[Kabar-Irian] Irian News - 4/17/06 (Part 2 of 3)
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Religion Report / Radio Australia
West Papua - the elephant in the room
12 April 2006
In Australia's confrontation with Indonesia over the Papuan asylum
seekers, there's a big elephant in the room. Last Sunday, all 42 attended
an Anglican church service in Melbourne - that's right, they're
Christians, and until recently West Papua was an overwhelmingly Christian
province. So what role are the churches playing in this matter? And will
they go to the barricades for the Papuans as they did for the East
Timorese?
Program Transcript
Julie Morgan and John Barr on West Papua
Susan Connolly on West Papua
Stephen Crittenden: Welcome everyone, to The Religion Report.
I've got a Norwegian friend who's been asking sarcastically this week what
the difference is between the asylum seekers on the Tampa, and the 42
Papuan asylum seekers who are at the centre of Australia's diplomatic row
with Indonesia at the moment. Norwegians are very interested in this
question, because a Norwegian ship captain was knighted for his efforts in
rescuing the people on board the Tampa.
Religion is the elephant in the room in this discussion. Last Sunday, all
42 of the Papuan asylum seekers went to church together at St Andrew's
Anglican church in the outer Melbourne suburb of Summerville. That's
right, they're all Christians. And Papua itself is a Christian province of
Indonesia, which is to say it's part of Indonesia, but not necessarily
part of the Indonesian Ummah - or at least it has been until the recent
rapid transmigration of a million Javanese Muslims into Papua.
Meanwhile the Indonesian government is very sensitive about the role
played by the Catholic church and Catholic NGOs in the liberation of East
Timor. And this week on the program, we're asking about the role that the
churches are playing in Papua.
The Catholic diocese of Jayapura in Papua is a Franciscan diocese. Until
recently its Secretariat for Justice and Peace was run by Theo van den
Broek, a Dutch, former Franciscan friar who now runs the Catholic
Institute for International Relations in East Timor. The Franciscan
brother who replaced him in Jayapura was out of contact range yesterday.
He's traveling outside Jayapura to investigate the causes of this week's
violent clash in which four people died.
Theo van den Broek says the church's role in Papua is different from its
role in East Timor which had been invaded by the Indonesian army. In
Papua, the church is not the proponent of the independence movement.
Rather its concern is about the escalating violence and abuse of human
rights.
Theo van den Broek: That is the main objective of the Catholic church in
West Papua. It is not backing up the independence movement. No. It is
talking about human rights abuses, and would like to have this thing into
the open and to be improved, and to get the dignity of people recognised
and guaranteed.
Stephen Crittenden: Do you see a repeat of what happened in East Timor,
the violence happening in West Papua however?
Theo van den Broek: That is one of the lessons that should be learned, and
also be taken very seriously by the international community - see -
getting the report out, which is a very well documented report, on what
happened in 25 years of Indonesian presence in East Timor. This presence
has been explained by all kinds of very concrete stories, well documented
stories, and it gives you a very sad picture of say 25 years of suffering.
Having that in hand and looking at the reports and documents about Papua,
there was a lot of say similarity in the way say the Indonesian army is
acting, the police are acting, and the government. So the first thing that
comes to my mind seeing this report on East Timor, say "My goodness, never
let it happen that we have to write the same report in another 20 years in
West Papua".
Stephen Crittenden: And we'll come back to that report in a moment, the
report on East Timor. That's Theo van den Broek, of the Catholic Institute
for International Relations in East Timor.
In Sydney this morning, a range of faith-based NGOs will meet to discuss
their response to the escalating violence in Papua. The meeting will be
convened by Julie Morgan, promoter of justice and peace for the Franciscan
friars of Australia. And one of the speakers with a lot of first-hand
experience in Papua will be John Barr, Executive Secretary of
International Mission for the Uniting Church. They both join me in the
studio. Good morning to both of you. Julie Morgan you first: what's the
purpose of this meeting?
Julie Morgan: Stephen, what we're hoping to achieve in gathering people
together is that the faith-based NGOs need to find out what's happening on
the ground in West Papua. Often we have little bits of information each.
In coming together we hope to share that information so that our
understanding of the deteriorating situation is deepened. We also hope to
be able to swap ideas and strategies about the kind of support that we can
offer to the churches in West Papua.
Stephen Crittenden: John, in introducing the program, I spoke about the
elephant in the room, that all 42 of these Papuan asylum seekers attended
an Anglican church service in Melbourne last week. They're all Christian.
Is there any doubt that there is a religious dimension to this story?
John Barr: Yes, West Papuans are very deeply religious and are very
strongly Christian. Christianity first arrived in the region in 1855, and
it was always seen as the point in which people began to think themselves
as Papuan people, as united people. Christianity had the impact of
bringing people together, and giving them a clear sense of identity.
