[Kabar-indonesia] Indo News - 10/4/05

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- Indonesians angry but defiant after Bali bombings
- Terror Fears Grip Asia After Bali Attack
- British-educated militant 'was behind Bali blasts'
- Bali – Commentary
- Blood in Bali
- Freedom Guard to protect minority groups from terror
- Questioning the regulation on houses of worship
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Indonesians angry but defiant after Bali bombings
Tue 4 Oct 2005 6:42 AM ET
By Tomi Soetjipto
Jakarta, Oct 4 (Reuters)

>From movie stars to Muslim clerics, Indonesians are angry about the deadly
bombings that have shattered the resort island of Bali for a second time.

But behind the fury on Tuesday there was hope -- and a steely
determination -- that last weekend's suicide bombs would not harm tourism
in the world's fourth-most-populous country as much as the Bali attacks of
2002.

Indeed, there has been no huge exodus of foreign tourists from Bali or
other parts of the sprawling Indonesian archipelago since Saturday's
blasts at three restaurants, which killed 22 people and wounded around 90
others.

Tourism Minister Jero Wacik said authorities were determined to win back
confidence after this second strike on an island, whose stunning beaches,
luxury resorts, rice terraces and Hindu temples had long made it a
favourite holiday destination.

"I think the effect will not be the same as on October 12, 2002, when the
first bombs in Bali exploded, because we handled that very seriously and
the president has now come down firmly," the minister said.

Dozens of militants have been arrested, tried and sentenced since the
first blasts, which killed 202 mostly foreign tourists.

On the island itself there was outrage.

"I tried to mop tears flowing from my eyes because I was enraged," said
Bagus Negantara, 25, a coffee shop worker near one of the blast sites who
witnessed Saturday's carnage.

Television actress Ayu Diah Pasha, a Balinese who now lives in Jakarta,
recalled the panic and confusion as she tried to contact relatives on the
island after the blasts. "Everyone is upset, not just the victims'
families or Balinese," she said.

She was echoed by Masduki Baidlowi, a preacher from Indonesia's largest
Muslim group, Nahdlatul Ulama, who said the bombings could have a wider
impact on the the country's economy.

"I feel upset ... not just for Balinese, but for us, all Indonesians.
Indonesia will surely recover, but it will take some time," said Baidlowi.

Analysts say Saturday's blasts and several other recent bombings show
anti-Western militants in the world's most-populous Muslim nation are
still capable of inflicting huge damage.

Limited Impact
But Peter Semone, vice president of the Pacific Asia Travel Association,
said that following a string of bombings around the world in recent years,
tourists had become more resilient.

"Is it going to affect Bali tourism? It will be naive to say it will not,"
he said. "(But) I think we live in a new (situation)."

Indeed, so far there appears to have been a limited impact on hotel
occupancy in Bali and the country's capital, Jakarta.

"There was cancellation on Sunday. But the impact was not too significant.
So far things are running normally," said Ranie Massie, director of
marketing at the five-star Grand Hyatt in Jakarta.

Other hotels in the capital also reported no drop-off.

Hundreds of Australian tourists have left Bali since Saturday on special
flights, and Canberra has warned travellers of possible further attacks on
Bali and urged tourists to stay away from popular nightclubs.

Still, tourists continued to lounge on Bali's beaches.

On the Jimbaran coast, where two of the three blasts occurred, many said
they planned to finish their holidays.

"We feel safe. People outside may have a different view but we are here
and we feel safe," said Frenchman Jean Pierre Friocourt as he enjoyed a
seafood barbecue on the sand.

His companion, Valerie Colongo, felt the same: "It can happen anywhere. If
we are always scared, we may as well close our doors and never travel.
That's what the terrorists want," she said.

With its towering mountains in West Papua and myriad temples on Java
island, Indonesia is a regional tourism hub. The industry is a key source
of foreign exchange in a country still struggling to recover fully from
Asia's economic crisis of the late 1990s.

Tourism has been performing well in recent years, having recovered from
its nadir in 2003, a year after the first bomb attacks in Bali. Those
attacks caused foreign visitor numbers to plunge to 3.3 million people,
the lowest level since 1995.

Last year, arrivals climbed to a record 5.1 million, bringing in around
$4.7 billion in spending.

