status quo defenders. The
transformationists saw the future of Maluku in a federal Indonesia, with
Jakarta devolving power to the states, without the involvement of the
military in all walks of life and a return of the control of Maluku's
resources to the traditional owners. On the other hand, those who defended
the status quo saw that the existing system was already benefitting them
and strongly defended the unitarian state and the role of the military in
defending such kind of state.
Unfortunately, the first camp was more represented among Christian
Moluccan intellectuals and the secular, more environmental and
indigenous-rights oriented NGOs, which began to flourish in Maluku during
the 15 year reign of Emil Salim as Minister of Environment. While the
second camp, which began more vocal during the 15-months Habibie
presidency, prefer to use Islamic symbols as their identification marks.
Eventually, when Habibie lost the chance to legitimize his Suharto-derived
position in the November 1999 presidential race, and the new president,
Abdurrahman Wahid began to indicate his willingness to curtail the power
of the military as well as the Suharto oligarchy, disgruntled factions
within the military with the financial support of the Suharto oligarchy
began to join forces, and calls for a holy war (jihad) between Muslims and
Christians in Maluku, as well as the formation of jihad task forces,
which were allowed to train openly with swords and in Arabic style dress,
became the norm of the day.
At the moment, Maluku is the battleground where forces defending the
entrenched military and economic interests in Indonesia are exploiting
every single local ethnic and religious issue to delegitimize the current
administration of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri (Aditjondro,
2000b).
In this kind of situation, it could be expected that those who have
repeatedly been accused of wanting to separate from the unitarian state of
Indonesia, feel themselves being pushed into that corner. Looking at the
current development in West Papua, where Tom Beanal, a former board member
of the Indonesian Environmental Forum, who had taken the mining giant,
Freeport McMoRan to court in the US, is now leading the umbrella group
fighting for independence, it would not be surprising if in the near
future, more young and old Ambonese are demanding independence from
Indonesia.
This has nothing to do with their religion, since many young and old
Achehnese, who have become disillusioned with the experience of 50 years
joining the Republic of Indonesia, are now loudly calling for a
UN-supervised referendum to fulfill their right to self-determination.
Nobody can deny the strong Islamic belief of the Achehnese people. Neither
can one deny the fact that many Riau intellectuals, who are now calling
for an independent state, are practicing Muslims and therefore are
disillusioned to see their natural resources enriching foreign
multinationals and the Jakarta elite, while most of Riau's villagers are
still living below the poverty line.
It is, on the contrary, the intolerance of the central government to
respect the federalistic aspirations in Maluku, and even more so it is the
intolerance of those who want to repress the deep feeling of
dissatisfaction in Maluku by threatening them with a holy war, that is
strengthening South Moluccan nationalism.
In other words, the Balkanization of Eastern Indonesia has already began,
and increased troop deployments in Maluku as well as the 'religious
apartheid' policy of Jakarta, is only a temporary solution, both for
Indonesia as a whole as well as for Maluku in particular. A temporary
solution, which is shamefully maintained by snipers, who keep shooting
innocent victims from both side, each time the Moluccan people got tired
of killing each other.
-------------------------------------
End Notes:
(1). I chose this term to replace the term 'race', which is an incorrect
way of distinguishing the different ethnic groups in Indonesia.
(2). I find this myth also embedded by press reports about Indonesian
politicians and generals, which state that "most Indonesians have only one
name", e.g. Suharto, Wiranto, etc. This statement mystifies the fact that
only Javanese of the older generation still use one name, and certainly
not all Indonesian ethno-linguistic groups which use their clan name as
family name. Even modern day Javanese -- including Suharto and Wiranto's
children and grand-children -- are now using family names.
(3). A honours thesis by a former staff person of mine, Abner Korwa, shows
how the canoe-building tradition of the Biak descendants on the Raja Ampat
Islands, is influenced by canoe building techniques from North Maluku.
Also, some maritime vocabulary among the coastal peoples of West Papua is
derived from Maluku and even Sulawesi.
(4). Nusantara, which is a Sanskrit-Indonesian word for archipelago, is
basically also what Indonesians call the archipelago where they live. It
is a more neutral term than Indonesia, which refers more specifically to
the political entity which is formally named the Unitarian State of the
Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia ).
(5). The term Ambonese is popularly used for inhabitants of the Central
Maluku islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, Nusa Laut, and the big island of
Ceram, which is believed to be the place of origins of all the Ambonese
people. Hence, Ceram (Seram) is also called 'Nusa Ina', the mother island.
(6). Similar ethnic prejudice based on conflicting roles during colonial
eras occur in Burma, with the Burman prejudice against the Christian
Karen, who fought with the British colonial troops against the Buddhist
Burman. Or in Vietnam, where Hmong hilltribes were used by the US
occupation forces to fight the lowland Vietnamese freedom fighters.