Stephen Crittenden: You were suggesting to me before we came on air that
Christianity and nationalism for the Papuans are one and the same thing.
John Barr: Indeed it is. To be Papuan is to be Christian, and to be
Christian is to be Papuan, and many of the aspirations the Papuans have
are very much embedded in their understanding of Christian faith. I must
add that there is a small Muslim Papuan population in Papua as well, and
the issue is not so much Christian versus Muslim, it's really associated
with cultural identity. It's really about being Papuan as against being
Asian, and of course that happens to be Christian and Muslim.
Stephen Crittenden: Now what about the break-up, geographically and
proportionally, of the Christians in Papua?
John Barr: It's the early German, and then Dutch Protestants worked in the
northern area from Sorong down through Manokwari, through to Biak and
Jayapura. The Catholics have traditionally worked in the southern regions
around Marauko and up through Timika.
Stephen Crittenden: What's the break-up numerically?
John Barr: Yes I think numerically the Protestants are in the majority.
It's difficult to get figures, but somewhere around nearly 50% of the
population is considered to be Protestant, Catholic may be around 25% -
30%.
Stephen Crittenden: And maybe the rest made up by a lot of Javanese
Muslims who've been brought in in large numbers in the last decade I
suppose.
John Barr: Yes, and indeed they're numbers that are increasing, that's why
it's hard to get a figure. I would suggest that probably the Christian
numbers may be slightly inflated. There's certainly been huge migrations
of Muslims coming in to the area as transmigrants from Java. But also more
recently, informal migration, particularly from Sulawesi, the Bugginese
people.
Stephen Crittenden: Now Julie, there are a number of Catholic orders
present in West Papua, but the Franciscans are certainly one of them. And
as I understand it, Jayapura is a Franciscan diocese.
Julie Morgan: Yes, the Catholic diocese of Jayapura is a Franciscan
diocese, and has been for a number of years. It was Dutch missionaries who
went there in the 1800s. It's now predominantly Indonesian Franciscan
friars, and Indonesian Franciscan sisters who are living and working in
West Papua.
Stephen Crittenden: There's a lot of anxiety obviously on the part of the
Indonesian government, expressed not so long ago by the Indonesian Foreign
Minister, about the role, particularly of the Catholic church and Catholic
NGOs in their support for the independence movement in East Timor. Is the
Catholic church playing a similar role in West Papua?
Julie Morgan: The Catholic church as I understand it in West Papua, -and
certainly the efforts that we're supporting in Australia and that
Franciscans International is supporting internationally - is about how we
can support the efforts to promote and protect the human rights of the
Papuan people.
Stephen Crittenden: So we're talking human rights more generally?
Julie Morgan: We're talking human rights more generally, we're talking
about service provision, in education, in health, in HIV, in development.
As long as we can support the people in those sorts of efforts, then their
identity as Papuan people will grow.
Stephen Crittenden: John, is there any doubt that the existing autonomy
arrangements have broken down?
John Barr: Oh yes, they've failed, there's no question about that. I think
the critical issue in Papua at the moment is that people are not quite
sure where to go. Clearly the autonomy deal has failed because of the
presidential decree dividing the province up into well now one other
province, and also into a number of small extra regencies. So clearly
special autonomy has failed.
Stephen Crittenden: What is the Uniting Church's role that it's playing in
this conflict?
John Barr: We see our role as being in solidarity with our partner church,
which is the Evangelical Christian church in the land of Papua. We believe
that we have a role to be their voice, because it's very hard to speak
clearly from Papua. We are also working with the church to assist in
certain areas, including health, including work with HIV-AIDS, and in
education. These are areas which are seriously lacking in Papua, and we
are there standing with them.
Stephen Crittenden: Julie, is it true that the Franciscan diocese in
Jayapura is involved in investigating allegations of violence and indeed
genocide, on the ground itself?
Julie Morgan: The Office for Justice and Peace in Jayapura is involved in
human rights investigations. And what it's doing is, it's concentrating
its efforts on some of the more recent examples, even in the last couple
of months. It's trying to do its own investigation, but it's also hoping
to support the investigative research of other civil society NGOs, like
ELSHAMS http://www.geocities.com/elshamnewsservice/. It's important for us
to understand how Papuan people are being treated, how the rule of law is
being applied or not applied in Papua. It's important to build up the
documentary evidence about that so that we can bring pressure to bear on
Jakarta about these sorts of human rights abuses.
Stephen Crittenden: Where might investigations like this lead?
Julie Morgan: Some people particularly perhaps the Robert F. Kennedy
Memorial NGO in the United States, they're perhaps pressing already for
investigations into genocide. I think the tack that we would like to take
is that when you start using the word 'genocide', you close down
conversations, and it will become even harder to do the preliminary
investigations that need to be done.