Bali takes the lion's share of that trade. About 40 percent of Indonesia's
visitors arrive on the island where 80 percent of residents make a living
directly or indirectly off tourism.
-- (additional reporting by Achmad Sukarsono in Bali, Asikin Nurachmad and
Ade Rina in Jakarta )
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Terror Fears Grip Asia After Bali Attack
-- New Terror Fears Grip Asia in Wake of Bali Bombings, Sparking Security
Scares at Embassies
By En-Lai Yeoh, Associated Press Writer
October 4, 2005

Bali, Indonesia Oct 4, 2005 — New terror fears gripped Asia on Tuesday,
sparking security scares at embassies and travel alerts, but Indonesia
shrugged off calls to outlaw the militant group suspected in the deadly
suicide bombings on Bali island.

Investigators were piecing together evidence pellets, batteries, cables
and detonators from the scenes of the blasts and renewed calls for anyone
who recognized grisly photographs of three suicide bombers to step
forward.

Two men were being held for questioning, but they have not been named as
suspects, said Bali police chief Maj. Gen. I Made Mangku Pastika, adding
that 39 witnesses were also being debriefed.

Southeast Asian nations have gone on high alert to prevent a repeat of the
Saturday night attacks on three crowded restaurants that killed 22 people,
putting hundreds of thousands of troops on standby, tightening security on
beaches and at resorts, and stepping up border security.

Adding to tensions, a Muslim cleric jailed for conspiracy in the 2002
bombings that killed 202 people on the same resort island said Tuesday the
latest attacks were a warning from God.

Suspicious packages threatening retaliation for injustices against Muslims
were sent to six Asian and European embassies in Malaysia including
Canada, Germany, and Thailand forcing evacuations and the closure of the
Japanese mission.

The parcels were later dismissed as a hoax, as was a tip-off that the U.S.
Embassy had also been targeted, said Abdul Aziz Bulat, Kuala Lumpur's
police head of criminal investigations.

No one has claimed responsibility for the coordinated attacks that also
wounded more than 100 people. But suspicion immediately fell on the
al-Qaida-linked terror group Jemaah Islamiyah which allegedly orchestrated
the 2002 Bali bombings.

Australia, which lost 88 citizens in the earlier attacks, warned Tuesday
of further possible strikes on the island and again urged Jakarta to ban
Jemaah Islamiyah.

But Indonesia shrugged off the call.

"It is an underground movement. We can only ban an established
organization," said presidential spokesman Andi Malarangeng, adding that
the government would continue to fight terrorism "under whatever name."

>From his prison cell, Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Bashir the group's alleged
spiritual leader said in a statement that last weekend's blasts were a
sign of God's displeasure with the Indonesian government.

"I suggest the government bring themselves closer to God by implementing
his rules and laws because these happenings are warnings from God for all
of us," said Bashir, who has campaigned for the implementation of Islamic
Shariah law in Indonesia.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Independent (UK)
British-educated militant 'was behind Bali blasts'
By Kathy Marks in Denpasar, Bali
Published: 05 October 2005

The suicide bombers who brought terror to Bali for the second time in
three years were probably recruited by a British-educated Islamic
militant, according to one of the ringleaders of the 2002 nightclub
attacks.

Ali Imron, who is serving a life sentence at a prison in Jakarta, the
Indonesian capital, told a local newspaper that last weekend's explosions
bore the hallmarks of Azahari bin Husin, a Malaysian bomb-maker and senior
figure in Jemaah Islamiyah, the regional extremist group.

The bombs, made of TNT and packed with ball bearings, destroyed two
open-air seafood cafés on Jimbaran Beach and a restaurant in central Kuta,
the island's main tourist area.

The death toll remains unclear, since many bodies were dismembered. Bali's
principal hospital, Sanglah, is listing 29 dead, but police say the figure
is 22, including the three bombers and several foreigners.

More than 100 people were wounded, including 23 who were airlifted to the
Royal Darwin Hospital in Australia. Doctors described their injuries as
"consistent with war", and said enough shrapnel had been removed from
their bodies to fill three large shopping bags.

Indonesian police have questioned 39 people, including two men regarded as
possible suspects, but they have not yet detained or arrested. "So far
they are just witnesses," said Soenarko Artanto, a senior spokesman.

Mr Soenarko said Azahari, who received a doctorate from Reading University
after studying in Australia, and another Malaysian fugitive, Noordin
Mohamed Top, were prime suspects in the inquiry. "After the recent
incidents our hunt for them has been stepped up," he said.