(7). Other Indonesian ethnic groups, such as the Javanese and the Batak
people from North Sumatra, were also well-represented in the KNIL. For
instance, Suharto, Indonesia's second president, was formerly a KNIL
sargeant, who moved to the Japanese-sponsored PETA paramilitary forces
during the independence war. Or, T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution, two
former commanders of the Indonesian army, who did not go through the
Japanese PETA period and directly moved into the Indonesian army (TNI).
(8). After the RMS rebellion on Ambon was crushed by TNI troops from Java,
many of the former Ambonese KNIL families were evacuated by the Dutch
government to the Netherlands, where a strong pro-RMS sentiment is still
strong among the Moluccan community of more than 40,000 people (Cohen,
1995). Meanwhile, the remaining RMS (ex-KNIL) troops fled to the interior
of Seram, from where they continued a protracted guerilla war against the
TNI forces until 1964, when the RMS President, Chris Soumokil, was caught
and sentenced to death in Jakarta. Many local villagers in the interior of
Seram have a traumatic memory of that 1950-1964 period, when the ongoing
protracted war betwen the TNI forces and the RMS guerillas deprived them
from their peaceful hunting-gathering-and-rotational gardening lifestyle
(see for instance, Wolff & Florey, 1996: 270).
(9). This line of argument, blaming an 'RMS-GPM-PDI Perjuangan conspiracy'
for the inter-religious riots which have gone on and off since mid January
1999, and has taken a death toll of more than 3,000 people (AFP, May 1,
2000), is pushed by a retired Moluccan police commander, Brigadier General
Rustam Kastor, whose book has been circulating in e-mail form through a
dozen Islamic mailing lists, and has also been published in hard copy in
Indonesia (see Kanstor, 2000). It is also popular among the Muslim groups
who oppose President Abdurrahman Wahid's more inclusive religious
politics.
(10). In addition to the RMS rebellion in Maluku, the young republic had
to deal with a series of rebellions on Java, South Sulawesi, South
Kalimantan and Acheh, to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state. This
is known as the DI-TII rebellion. Then, in the late 1950's, the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported a regional rebellion in North Sulawesi
and Sumatra, which was more aimed at a better deal for the regions in
sharing regional revenues with Jakarta. This is known as the PRRI-Permesta
rebellion.
(11). Sometimes, without bothering its strict economic potentials, Sukarno
did indeed attempt to distribute the 'development sweets' strategically to
the regions which had been involved in those rebellions. In South
Sulawesi, from where Sukarno recruited his Minister of Industry, M. Jusuf,
Sukarno built a sugar mill in Bone, a cement factory in Tonasa, a paper
mill in Gowa, and developed the harbour of Makassar, which was called
Sukarno-Hatta.
(12). This 'scapegoat' politics of labelling dissidents as members or
symphatizers of banned political parties or movements, has been a dominant
intimidation technique used by the security apparatus during the Suharto
era. In Java, the predominant scapegoat was the Communist Party (PKI).
Muslim dissidents, all over Indonesia, were often labelled as being
members of the Islamic rebellion, DI-TII. In West Papua, dissidents were
often labelled as members of the banned Papuan Independence Movement, OPM,
and in East Timor, one could easily be labelled as FRETILIN member
(Aditjondro, 2000a: 178).
(13). Generals Sumeru, Hasan Slamet, and ...... For corruption under
Sumeru, see Tempo , June 7, 1975: 22. For corruption under Hasan Slamet,
who was also accused of being a womanizer, see report of DPP Angkatan Muda
Pattimura to First Lady, Mrs. Tien Soeharto, on September 15, 1980 (copies
kept by the author).
-------------------------------------
Bibliography:
Aditjondro, George J. (1990). "Sudah cukup manusiawikah pembangunan
Indonesia Timur?" Surya , December 1.
____________ (2000a). "Ninjas, nanggalas, monuments and Mossad manuals:
the anthropology of Indonesian state terror in East Timor." In Jeffrey A.
Sluka (ed). Death squad: the anthropology of state terror. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 158-188.
____________ (2000b). "The political economy of violence in Maluku." Green
Left Weekly , March 15. Chauvel, Richard (1990). Nationalists, soldiers
and separatists: the Ambonese islands from colonialism to revolt
1880-1950. Leiden: KITLV Press.
Cohen, Margot (1995). "Long road home: Moluccan exiles trickle back after
40 years." Far Eastern Economic Review , March 30, pp. 22-23.
Kastor, Rustam (2000). Konspirasi politik RMS dan Kristen menghancurkan
umat Islam di Ambon, Maluku: mengungkap konflik berdarah antar umat
beragama dan suara hati warga Muslim yang teraniaya. Yogyakarta: Wihdah
Press.
Wolff, Xenia Y. & Margaret Florey (1996). "Foraging, agricultural, and
culinary practices among the Alune of West Seram, with implications for
the changing significance of cultivated plants as foodstuffs." In David
Mearns & Chris Haley (eds). Remaking Maluku: social transformation in
Eastern Indonesia. Special Monograph No. 1, Darwin: Centre for Southeast
Asian Studies, Northern Territory University.
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