Stephen Crittenden: Is it true, Julie, as I hear, that the Franciscans
internationally are lobbying at the United Nations in Geneva in the hope
of getting the United Nations to come to review its role in the handover
of power in '69, and I guess the suggestion has been made that that was
not a free choice, that in 1969 every rule of genuine self determination
was overturned in a way.
Julie Morgan: That's right, I think it was about 1,028 people who were
hand picked and asked to vote on that act of free choice. That whole thing
was manoeuvred, but because it was run under the auspice of the United
Nations, there is a veneer of respectability if you like. There's a veneer
of authenticity about that, which means that Indonesia can still claim
that it was a legal incorporation of Papua into the greater nation of
Indonesia, so it is true that Franciscans International, with the Office
for Justice and Peace in Jayapura, is trying to do high level advocacy in
Geneva not only with the Indonesian Ambassador to the UN, but also with
United States NGOs, with United States politicians, because United States
also had a hand in that handover from Holland to Indonesia.
Stephen Crittenden: John Barr, what about the talk that we've heard in the
last few days where the Federal government has suggested that maybe, well
the Prime Minister initially suggested, that maybe the government needs to
review the way it accepts refugees with an eye to Australia's national
strategic interests in the region. What are the churches likely to say if
anything like that was pushed any further?
John Barr: We would oppose any review of the process. I think that there
is a process, we have international obligations, and we ought not to allow
our foreign policy to dictate the terms on how we receive asylum seekers,
people who are fleeing persecution. That's a major issue for us. I must
also add that I think there's a lot of rhetoric going on here between
Jakarta and Canberra, and the Australian government has always been very
concerned about the relationship with Jakarta, both Labor and Liberal
governments. It's probably, you couldn't get two countries more different
in terms of culture and religion. It's pretty hard work, building that
relationship, so I'm always careful to read between the lines, in terms of
what's being said, both in Jakarta and in Canberra.
Stephen Crittenden: Thanks to both of you for being on the program.
Both: Thank you.
Stephen Crittenden: Julie Morgan, on behalf of the Franciscans, and John
Barr on behalf of the Uniting Church.
One of the most prominent Australian voices on East Timor in recent years
has been that of Josephite nun Susan Connelly, recently named on the
Indonesian government's list of Australian enemies it says are working for
Papuan independence, along with Bob Brown, Natasha Stott Despoja, Stuart
Rees, Greg Sword, Sydney University and the ACTU.
Susan Connelly says if you want to understand the real connection between
what happened in East Timor and what's happening in Papua, the place to
start is the chilling new report on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
commissioned by the East Timor Government.
Susan Connelly: It is a good place to start. It can obtained by anybody on
the face of the earth from www.ictj.org it's there, and at the end of it
the whole 2-1/2-thousand pages of it, there is a shorter executive
summary. I must say it reads very, very sad reading. But the connection,
apart from my sorrow for the Timorese, the connection between that and
what is happening in West Papua just stood up and shouted at me. I mean
there are reports out about what is happening in West Papua, the one from
Sydney University is excellent. Other ones are there. Why people say that
there's no evidence I do not know, there's pages and pages of evidence.
You put these two reports side by side - even to put the tables of
contents side by side - it's the same system, doing the same thing. In
many cases it's the same individuals. In the report on the Timor
situation, there are 55 pages, there's actually about 430 names of people,
Indonesian and Timorese, who have been accused of serious crimes, indicted
for those crimes, and are waltzing around on the face of this planet,
entirely free. Some of them actually were promoted in the Indonesian
military and some moved sideways. For instance, a man by the name of
Major-
General Mahidin Simbolon
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor1202bg.htm. He was
charged by UN Prosecutors with crimes against humanity, and he was sent to
West Papua as a military commander. I mean, it's bizarre.
Stephen Crittenden: And you say this is in fact a pattern?
Susan Connelly: It is. Timbul
Silaen http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/2194807.stm - he was
the police chief in East Timor in 1999, what was his next job? Police
Chief in West Papua, the following year. General Zaki Anwa
http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/1999/76/, he's named, Tono Suratman
http://www.unb.ca/bruns/9900/issue17/intnews/indonesia.html, there's pages
of these fellows, high level and also low level. But the Kendall report
makes it very clear that Indonesian military commanders ordered and
condoned the systematic killing and disappearance of thousands of East
Timorese. And they're totally implicated because the sheer numbers of the
fatalities, the fact that it was obvious it was a co-ordinated military
operation so often, you'd have to be a fool to say that if they're in West
Papua, they're not doing the same thing, being responsible for what the
West Papuans are now saying is going on.
Stephen Crittenden: You're saying that no-one can really get away with
saying 'We don't know what's happening in West Papua'.