Ali Imron, whose two older brothers, Amrozi and Mukhlas, are on death row,
told the Indo Pos that the perpetrators were "those same people" as last
time. Asked whom he meant, he replied: "Who else if not the group of Dr
Azahari?"

He said the modus operandi was characteristic of the Malaysian, as were
the nine-volt batteries found at the sites. "The use of nine-volt
batteries is a trademark of Azahari," he said. "It could be Azahari's new
recruits. All this time Azahari has never stopped recruiting new people to
execute bombings, so those three who died could be his men."

The batteries were among bomb fragments recovered by police. They have
also found pellets, cables and detonators, as well as scraps of clothing,
a sandal and a wallet believed to belong to the bombers. Investigators say
the bombs may have been triggered by mobile phones.

Imron said Azahari might have travelled to Bali to supervise the
operation. "So far, Azahari always observes," he said. He did not
recognise photographs of the three bombers, whose severed heads were found
at the scene of the blasts.

In an unexpected intervention, Abu Bakr Bashir, the elderly Indonesian
cleric imprisoned for his role in the 2002 attacks, condemned the
bombings. "I very much disagree with any bombings, regardless of the
reasons, in non-conflict areas, which are aimed at sacrificing the
innocent," said Bashir, who is regarded by some as the spiritual leader of
Jemaah Islamiyah.

The organisation, experts say, has been hit by a series of arrests in
recent years, but may have formed alliances with other organisations or
individuals.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Wall Street Journal
Bali
Commentary
By Sadanand Dhume
October 4, 2005; Page A26

No sooner had word of Saturday's terrorist bombings on the island of Bali
spread than officials began speculating on the identity of those behind
them. The suspects are Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top, Malaysians
linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, al Qaeda's best known Southeast Asian
franchise. Over the coming weeks, the search for the fugitives -- also
accused of masterminding suicide-bombings of Jakarta's Marriott hotel in
2003 and the Australian embassy last year -- will gather momentum. If
Indonesia's response to previous attacks is any indication, we can expect
a rash of arrests, perhaps even the apprehension of Husin and Top
themselves.

Yet it's important not to allow the excitement of a made-for-TV manhunt to
obscure deeper issues facing the world's largest Islamic society. The
Indonesian government and foreign experts alike tend to measure success in
this war on terror in terms of arrests and convictions. But Indonesia's
terrorism problem is rooted in culture, not law and order. It will persist
so long as the country continues to churn out young men moved to violence
by the sight of a beer bottle, a church steeple or a woman's bare head.

On the face of it, you couldn't find less promising ground for militant
Islam. Preceded by a millennium of Hinduism and Buddhism, Islam washed up
in the archipelago in the 12th century and took root only in the 14th. The
advent of colonialism in the 1500s meant that the faith did not enjoy the
long political supremacy in Indonesia that it did in the rest of the
Muslim world. Distance from the Arab heartland gave Indonesian Islam an
easygoing eclecticism absent in the desert faith of Saudis: Allah kept
company with Dewi, goddess of the rice paddy, Nyai Loro Kidul, queen of
the South Seas, and Nini Tawek, angel of the kitchen. Nor did the new
faith erase memories of an older past. Indonesians continued to take pride
in the civilization that built Borobudur, the world's largest Buddhist
monument, and in Majapahit, a Javanese Hindu empire whose influence
stretched to present-day Cambodia.

Over the past three decades, Indonesia's fabled heterodoxy has faded. Gen.
Suharto, who ruled for 32 years after taking power in 1966 amidst an
anti-communist bloodbath, enforced uniform religious education. His rule
also saw a turn to faith by millions left rudderless by a rapidly
modernizing economy. Saudi and Gulf petrodollars financed mosques and
preachers demanding a "purer" reading of Islam. The explosion of the
Internet and desktop publishing imported the discourse of Riyadh and
Tehran to the cities and towns of Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi.

Before long, the onion dome began to replace the traditional Javanese
sloping roof on mosques. Headscarves and Koranic study groups mushroomed
on college campuses. In offices, the Arab greeting, assalam aleikum, vied
with the religiously neutral selamat pagi, or good morning. In
kindergartens, traditional Javanese names started to give way to Arabic.
Suharto's downfall in 1998 only made matters worse. A volunteer army
called Laskar Jihad shipped hundreds of machete-wielding young men to wage
a holy war against Christians in the eastern province of Maluku. Another
group, the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) made a habit of trashing Jakarta
bars and discos. Radical clerics such as Abu Bakar Baasyir, the spiritual
head of Jemaah Islamiyah, felt safe to return home from exile.

Today, political Islam in Indonesia is stronger than ever. The speaker of
Parliament belongs to the Justice and Prosperity Party, a cadre-based
group with ideological roots in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. College
students gather in campus mosques to study the writings of the Egyptian
Islamist Sayyid Qutb or enroll in Hizbut Tahrir, a group banned in many
countries for its call to reunite Muslims under a Caliphate. True, only a
tiny percentage of Indonesian Muslims espouse violence, but that has been
enough to make the seven years since Suharto among the bloodiest in the
country's history. Terrorist attacks make world headlines, but much more
goes on under the international radar. The legacy of the civil war in
Maluku has segregated the island of Ambon on religious lines. Much the
same is true of Central Sulawesi. Across Java, Christians complain of
church burnings and intimidation.

Many had hoped that last year's election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as
president with 60% of the vote would restore Indonesia's reputation as the
Muslim world's beacon of tolerance. Mr. Yudhoyono, an articulate
U.S.-trained former general, has a doctorate in agricultural economics and
a taste for treacly ballads. His Democratic Party preaches a non-sectarian
message. As former president Megawati Sukarnoputri's security minister, he
was responsible for rounding up those behind the 2002 Bali bombings. Yet
he has been unwilling to confront radical Islam. In recent months, he has
stood by as Muslim mobs have shuttered churches, torched mosques belonging
to the beleaguered Ahmadiyah sect, and threatened to evict a liberal
Islamic radio station from its Jakarta offices.

Given this curious lack of leadership, it's easy to imagine the president
as powerless in the face of radical challenge. In fact, the opposite is
true. Despite Islamist gains, the vast majority of Indonesians remain
moderate, content to live with beer in the supermarkets, miniskirts in the
malls and the strains of raucous local pop music on street corners. The
military, the best organized force in society apart from the Islamists, is
largely secular, as are important segments of the media. Business elites,
largely Buddhist and Christian ethnic Chinese, have the most to lose
should their country continue its lurch toward the sectarian madness of
such places as Pakistan and Nigeria.

Mr. Yudhoyono ought to seize this opportunity to display statesmanship: He
must acknowledge that this is a war of ideas. It must be fought, inch by
inch, in school classrooms and college cafés, on the editorial pages of
newspapers and in television studios, on the factory floor and the street
corner. His message must be: No more tolerance of intolerance. If he can
lead from the front and articulate a vision of a self-confident Indonesia
at peace with an ancient past and a modern future, the country might
reclaim the place it once held as an Asian tiger -- mentioned in the same
breath as Korea and Thailand. If, instead, he acts as though throwing a
few dozen people in jail will derail militant Islam, then Indonesia will
only slip further toward the chaos and bloodshed that has become all too
familiar in other parts of the Muslim world.

Mr. Dhume, a former Indonesia correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic
Review and The Asian Wall Street Journal, is writing a book on the rise of
radical Islam in Indonesia.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
FrontPageMagazine.com
Blood in Bali
By Dr. Walid Phares
October 3, 2005

At 8 o'clock Saturday night, horror struck once again in Bali. As of this
writing, at least 26 people were killed 101 injured -- including
Indonesians, Americans, Australians, Koreans, and Japanese -- by the bombs
detonated in three restaurants across the tourism capital of the area. The
financial losses are yet to be accurately determined. The terrorist
attacks that shook the island -- a mostly Hindu enclave within Indonesia,
the world's most populous Muslim country -- were bloody and
psychologically devastating, but their most important dimension was
strategic: these attacks showed terrorist recidivism. Indeed, it surprised
no one when al-Qaeda's Asian affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah targeted Jakarta
in 2002, but that the group would strike again in the heart of the same
city almost exactly three years later is certainly full of meaning. That
would be the equivalent of New Yorkers witnessing two hijacked planes
slamming into the Big Apple's skyscrapers sometime next September. The
psychological devastation, even with fewer casualties, would be ballistic.
That is the feeling among Bali’s population today: disbelief.