Susan Connelly: Indeed we can't. And we in Australia certainly can't. It's
there, you've only got to turn your computer on, you can find out. And
look, truly Stephen, I could read you out a paragraph here, you probably
haven't got time, you could put either the words 'East Timor' or 'West
Papua' in where the noun goes, and the violations of human dignity would
remain the same. Torture, disappearance, detention, rape, starvation.
Stephen Crittenden: You say that this is an international community
responsibility, that there are people named in this report who ought to be
charged, but apparently are not going to be.
Susan Connelly: I believe that very strongly. I do not believe that the
responsibility for this should lie with East Timor. The East Timorese
people are doing a fabulous job, and their government I reckon is doing a
fabulous job. They've got enough to do feeding their people and getting
themselves up from the terrible destruction. It's not their place to carry
the can for us again. I mean they've done that a few times, saving our
soldiers, and sharing half their oil with us. Leave them alone. It's our
responsibility, it's the countries that were responsible for selling
military arms to Indonesia, knowing full well where they were being used.
I mean the Indonesians only use their arms against their own people
anyway. It's countries like us, Britain, the United States, all turning a
blind eye, all kow-towing and trying to rip Indonesia off basically, I
mean there's no love of the Indonesians, it's what they can get out of
them. It is an international problem.
Stephen Crittenden: And what should the international community do?
Susan Connelly: Well the recommendations in this report are there, and
they're very, very heavy recommendations indeed, and when the report is
actually launched, and moves are under way to get governments to try and
do something about this, it will be very important for Australia to do the
right thing, because this is bigger than East Timor, it's not only about
East Timor. Because if people get away with this type of thing, they will
only do it elsewhere, which is exactly what's happening in West Papua.
Stephen Crittenden: Do you expect that the churches will go to the
barricades at some stage in the future, over West Papua in the way that
the Catholic church in particular did over East Timor?
Susan Connelly: Well Stephen, I certainly hope we do. I never heard of
East Timor before 1992, I mean that's how cosseted I was. There's book by
an English priest by the name of Patrick Smythe, who deals with the
response of the church, the Catholic church particularly, in Australia,
Britain, Canada, all over the world, Indonesia and Timor to the Timorese
question, and it doesn't make pretty reading. Because he really points out
we were so slow, so slow, to put our words with our actions. We're real
good at saying things from the Gospel, oh yes, whatever you do to the
least of my brothers, you do to me. But as for standing up when they're
accused of being Communists, which is what they were, that was an entirely
different thing. I certainly hope we're not as slow as we were. Let's put
our money where our mouth is, let's put our religion where out mouth is.
Stephen Crittenden: Thank you very much for being on the program yet again.
Susan Connelly: Thank you, Stephen.
Stephen Crittenden: The Co-Redemptrix of East Timor, Susan Connelly.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The following interview with Brigham Golden (Columbia University / Council
on Foreign Relations Task Force on Papua) was published in The Van Zorge
Report on Indonesia (Vol. VIII No. 3—February 21, 2006), as part of its
three-part special series on Papua “Still at the Crossroads”.
VZR: As we enter 2006, do you feel improvements are occurring in Papua or
is the situation getting worse politically and in humanitarian terms? What
is causing the situation to unfold in this manner?
BG: It’s sad really. Ethnic Papuans are struggling in so many ways in
Indonesia, and things never seem to improve for them. Most indexes of a
healthy society—education, economy, public health, violent conflict—have
remained unchanged or trended downwards over the past few years.
Politically, there is more chaos, divisiveness and governmental
ineffectuality than at any time I can recall.
While there are many factors driving the recent deterioration of
conditions in Papua, by far the most profound and troubling is the manner
in which the executive branch of the central government squanders
opportunities to improve them. For example, had the Megawati
administration shown a real commitment to Special Autonomy, a policy
well-conceived by compromise-minded Papuan leaders and passed largely
intact by the DPR in 2000, there may have been a chance to systemically
address the alienation and inequity that drive social and political
conflict in Papua. Instead however, her administration elected to
aggressively pursue a controversial division of the Province that
simultaneously threw the implementation of Special Autonomy into chaos,
spurred horizontal conflict in Papua and ruined any possible atmosphere of
trust among Papuans. If their goal was to end conflict in Papua by
bringing ethnic Papuans into the national fold this was a shockingly bad
decision. Of course I’m not sure it was their goal at all.
Why the central government pursues policies that aggravate conditions in
Papua while ignoring or undermining those that would improve them is
really the million-dollar question with respect to Papua—and the key to
projecting the direction in which the region is headed in the future. It
is my strong belief that the answer is rooted in powerful interests that
benefit from the status quo in Papua, which is to say, from a milieu of
conflict, high security and centralized control over economic
opportunities. Needless to say, these interests are primarily
Jakarta-based, and are located in the business and security sectors—both
of which have huge investments in Papua that would suffer dramatically
should political control, economic opportunity and security be ceded to
ethnic Papuans.