Why would the jihadists shed more blood, with suicide bombers, in the very
same location of their most publicized attack, even though in terms of
total casualties the attack proved less successful? "The terrorists are
still looking for soft targets," Indonesian President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono said at a press conference after touring the devastated areas on
the island. The top Indonesian anti-terrorism official, Maj. Gen. Ansyaad
Mbai, said the two suspected masterminds of the bombings are Malaysians,
accused to be part of the Jemaah Islamiyah terror group. The Indonesian
authorities also accuse them of "orchestrating the 2002 Bali nightclub
bombings, as well as two other attacks in the Indonesian capital in 2003
and 2004." The first Bali bombings, which also targeted nightclubs crowded
with tourists on a Saturday night, killed 202 people, most of them
foreigners. Jakarta’s sources cited the names of the two alleged
masterminds: Azahari bin Husin and Noordin Mohamed Top.

Over the past two years, Western and Indonesian intelligence agencies have
warned that Jemaah Islamiya was planning for more attacks. Already by the
time of the 2002 attacks, Jemaah Islamiyah has been linked to at least two
other bombings in Indonesia, both in Jakarta: One outside the Australian
Embassy in 2004 and the other at the J.W. Marriott hotel in 2003. The
latter killed at least 23. But media reports insist that the jihadists'
mentor, Abu Bakr Bashir (who has been jailed for plotting the 2002
attacks), denied any connection to the weekend explosions.

Why did Jemaah Islamiyah strike Bali proper for the second time? Why not
find soft targets elsewhere? Who gave the order, and what is the
involvement of al-Qaeda in this repeat attack? The Indonesian authorities
didn’t address the most strategic dimension of these questions. To be told
that Jemaah has been active since 2002 is already known. What’s new in
these revelations? Of course Jemaah has been waging its jihadist
operations since its inception. Never mind the incarceration of its
spiritual leader Bashir, the very logic of jihadism is to move beyond the
jailed leader and strike again. A diligent reading of the web chats and
releases, let alone an intelligent analysis of al Jazeera’s panels,
suffice to reach a rational conclusion: Jemaah Islamiyah never called off
its war against secularism, modernism, democracy, pluralism, and moderate
Islam in Indonesia, let alone the weak infidels of Bali and the greater
infidels of Australia and the West. That is the matrix; the rest are
details.

In short, Indonesians and their allies must calculate their counter
terrorism strategies based on the reality of an ongoing War on Terror, not
a sporadic conflict with Jemaah, one actor in that war. The terror blasts
cited between 2002 and last week end’s renewed horror on the tortured
island were not isolated incidents taking place from time to time over
three years, but a series of systematic attacks conducted by an
organization determined to wage jihad at its discretion, on its own
timetable, and against the targets of its choosing. This new carnage
should remind both Jakarta’s authorities and their allies around the world
that this is a global war.

On this level, official and media reports referred to "warnings" about
possible renewal of Jemaah Islamiyah's suicide attacks somewhere in
Indonesia. Such reports, if not specific, are stunning in their semantics:
the terrorists have never retreated nor granted their enemy quarter.
Jemaah has never stopped planning and gathering resources for operations.
Indonesia’s authorities should be psychologically mobilized non-stop
against Jemaah and its sisters around the islands. So should the rest of
the world. These are lessons to all other democracies and countries trying
to become ones. The jihad wars against free societies have been declared
and are waged on a daily basis. Those countries that haven’t been hit will
eventually be hit and those who have been targeted already will continue
to be targeted. Even expect the sites that have been reached by violence
to be visited again: Not only Baghdad and Basra, but also New York and
London. The Jihadi terrorists are not different from the previous foes the
free world had to face such as Nazis, Fascists, and Bolsheviks: For as
long as they’ve marked a city or a country with "dar al Harb" or placed
its population under the lethal status of "Kuffar" (infidels).

My colleague, Professor Zachary Abuza, author of Militant Islam and South
East Asia: Crucible of Terror, is a leading expert on Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI). He says its its connection to al-Qaeda has advanced significant
analysis on a tactical shift. Writing on the Counter Terrorism Blog last
Saturday, he stated, "JI was formerly close to Al Qaeda, though that
relationship has been in doubt owing to concerted counter-terror
operations that have led to the arrests of much of the respective
organization’s leadership." Moreover, he notes a technical, tactical
shift: an "apparent shift back to smaller bombs." Abuza asks:

“Does this indicate the inability to procure the materials and indicate
limited human and material resources to put together large bombs? Does it
signify that the link to Al Qaeda, which passed over $130,000 to JI for
operations no longer exist? The fact is we really don’t know the extent of
the current relationship.”

Indeed, as other area experts and terror analysts concur, the modus
operandi regarding the type of bombs, and their transporters has changed.
The Jihadists, as I analyze in my forthcoming book, Future Jihad (November
2005), are currently in a state of mutation, as is the case with most
organizations. Field experience and transformations are crucial in the
shaping of new tactics and means of delivery. Just as it is less likely
that a second Mohammad Atta team would proceed with the exact same plans
to pulverize two NYC landmarks, it is less likely for JI to use the exact
same material to blow up the same type of target in the same city. Most
likely some of the components have to change, at least from a tactical
angle. But these are only tactical analysis: what is the big picture? Here
are some main themes:

1. Jemaah Islamiyah has engaged in strategic jihad in Indonesia and in
neighboring nations with a global objective: to undermine current
governments and replace them with Islamist regimes, so that a regional
super-Emirate would be declared, from Mindanao to southern Thailand. The
group is not a national liberation movement, nor another Asian drug
empire. It is an ideological, transnational movement aimed at raising an
empire to rule 250 million people (from various nations), to exploit vast
oil reserves, and eventually to join a world Caliphate. Thus, JI is not a
seasonal gathering that engages in explosions here and there, with an
irrational plan. It is a network that recruits, deploys, gathers
resources, strikes, absorbs Western reaction (including the arrests of its
leaders and mentor), and reorganizes. This also explains why mere legal
and police action are so ineffective: pinpricks only take out one layer of
the organization, which the whole quickly learns it can live without.
Military action alone takes out enough layers to keep the terrorists on
the defensive.

2. JI specifically targets the stability of the largest Muslim nation on
earth with the goal of establishing a Taliban-like power, possessing full
control of Indonesia’s vast oil production and reserves. To do so, the
jihadists' aim at what I call "triggering valves." Bali is one of them.
Samuel Huntington called such areas in his book The Clash of Civilizations
(1996) "fault lines." The jihadists have discovered the importance of
these "fault lines" where different religious civilizations meet (and
sometimes collide) and turned them into "valves." In simple words, the
reason why Jemaah Islamiyah hit Bali for the second time is not only
because it was a soft target, but because also it is a culturally and
symbolically a "triggering spot." Bali is mostly Hindu (with Buddhist and
other influences), and therefore is considered "infidel." Bali is also the
center of materialistic pleasures, definitely projected as "infidel." Last
but not least, Bali is an international center of tourism, with the high
likelihood of attracting Western, Asian, and other foreigners, all
"Kuffars," even if Muslim moderates live or work there. Combine these
three dimensions, and you’d have an emple "trigger." Until it shuts down
or empties, the jihadists will most likely target it again and again.
Obviously, they won’t use the same tactics or weapons, but the strategic
objective is the same.

3. In addition to this "triggering valve," Bali has another function for
the JI: by crumbling its economy, they expect a domino effect in different
directions. Indonesia economy would lose significant income. Secondly,
Bali’s catastrophe would send messages to other parts of the country not
to build similar dens of "infidel debauchery." Three it would signal JI's
power to cause a large nation's decline and encourage other groups to join
its ranks. And beyond Bali, a double strike against the city would bring
attention to the island, allowing the organization’s allies in other parts
of the country to go on the offensive.

4. Indonesia is already struggling with an increasing number of separatist
movements in the form of the Malukus and Sulawesi, as well as in Aceh and
Papua. Since non-Muslim East Timor violently gained its independence from
Indonesia back in 1999, other Muslim and Christian island nations have
sought (and are seeking) domestic sovereignty. A crucial question is the
real position of Jemaah Islamiyah and the jihadists regarding these
movements. Case by case, the Islamists would certainly oppose the
separation of non-Muslim groups, as they did with East Timor, but would
base their position on Muslim areas on the jihadi nature of the Muslim
secessionists, that is, whether those leaving the union were radical
Islamists or moderate Muslims. Striking in Bali, in the nervous center of
international entertainment, Jemaah would drag world attention in one
direction, while other sinister action is probably being prepared in
areas. I have little doubt that the jihadists are not encouraged by
U.S.-led humanitarian efforts to help the victims of the Tsunami in Aceh.
One dimension of Bali’s second attack is to divert attention from the
positive image the "infidels" (especially the Great Satan) got in this
effort.