There is no factor that will more greatly determine whether conditions in
Papua improve or deteriorate in the coming years than the willingness and
ability of a Presidential Administration to oppose these entrenched
interests. Unfortunately, my sense of the current political milieu in
Indonesia is that there is little for an Indonesian President to gain in
doing so—even if it means successfully resolving the problems of Papua.
Unlike Aceh, where the peace accord was a popular success for President
Yudhoyono, Papua is simply not worth the effort. The Indonesian public
just doesn’t care about Papuans in the same way, and the formidable powers
interested in maintaining the status quo can easily mobilize Nationalist
rhetoric to cast any concessions to ethnic Papuans as defeats to
“secessionists” bent on dissolving the unitary state. In the end, being
tough on ethnic Papuans and continuing the conflict there as a winnable
war against “separatists” offers more political capital to an
Administration in Jakarta than does resolving conflict by providing for
the needs of its citizens there.
Ultimately, and I am very sad to say it, I believe that this political
reality is rooted in a racist discrimination that pervades Indonesian
society. Ethnic Papuans, Indonesia’s Black Indians so to speak, are far
and away the Republic’s most destitute and marginal people, and yet there
is disturbingly little concern for their plight among the general
population. In this sense, Papuan suspicions that they are not welcome
members of Indonesia’s “national family” (keluarga negara) are shared by
most Indonesians as well. This cycle of discrimination and alienation is
the true root of Papua’s problems in Indonesia—and yet it remains almost
completely unacknowledged.
I once heard Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono remark that the problems of
Papua were infinitely more difficult to solve than those of Aceh because
“diskriminasi” in Indonesian society keeps Papuans from believing that
they could ever become Indonesians. This was the only time I have ever
heard a senior government official acknowledge the racism that ethnic
Papuans suffer from in Indonesia. What strikes me most in retrospect is
how such an admission can disappear into the ether. Until this truth is
recognized in Indonesia I’m afraid there’s little hope for Papuans there.
VZR: What do you think it would take on the part of the central government
to interest people in Papua to drop their separatist claims and to move
forward together as a part of Indonesia?
BG: The central government needs to focus on two separate tracks in order
to truly convince ethnic Papuans that there is a place for them in the
Indonesian national project. The first, which I’ve discussed a bit
already, is Special Autonomy. Providing Papuans with a local government
they feel they can be a part of is absolutely critical—not only by getting
Papuans involved in the system, but also by allowing them to use the
system to address the deep-seeded social ills which plague their
communities. Even if there are failures in addressing these ills, at least
Papuans will finally be able to try to help themselves.
The second track that the central government must pursue is symbolic—which
by no means suggests that it is any less important to achieving a
resolution in Papua. Indeed, only by addressing this symbolic level will
the central government finally be able to address the deeper dreams of
liberation (merdeka) that are so evocative for Papuans and which form the
philosophical backbone of the independence movement.
Papuans discuss the manner by which this symbolic level should be
addressed as a “National Dialogue” (Dialog Nasional). In effect, Jakarta
must be willing to enter into a high-profile and comprehensive discussion
with Papuan leaders. There is simply no other way to achieve resolution
for most Papuans. The question is how to do this in a manner that is sure
to be productive.
To be successful this dialogue must be viewed by Papuans as being driven
by good-will and respect on the part of Jakarta. Papuans must be allowed
to select their own representatives and the location of the event. The
agenda need not be so complicated however. Primarily this would be a forum
for Papuan representatives to voice their grievances and speak openly of
their history of hardship. Indonesian leaders—ideally the President—need
only listen and respond with a sincere apology. Such an official apology,
properly delivered by the President of Indonesia, would be a profound
gesture in the eyes of Papuans.
There must, of course, be some tangible concessions by the central
government as a part of the National Dialogue for Papuans to accept
reconciliation within Indonesia. However, in my opinion there only need be
two. The first would be full implementation of Special Autonomy—both in
the spirit and the letter of the law. The second would be the dramatic
reduction of military forces in the region. No other gesture by the
central government could more greatly signify good will to Papuans than
this.
Regarding the crucial issue of participants, the logical representative of
the Papuan people in the National Dialogue would be the Majelis Rakyat
Papua (MRP). However, to ensure that the MRP has the broad-based
legitimacy necessary for the National Dialogue, I would urge the central
government to encourage the MRP to convene a Third Papuan Congress to
elect its membership. By allowing Papuans to build upon the momentum of
the Second Papuan Congress of 2000—a profound event attended by
representatives of every tribe, church and community organization in
Papua—the energy of the Papuan independence movement would be channeled
instead into an established governing body that is within the Indonesian
system and can truly represent the Papuan people in a National Dialogue.
Without an open selection process like this among Papuans, Jakarta will,
for all practical purposes, have no one with whom to undertake a true and
meaningful dialogue.
Finally, Jakarta must also understand that the National Dialogue would be
most successful if there were representatives from the United States, the
Netherlands and the United Nations in attendance as well—since most
Papuans believe that these institutions were also involved with the
historical injustices under which they have suffered. Though Indonesia has
repeatedly asserted its unwillingness to “internationalize” Papua’s
problems, these institutions would in fact only need to witness the
Dialogue and to respond with a formal apology.
Properly implemented, Special Autonomy and a National Dialogue are the
only policies through which the central government can convince Papuans
that they have a place in an Indonesian democracy. Whether the political
will exists in Jakarta to undertake these policies—and to do it
properly—is another matter entirely. What is clear to me however, is that
the window in which a real resolution of Papua’s problems could be
achieved will not stay open forever. Yudhoyono has said that he intends to
focus on Papua this year. If he fails to do so it is likely that we will
see instead a significant deterioration of conditions in Papua—most likely
in the form of spontaneous and endemic sectarian conflict between ethnic
Papuans and ethnic Malay Indonesians. If that scenario comes to pass, any
hope of resolving Papua’s problems within the Indonesian context will
almost certainly be lost.
VZR: Do you feel the Papuan people as well as their leaders understand
politically the changing situation vis-à-vis special autonomy and the
potential redrawing of provinces?
BG: First of all, no one understands this situation or how it is changing.
Special Autonomy and the division of the province are pretty much in chaos
at the judicial, legislative and administrative level. Both are happening
in some form, but the disparity between what they were designed to be, and
what they actually are, is simply ridiculous. While it’s true that some of
these problems, such as the unchecked autonomy of kabupaten-level
administrations, are pandemic throughout Indonesia, in Papua the failures
of decentralization are far more dramatic. More importantly though—and
this is what makes the region so uniquely troubled—in Papua these failures
of governance exacerbate a unique and tense environment in which a large
portion of the population is so dangerously alienated from the system that
they perceive its failures as proof of its malice towards them. In some
cases, I should add, they are probably correct in that perception.
All this is to say that Papuans and their leaders are confused and
distressed. Worse still, this confusion and distress has given rise to a
multitude of competing interests, all trying to gain advantage and shape
the form that these policies are taking. The result is truly chaotic and
has provoked conflict of all forms, including large scale inter-tribal and
inter-ethnic violence. What is truly disturbing is that some of these
conflicts appear to have been strategically engineered by parties in
Jakarta to serve their policy interests—particularly with respect to the
division of the province.
VZR: What are some of the major social issues facing Papua in 2006?
BG: Ethnic Papuans lag dramatically behind the inhabitants of every other
region in Indonesia in virtually every index of social well-being:
education, public health, personal income… There are just so many acute
social issues facing Papuans it’s hard to prioritize. My own personal
obsession is with education. If there is one thing that I think could
positively transform Papua it is education, at all levels—from pre-school
to advanced degrees. There has been some progressive talk in Papua about
plowing large amounts of the funds now available to the government through
Special Autonomy into public education—and honestly there is nothing on
which the monies could be better spent.
There is, however, one social issue that isn’t getting much attention but
could prove devastating in Papua without immediate intervention. This is
HIV/AIDS. Dr. Leslie Butts, from the University of Victoria is the leading
researcher on the subject, and has recently returned from a fact finding
mission in Papua. Her conservative estimate is that between 5% and 10% of
the population in Papua is currently HIV-positive. This is a shocking
finding, and would place infection rate in Papua at thirty to sixty times
the national average. Without intervention by the government and
international organizations immediately, the possibility of a humanitarian
tragedy on a scale never before seen in Eastern Indonesia is very real. My
own focus of late has been the development of community-based HIV/AIDS
Network through the Papua Resource Center. Initiatives like this are
desperately needed and I urge anyone interested in the subject to get
active immediately.
VZR: What can Freeport-McMoran and other international companies working
in Papua do to create a less contentious environment while working there?
Is there the political will do that?
BG: Companies working on the resource frontier, and Papua is a resource
frontier in all those classic ways—lawlessness, fast wealth, cabals, rogue
elements, rapacity—do not have it easy. One has certain expectations of
how a modern international corporation should behave (transparency,
vertical hierarchies, division of labor), but in Papua it is difficult to
avoid becoming a part of the chaos of the resource frontier. The way it
happens most acutely is through the intersections that develop between
wealth and violence. These intersections, what I call the economies of
conflict, are to some extent unavoidable. Nevertheless, companies
operating on the resource frontier must do everything they can to
undermine them.
In the case of Freeport, for example, the company has an overwhelming fear
of violent conflict that will either threaten production or be perceived
by investors as a threat to production. This fear ultimately drives
Freeport to pay every institution that holds the capacity to inflict
violence or incite conflict—usually parties in the community and the
security forces. Unfortunately, in this way Freeport effectively
encourages these parties to maintain the threat of imminent violence. It’s
really quite a perverse situation.
The basic methods that Freeport—or any company in Papua for that
matter—can reverse this trend and foster peace are not so hard to
identify. It’s the will to do pursue them that is the problem. It requires
being courageous at times, refusing to pay threatening elements. It also
involves aggressively building the institutions of a lawful and healthy
society: local police, local governance, health care, education and an
equitable local economy. This kind of social engineering is expensive and
difficult, but if companies on the resource frontier want a safe place to
operate, they have little choice but to build their local environment from
the ground up.
-- Brigham Golden is an Anthropologist at Columbia University with over
twelve years of research experience in Papua. He is also actively involved
in the region through the Council on Foreign Relations, where he sits on
the Papua Task Force; the Carter Center, for which he serves as an
election monitor; and the Papua Resource Center, a network of individuals
and institutions working to strengthen education, health and culture in
the region. Currently, he is writing a book about the history of the
region surrounding Freeport’s mining operations and working with the Papua
Resource Center to establish a major initiative to address the HIV/AIDS
crisis in Papua.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Sydney Morning Herald
April 12, 2006
Opinion
Muffled Cry of Freedom Falls on Deaf Ears
-- The tighter the gag on Papua's people, the more desperate they are to
be heard, writes John Martinkus.
I Was last in Papua early in 2003, reporting on the rise of Islamic
militia groups aligned with the Indonesian Army on the PNG-Papua border,
the intimidation and attacks on human rights workers by the Indonesian
military and the outrage of Papuan leaders at the insincerity of the
government in Jakarta in honouring the 2001 autonomy law.
In the intervening three years these issues have remained the main
concerns for Papuans. The only difference now is that the Indonesian
authorities have got better at keeping the information out of the Western
media and the people of Papua are more desperate to be heard.
The Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club confirmed in February that in the
previous 18 months not one foreign correspondent had received permission
to travel to Papua. As for visiting journalists, I had direct experience
of the new restrictions in May 2003 when I received my temporary press
card in Jakarta. Stamped across the front of the card was: "Not for visits
to Aceh, Papua or Maluku." That was then introduced as the standard for
visiting journalists. In an odd twist, the man who authorised my
restricted accreditation back then, M. Wahid Supriyadi, is now
consul-general for Indonesia in Melbourne and penned an opinion piece
published by both The Age and the Herald Sun this week in which he stated
that we were in an age of global communications, when not a single
untoward death in Papua could possibly go unnoticed in the world's media.
An interesting comment from a man who had the job of keeping foreign
journalists out of Papua for the past three years.
But journalists are only one of many groups and organisations being kept
out of Papua. The ban has extended to academics, church groups,
non-government organisations, human rights monitors and even an
ambassadorial-level European Union delegation last year. Human rights
organisations in Papua have come under very real and direct threat from
the Indonesian military and are very restricted in what information they
can gather and what they dare report publicly. One of the most chilling
interviews I had in Papua on my last visit was with Johannes Bonay, the
director of Papua's only functioning human rights organisation, ELSHAM. He
told me how his wife and daughter were seriously wounded on December 28,
2002, when unidentified gunmen ambushed the car in which they were
travelling between the border posts of Papua and PNG.
The police investigation identified Indonesian military as being present
when the shooting occurred. If we analyse the reports made by the people
and the investigation made by the police we can divine that Kopassus was
behind this, Bonay told me at the time. Back then he was receiving
none-too-subtle threats with recordings of someone being tortured being
repeatedly left on his answering machine. He has since left Papua.
It is in this information-poor environment that Papuan protests against
the division of Papua and rejection of the 2001 autonomy law have taken
place largely unnoticed by the press in Australia. Last year, on August
12, 10,000 people marched for 20 kilometres into the capital, Jayapura, to
protest against what they called the total failure of the autonomy law.
This law had as its centrepiece the formation of a Papuan People's
Assembly as a representative body for Papuan leaders.
Concerned that the proposed assembly would become a vehicle for
independence support, the former president, Megawati Soekarnoputri,
ordered a restructuring of the administration of Papua into three
provinces, basically rendering the autonomy law unworkable. The current
President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has endorsed this with last month's
elections for the new province of West Irian Jaya going ahead, to the
dismay of Papuan leaders.
Canberra and Jakarta can talk all they like about implementing autonomy,
but the people of Papua have firmly rejected it. Whether that rejection is
reported or not, that is what is driving events on the ground, not, as our
Prime Minister implies, the encouragement of supporters of independence in
Australia.
Maybe Canberra doesn't know what is happening. As a US State Department
official told me in Papua in 2002, Australian embassy officials in Jakarta
showed no interest in events there, and they didn't want to be caught out
by knowing too much, as they had been in East Timor.
-- John Martinkus is the author of Quarterly Essay 7, Paradise Betrayed:
West Papua's Struggle for Independence. He also wrote Indonesia's Secret
War in Aceh (Random House, 2004) and A Dirty Little War: An Eyewitness
Account of East Timor's Descent into Hell 1997-2000 (Random House, 2001).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Canberra Times
Tuesday, April 11, 2006
Commentary
Indonesian military rules West Papua, not Jakarta
By Bruce Haigh
For as long as the Indonesian army administers West Papua, abuses will
occur toward the indigenous Papuan population. The raison d'etre of the
military is to hold the archipelago together - an archipelago inherited by
the Javanese from the Dutch after a guerilla war. The Indonesian Republic
came into being on December 27, 1949. West New Guinea as it was known
remained with the Dutch. Indonesia pressed the Dutch to hand over West New
Guinea, including the threat of force.
The hand-over from Dutch to Indonesian administration occurred in 1963. It
was the same year as Indonesia's President Sukarno launched a program of
confrontation (Konfrontasi) against the new Malaysian Federation.
Australian troops were deployed in support of Malaysia, and as a result
found themselves in action against Indonesian troops in Borneo. That was
42 years ago. In 1969, a UN supervised Act of Free Choice was held to
determine if the Papuans wanted independence or incorporation into the
Indonesian Republic. The Indonesians hand- picked Papuan delegates who
agreed to incorporation. The basic tension in the relationship between
Australia and Indonesia over the past 42 years has been the Indonesian
army and its role in the region, particularly with respect to maintaining
control of the archipelago.
After the collapse of the Suharto regime in late 1997, the military was
forced to accept a reduction in power and influence. Elections were held
which on the face of it further reduced the power of the military. But in
fact the reduction in power was only in terms of the ease of direct and
immediate access to civilian politicians in Jakarta. The role and prestige
of the military in holding the archipelago together remained unchallenged.
Then came East Timor. The elected civilians in Jakarta undermined the
military – indeed humiliated the military through the terms negotiated
over the exit of East Timor from the republic. However, it was easier for
the military to blame Australia for its interventionist role than to get
stuck into Indonesian politicians who had decided to quit East Timor. The
military has not given up its blueprint to regain East Timor, and nor its
desire to hang on to West Papua despite the limited nature of the claims
of the Indonesians over the territory.
The Indonesian army administers the archipelago with an iron fist. It does
not tolerate dissent and has an economic imperative for maintaining tight
control. If John Howard wants to bring about change in West Papua he must
address himself to the Indonesian army, not the Indonesian Government.
The politics of Indonesia are that the civilian politicians of Jakarta
can't change or influence a thing in West Papua. It is a
military-controlled province. The government of Indonesia exercises little
power or authority outside Jakarta. Whatever authority or power it enjoys
in the provinces is at the discretion and interpretation of the army.
The protest coming out of Jakarta at the moment from Indonesian
politicians and commentators is directed as much at the military as it is
at Australia. They have to appear tough in order to try and influence the
army to take them seriously while at the same time seeking to pass a
message to the army to soften the brutal administration of West Papua in
order to avoid international scrutiny that might force another, and this
time properly conducted, Act of Free Choice.
The Government in Jakarta has little leverage over the army. For some time
the army has been applying pressure on the Government to increase their
power to the level they enjoyed under Suharto. Whether they achieve this
by undermining elected representation to the point of rendering it
ineffectual or by engineering the collapse of the electoral process does
not overly concern them. The aim of the army is to directly control the
affairs of Indonesia and to have control over policy.
If John Howard and Alexander Downer want to reduce tension in West Papua
they must address themselves to the army. For it is the army that runs and
controls West Papua.
Its indigenous population do not believe they are part of Indonesia.
They believe they were tricked by the Act of Free Choice into giving up
their sovereignty. Every day of brutal and oppressive administration by
the Indonesian army only reinforces that belief. The continued suffering
of the West Papuans increases the prospect of civil war and refugees.
If Howard and Downer are to develop a relationship with Indonesia that has
a measure of strength and durability, they should learn from the mistakes
of Whitlam, Hawke, Keating and Evans. They must talk directly. They must
highlight, address and discuss the problems as they see them with the
government and the army. They must not talk out of both sides of the
mouth. The must not sweep the problem of West Papua under the carpet where
it will only fester. They must not bend to the old Jakarta appeasement
lobby in Australia.
-- Bruce Haigh is a retired Australian diplomat who served in north and
south Asia and the Middle East. He was also director of the Indonesia
section of DFAT. He has written a book on Indonesian/Australian relations,
The Great Australia Blight, and another on regional defence, Pillars of
Fear. He is also a former soldier and now farms near Mudgee, NSW.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
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