5. Finally, one has always to ask about Jemaah Islamiyah’s relations to
al-Qaeda. Experts and analysts have different opinions of the state of
these relations, but there is little doubt that relations between these
murderous terrorist entities still exist. Not only do Islamist chat rooms
and web postings constantly indicate that the southern Asian "brothers"
are part of the Caliphate-to-come, and in close contact with al-Qaeda
headquarters, but analytical readings of the global moves by the jihadists
indicate that a distribution of role has been in the making for few years
now. The jihadists have surpassed the Soviet methods of deception and are
now able to impact, if not to influence Western and allied analysis.

Saturday's attack was a surprising step forward in the jihadists' agenda:
they have terrorized a moderate Muslim nation in an area with a high
concentration of so-called infidels. If the West does not stay on the
offensive against terrorists militarily, America may suffer a similar
fate.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Jakarta Post.com
National News
October 01, 2005
Freedom Guard to protect minority groups from terror
Tiarma Siboro, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Indonesia's founding fathers declared that this country would embrace
various cultures, ethnic groups, religions and beliefs, however such
idealism is fast disappearing and freedom to enjoy this diversity has
become endangered, with minority groups often suffering from violence and
terror.

The government security forces, however, are often indifferent to attacks
on minorities -- ostensibly because the officers fear inflaming the
situation further.

In a move made so that all Indonesians can enjoy the same rights and
privileges as full citizens of the nation, a group committed to
non-violence declared the establishment of the Garda Kemerdekaan (Freedom
Guard) here on Friday.

"We set up the organization with the main objective of rebuffing all
violence, protecting people from any type of brutality and standing
alongside any groups being abused or terrorized simply because of their
differences," said guard leader and journalist Ahmad Taufik.

He said the guard's establishment was partly done to demonstrate the
public concern over the increased number of attacks by Muslim extremists
on minority groups and Islamic scholars -- largely because the extremists
have decided that such people were heretical or deviant.

Muslim hard-liners recently vandalized and terrorized Ahmadiyah, an
Islamic sect that recognizes another prophet after Muhammad. Mainstream
Muslims worldwide believe Muhammad was the final prophet.

The frequent attacks have forced Ahmadiyah members to flee their homes and
villages. However, very little if any, action has been taken by the police
or other law enforcement personnel against the attackers, which included
militants from the Islam Defenders Front (FPI).

A series of threats and intimidation tactics have also been directed at
the Liberal Islam Network (JIl), which promotes liberalism and pluralism
among Muslims and is open to dialog with followers of other faiths.

Frequent intimidation and evictions of Christians from their houses of
worship by Muslim extremists, have also been a regular occurrence in
recent months -- particularly in western Java.

"Garda Kemerdekaan members will act as reinforcements to protect places
that have been targeted by hard-line groups," Taufik told The Jakarta
Post.

To prevent it from being branded just another militia group, he said no
Freedom Guard members would be equipped with any type of weapon while
carrying out their peaceful mission.

Also joining the new group are individuals representing various religious
organizations, including Nahdlatul Ulama -- the country's largest Muslim
organization, the Bishops Council of Indonesia (KWI), the Indonesian
Communion of Churches (PGI) and the Hindu Community.

Activists and supporters of Ahmadiyah and JIL as well as members of many
ethnic groups, such as Chinese-Indonesians and Madurese, were among those
attending Friday's declaration.

Prodemocracy activists from several non-governmental organizations and
journalists grouped in the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) also
took part in the establishment of Garda Kemerdekaan.

Nong Darul Mahmada, a JIL activist who was among those who witnessed the
declaration, called on all people to strive for their own freedom, while
expressing their thoughts and beliefs.

"Each of us is different from one another and it is our own right to have
freedom of expression in this diverse nation. None of us is allowed to
abuse others," Nong asserted.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Jakarta Post.com
Opinion
October 01, 2005
Questioning the regulation on houses of worship
Hairus Salim, Jakarta

A number of houses of worship in West Java were reported to have been
forcibly closed several weeks ago by a group of hard-liners. This incident
promptly triggered protests by those whose religious freedoms had been
infringed. They blamed the government for allowing -- and thus apparently
justifying -- the pressure against and eventual shutdown of their
temporary churches.

The group of people who enforced the shutdowns argued that the houses of
worship had been built and were being used without following the proper
licensing procedures. They referred to the Joint Decree of the Minister of
Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs (SKB) No.1/1969,
regulating the building of houses of worship. To get a church, temple or
mosque built one requires government licenses, the consent of locals and
the requisite congregation base.

Hard-line Muslim groups acting to shut down temporary Christian churches;
it is an act we have seen a lot of recently.

Residents' demands for Christians to end their praying is usually "gently"
expressed, but occasionally it is accompanied by violence like acts of
vandalism and arson. The starting point of tension over places of worship
is again the regulation SKB No.1/1969. One side strongly demands that the
rule is consistently applied and used as a reference. The other argues
that it is their constitutional right to worship, and there are growing
demands, especially from non-Muslims, to revoke the law.

So far, the government has been seemingly ambivalent about this issue.
While apparently striving to enforce the regulation, it also has
acknowledged the seeds of anger and frustration its enforcement is sowing
among the members of minority religions affected by the rule. For a
critical analysis of the decree, it is important to review the history
leading to its creation.

With the collapse of the New Order, a series of sectarian incidents took
place in Indonesia. Strained relations began with the circulation of
religious pamphlets and books full of missionary zeal; and physical
clashes, including attacks on and the destruction of churches and mosques
were widespread.

However, in the early period of the New Order, particularly from 1967 to
the early 1970s, religious frictions in the country were just as frequent.

Five religions were officially recognized at the beginning of the New
Order. This in part was a reaction to the role of the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI) in the previous order, which explicitly ignored religion. As a
consequence of this recognition, religious propagation and study were
intensified, affecting interfaith ties.

A contest between religions for new followers was inevitable. Targets of
such recruitment were nominal believers and non-Javanese ethnic groups.
Problems arose if those targeted were seen as already "professing" a
religion.

This happened at the same time as religion was becoming more global than
it ever had before; the internationalization of faiths and missionary
movements.

All major religions in Indonesia are indeed of foreign origins. However,
during the period of parliamentary democracy, and especially during the
period of guided democracy, religious propagation with foreign assistance
was considerably restricted. Starting 1966, in line with the
re-incorporation of Indonesia into the world, there was an influx of aid
for the development of all faiths.

Following the ban on communism, the process of religious propagation got
even more intense. Embracing a religion was often as much motivated by
"political security", so that one would not be branded as a communist and
killed, as it was about real faith. This was reflected by a rapid
expansion in the building of houses of worship. These new buildings were
often erected in places where the new creed was a minority and had never
been seen before, which often sparked envy or anger among other groups.

Several violent incidents involving different regions were connected with
this development; which of course worried our leaders. The government was
then in dire need of stability to ensure its development programs would
work -- and this meant interfaith stability and harmony. For the
prevention of further sectarian conflict, the government finally created
some rules, including the one on houses of worship.

This background is important when one reexamines the relevance of the
decree. From this historical scrutiny, it is obvious that the regulation
was made first of all to prevent conflicts that had begun to heat up
between the faiths because of allegations of religious conversions and
church building. The regulation was, in fact, a provisional move meant to
calm the tensions between the groups over the short term.

The situation was an emergency in political and religious terms and it is
interesting to note that the rule remains valid and has never been
revoked, making it one of the standards with which we now appraise
interfaith relations.

Unsurprisingly, then, the rule's continued interpretation has meant that
religious groups have been attacked because their churches are considered
to be unlicensed. While in the short term the regulation might have
prevented conflicts, over the longer period it is actually helping to
provoke the clashes it was originally designed to stifle.

Naturally, the regulation's provisions are not applied in all areas in
Indonesia. In certain regions, many communities are not bothered at all
about the building of mosques, churches or temples of different faiths.
But it is clear that after such a long time, this decree -- along with
many other rules governing religions here -- has constructed the ways
believers of different faiths communicate with each other. It has become
the main source of reference instead of ideas like mutual respect and
tolerance.

What the history shows is that it is indeed necessary to review or even
annul this regulation. The political situation that emphasized public and
private security at the time of its creation has significantly changed.
The basic reason, of course, is that the decree goes against notions of
human rights, which protect religious freedoms. In practice, forcing
compliance with the rule is often only directed at the minority in a
region and is more or less ignored by the majority.

Perhaps we no longer need this kind of regulation. The rules about
building of houses of worship could be made identical to those governing
general construction -- licenses and requirements for building height,
safety, the environment and so forth. If any development of a house of
worship is considered a "nuisance", it should be dealt with according to
the existing laws.
-- The writer is from the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKiS).