[Kabar-indonesia] 2: Tempo Cover Story: Who's Accountable? [+Opinion; Interview]

[JoyoNews at aol.com]

3 Tempo Magazine Cover Story Reports (2 of 2): 

- Who's Accountable? 

- Opinion: The Sidoarjo Crisis 

- Interview/Sidoarjo Regent, Win Hendrarso: 
  We await the governmen t's political decision 

Tempo Magazine
No. 51/VI
August 22-28, 2006 

Cover Story 

Who's Accountable? 

It remains unclear who should take responsibility for the Sidoarjo disaster
--and may not be effectively resolved through the criminal justice system. 

THE outpour of hot mud in the Sidoarjo subdistrict of Porong, East Java, has 
now been going on for 12 weeks. Just who should take responsibility for 
mudflow from concession land owned by Lapindo Brantas Inc. is still unclear however, 
even though police have already named six suspects in the case-two 
individuals from Lapindo and four contract employees from the Medici Citra Nusa drill 
site. There is not even any indication when the police investigation will be 
completed. 

At the same time the overflow of hot mud is getting increasingly out of hand. 
The volume of mud that was initially only 5,000 cubic meters a day has now 
increased tenfold. The extent of the area inundated by the mud is also getting 
wider and the number of victims continues to grow. Lapindo, which together with 
the government has been trying to stop the overflow, is already pursuing the 
third of three planned scenarios. 

If successful, the mud will be stopped by next November. If it fails, on the 
other hand, it will be unclear when the disaster will end. So far all of the 
related issues have been dealt with by Lapindo, including the cost of trying to 
stop the outpour and paying living allowances to displaced people who now 
total more than 2,000. Up until last week, Lapindo had spent at least US$31 
million (almost Rp280 billion) in dealing with the problem. 

Is it true that Lapindo should be the one to take responsibility since the 
site of the outflow is located on a concession area of a subsidiary company 
owned by the Bakrie business group? According to the former technical director of 
the Directorate General for Oil & Natural Gas, Ramses Hutapea, under the 2001 
Law on Oil & Gas (Migas Law), it is the Upstream Oil & Gas Regulatory Agency 
(BP Migas) that should bear the responsibility. 

Ramses, who often represents the government in joint contract negotiations 
between BP Migas and the private sector, says that it is this agency that 
supervised and agreed to all of the exploration programs. "So the government 
represented by BP Migas should still be responsible for the damages," he said. BP 
Migas spokesperson Amir Hamzah however rejects Ramses' statement. 

Amir does concede that based on the provisions in the Migas Law, his agency 
had the supervisory role and approved all of the exploration activities. 
However there is a clause in the contract between Lapindo and BP Migas stating that 
operational problems and impacts that are caused as a result of the 
exploration activities are entirely the responsibility of the contractor-that is 
Lapindo. 

This was confirmed by lawyer Wirawan Adnan who was able to get a look at the 
agreement between Lapindo and the government. "BP Migas as the owner of the 
oil and gas should indeed be responsible. But there is a clause that states that 
if damages occur during the exploration, Lapindo has responsibility for the 
damages," said the founder of the legal office of Sholeh, Adnan & Law. 

Based on a document obtained by Tempo, the contract between the government 
and Lapindo started as a joint contract between the government, which at that 
time was still represented by the state-owned oil company Pertamina. It was only 
taken over by BP Migas after the Migas Law was ratified and a joint agreement 
signed with the US company PT Huffco Brantas on April 23, 1990. 

Six years later, Lapindo Brantas Inc., which was established by Kalila Energy 
Ltd. and Pan Asia Enterprises, bought the Brantas Block concession owned by 
Huffco. In 1996 Lapindo signed a memorandum of understanding for the sale of 
the gas with the State Gas Company. The Brantas Block fist started production in 
1999 and now drills 21 wells, 15 of which are already in production. 

So far, Lapindo has stated its willingness to take responsibility for the 
costs of handling the disaster. "We have allocated US$70 million (Rp630 
billion)," said Lapindo General Manager Imam P. Agustino. Nevertheless, to this day 
Lapindo still has not acknowledged that the cause of the mudflow is the well it 
owns at Banjar Panji-1. "The location of the outflow is around 200 meters from 
our well," maintained Imam. 

Looking at the complexity of the case, Adnan does not believe that it will be 
effective for it to be resolved by the criminal justice system. "This 
represents a professional area of work," he said. According to Adnan, the police will 
have problems investigating the case because it is difficult to know whether 
a procedural error in the drilling took place or not. 

He gave as an example the question of the failure to install a casing which 
is being blamed as the main culprit in the disaster. "It could be that a casing 
was not installed because it may indeed not have been time yet," he said. 
Adnan added that if the casing is installed too early it could actually diminish 
the chances of finding oil and gas. 

Because of this, says Adnan, the ones most capable of assessing the matter 
are professionals in that area. According to Adnan, the Department of Energy & 
Mineral Resources could take over the investigation from the National Police 
and use state civil service investigators. And this is allowed under the Law on 
the Environment. However the most important thing is still the result of the 
investigation, because from this, it will be clear who should be responsible 
for the damages. 

-- MT, Ramidi 

sidebar: The Ebb & Flow of the Brantas Block 

1990 
US oil company HUFFCO obtains an exploration license for the Brantas Block 
covering an area of 3,050 sq/km. Operations include mining in East Java and in 
the Madura Strait. 

1993 
First exploration activities are carried out in Porong and Baluran. The 
results are negative. 

1994 
The Wunut, Toto and Jombang regions are explored. Gas is found at Wunut. 

1996 
Lapindo Brantas Inc. is established. The company is owned by Kalila Energy 
Ltd. (84.24%) and Pan Asia Enterprise (15.76%). Lapindo purchases a concession 
for the Brantas Block owned by HUFFCO. 

1997 
Lapindo signs an MoU with the State Gas Company (PGN) to distribute gas 
produced from the Wunut well. 

1999 
The first gas from the well is distributed by PGN. 

2000 
The Wunut field continues production, reaching 4.1 billion cubic feet per 
year. 

March 2004 
PT Energi Mega Persada, a subsidiary of the Bakrie Group, buys Lapindo. 

December 2005 
Lapindo installs a rig to conduct exploration at Banjar Panji-1 (BJP-1), 
Porong, Sidoarjo. 

March 8, 2006 
Exploration at BJP-1 starts. 

May 29, 2006 
A mud outpour occurs in the drilling area owned by Lapindo located in Porong, 
Sidoarjo, East Java. 

June 2, 2006 
Around 1,500 residents from Renokenongo village are evacuated after their 
homes are flooded by hot mud. 

June 8, 2006 
The Environmental Impact Management Agency asks Lapindo to take 
responsibility for the toxic mudflow. 

June 10, 2006 
On Saturday afternoon, one lane over an 8-km length of the Gempol-Sidoarjo 
toll road is closed after the overflow of hot mud is deemed to be dangerous to 
road users. The mud overflow and hot gas forces the closure of all lanes on the 
road. 

June 20, 2006 
Vice President Jusuf Kalla pays a visit to observe firsthand the outflow from 
the BJP-1 well. 

June 22, 2006 
Lapindo promises to compensate for the financial losses suffered by 12 
companies inundated in Porong. 

June 28, 2006 
The number of displaced persons reaches 6,138. They are given shelter at 
refugee camps in the Porong Market and the Renokenongo village hall. 

July 11, 2006 
Rahenold and Slamet Riyanto, drilling supervisor and drilling project manager 
of PT Medici Citra Nusa, contractors to Lapindo, are questioned as suspects. 

July 24, 2006 
East Java Regional Police name General Manager of Lapindo Imam P. Agustino, 
CEO of PT Medici Citra Nusa Yeni Nawawi, and Vice Drilling Share Service 
Officer at PT Energi Mega Persada, Nurohmad Sawulo, as suspects. 

August 10, 2006 
The dam behind the headquarters of the Sidoarjo Subdistrict Military Command 
is breached and hot mud begins to inundate the railway line. 

August 11, 2006 
President Yudhoyono visits the location and promises to provide Rp1 billion 
in assistance. The government declares it will build a 764-hectare containment 
dam. 

August 15, 2006 
East Java Regional Police seize drilling equipment from Lapindo. 

-- Poernomo Gontha Ridho 
 
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Tempo Magazine
No. 51/VI
August 22-28, 2006 

Opinion 

The Sidoarjo Crisis 

LAST week's protests by victims of the Sidoarjo mudflow by blocking the 
freeway and the railroad, is a clear indication that the situation there has 
reached a critical stage. The appalling and prolonged problem has caused people to 
become very frustrated. All efforts to stem the flow of mud-which began on May 
29 at the location of the PT Lapindo Brantas drilling operation near Banjar 
Panji village in Porong, Sidoarjo district-have come to nothing. The flow of mud 
has increased, and has now reached around 50,000 cubic meters per day. 

With this much mud pouring out every day-enough to fill 5,000 trucks-the 
danger is there for all to see. Every day, the level creeps up 3 centimeters 
higher. The "lake" formed already covers 235 hectares and is still growing. The 
embankments holding the mud in are already 5-7 meters high, but it is only a 
matter of time before the salty mud breaks through. If a dike is breached when the 
Porong-Surabaya freeway is open, for example, the mud could endanger the 
lives of passing motorists. The rainy season, which seems likely to start in 
October, should signal the need for an urgent solution to the problem in Sidoarjo. 

A breakthrough is needed to stop the mudflow and to relieve the pressure on 
the "lake." Lapindo Brantas, the company owned by Bakrie, needs to try more 
than the three technical solutions it is currently attempting. If the first 
methods (snubbing and side tracking) fail, the third option, drilling a relief 
well, must not be allowed to become the last possible solution. 

There is something important to note about these technological solutions. The 
mudflow did not start at the mouth of the Banjar Panji-1 well, but about 150 
meters away. Lapindo has two theories on the origin of the leak. Initially, it 
was linked to the drilling. Then, it was suggested that "coincidently" the 
leak happened at the same time as the drilling, and that it was caused by some 
other as yet unknown factor. 

Thus far, the technological solutions have been applied under the assumption 
that the leak happened as a result of the drilling. This is why efforts to 
stop the leak have focused on the well, and have involved attempts to bypass the 
abandoned well and then spray cement. If the cement is applied, but the leak 
does not stop, it could be mean that the leak is not originating from the well, 
but was caused by something else that must be determined. 

In spite of this, nobody has had the nerve to say for certain that the 
drilling at the Banjar Panji-1 well is not related to the subsequent leaking of the 
mud. In other words, Lapindo needs to hold to its commitment to rectify the 
situation, as it has done so far, whatever theory is proven later on. 

A solution to relieve the pressure on the "lake" cannot be delayed any 
further. As the rainy season approaches, this is as urgent as the effort to stop the 
gushing mud. The existing dikes will not be able to withstand the combination 
of rainwater and the mud. The 'reservoir' can still be expanded to contain 
the mud for another six months, but this will flood paddy fields, homes and 
places where people earn a living. The number of displaced people, currently at 
8,000 families, will increase. 

An alternative that has been studied at Surabaya's November 10 Institute of 
Technology, namely separating the water from the sediment and dumping it into 
the sea, could be attempted immediately. The mud is 70 percent water, and the 
rest is sediment. If the water could be dumped in the sea, the "lake" would not 
need to be enlarged, and the pressure on the dikes would be reduced. If there 
are doubts about the Lapindo statement that the sea's ecosystem would not be 
endangered by the wastewater, the regional administration could ask the 
company to cover the costs of any environmental damage. The important thing is to 
act immediately, before the rains come and complicate the problem. 

The top priority is to protect people from any losses. Lapindo, which has 
already made available US$70 million, and has only used half of it, needs to 
think about larger financial reserves, for example if the leak has not been 
plugged in the next year. Of course it is only right that the business partners of 
Lapindo Brantas, who will reap the financial rewards if gas is found, should 
also share in the risks that emerge. 

It would be a bitter blow if the government, which is busy dealing with 
natural disasters in so many locations, had to bear the costs of the Sidoarjo 
mudflow as well. As part of a well-known conglomerate, Lapindo Brantas should 
continue with its commitment to repair the damage that has already been done, and 
forget any ideas of trying to avoid its responsibilities. 
 
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Tempo Magazine  
No. 51/VI
August 22-28, 2006 

Interview/Sidoarjo Regent, Win Hendrarso: 
We await the governmen t's political decision 

IT is certain Win Hendrarso never planned on becoming a regent just to manage 
a mudflow problem. Yet this is what the 52-year-old Surabaya native has 
recently been facing. The hot, smelly mud coming out of the gas exploration project 
site of Lapindo Brantas Inc., has occupied his time day in and day out since 
last May. Win, who is on his second term as Regent of Sidoarjo, must attend 
daily update meetings on the situation and pay visits to victims of the 
disaster. 

His rage at the seemingly unsolvable situation is understandable. Last week, 
a camera caught him throwing a stone in the direction of the source of the 
mudflow. Reportedly, he was also hospitalized for stress. Yet the problem is 
unlikely to go away anytime soon. As of last week, there was still no report on 
how the hot mudflow can be stopped. 

In the middle of his meetings, Win took time off to discuss his efforts to 
deal with the problem last Tuesday, with Tempo reporters Zed Abidien, Untung 
Widianto, Sunudyantoro and Rohman Taufik, at the Surayaba Shangri-La Hotel. 

What is the government's priority right now in dealing with the disaster at 
Porong? 

We are concentrating on reinforcing embankments. The embankment around 
Jatirejo village and around the toll road has reached a height of 5 meters, while 
the mudflow has reached 4 meters high. It would be extremely dangerous if that 
embankment collapses, not just to the population around it but also to nearby 
infrastructure. We will start to reinforce the embankment this week.

What would be the limit of the embankment? 

The maximum height should be 7 meters. The embankment circling the pond, as 
well as the one protecting the toll road is 17 kilometers long. On the map, we 
call that embankment area 'the Bermuda triangle' because it encircles a pond 
in the shape of a triangle and this area is now as dangerous as the infamous 
spot with the same name. The entire area containing the mudflow is about 250 
hectares.

Is this step being taken because you're pessimistic the mudflow cannot 
be stopped? 

We are making plans for the worst possible scenario. We only have two 
choices: people or the environment. We cannot possibly choose both of them, because 
it cannot be done synergetically. So, to minimize the risk, we will dispose of 
the mudflow into the river or the sea by not polluting the environment and in 
that way save the people. But in order to so a strong embankment must be 
built. We also need to build a water management system which will separate water 
from the mud. Only then can the water be discarded in the river or the sea.

This assumes the mud cannot be stopped? 

Whether it can be stopped or not, the embankment will be our priority. And 
reinforcing the embankment will be done by 1,000 personnel of the army's 
engineering corps.

Will the mud be diverted straight to the sea or through the Porong River? 

There are two possibilities. If the water separator system-extracting the 
uncontaminated water from the mud-succeeds, we will dispose of it in the river 
first, because channeling it to the sea requires pipes the length of 15 
kilometers to be installed. 

At the recent coordinating meeting, you said that solving the mudflow 
problems requires a political decision. What do you mean? 

We are still waiting for the political decision of the Environment Minister, 
whether we can dispose of the mud water to the sea or not. So far, we don't 
have that decision yet and we are racing against time. As such, to anticipate 
the delay in making this decision, we need to agree on building a strong, 
permanent embankment.

Won't the Environment Department impose conditions before that water can be 
discarded into the sea? 

The condition is that there should be a pond as a controlling mechanism, 
which will be filled with fish, so we can be sure the water does not disturb the 
ecosystem. The problem is, how long will it take to build this pond and the 
equipment, because we are fighting the mudflow. And that's not counting the 
coming rainy season.

At what point will the current pond exceed its capacity? 

Right now, about 50,000 cubic meters of mud is being discharged every day. To 
contain that alone, we need a 5-hectare pool with 1-meter height. So, if the 
embankment is built 7 meters high, a 1-hectare pool can contain 35,000 cubic 
meters of mud. This means, that in one and a half months, we need 70-hectare 
mud ponds. We are now trying to build new ponds totaling 90 hectares.

Will construction of those ponds affect the homes of the local population? 

Yes, it will. That is why we are proposing a permanent relocation, because 
when 
all the ponds (eight) are being dug up, part of the people's homes will be 
underwater. 

There are 981 families or 3,664 people at Jatirejo village who must be 
relocated.
To build those embankments, how many people must be relocated? 

For the moment, it will be the residents of Jatirejo village first. If that 
location is not enough, we will have to relocate the residents of Siring 
village.

When will the relocation happen? 

We have already informed the residents of Jatirejo. Some of them have agreed, 
with the same conditions offered to other hamlets and villages. We have 
identified a number of locations to choose from but the people still want to be 
within the Porong subdistrict. Maybe it will be on the west of Porong or around 
Kesambi. Ideally, they should be relocated west of Sidoardjo, perhaps in 
Krembung or Tulangan subdistricts. 

What about the costs? 

Lapindo must take care of all the costs. That's why the residents will share 
in the profits, not in the losses. 

If the mudflow cannot be stopped, in which direction will the ponds go? 

Most likely towards the east, to the villages of Keboguyang, Buaran Kidul and 
Besuki in Jabon subdistrict.

If the mudflow does not stop, can all the pools contain the mud? 

No, they cannot, particularly during the rainy season. If we are forced to 
during an emergency in the rainy season, we will have to discard to take the 
river route. We would make ditches between the ponds and the water will 
automatically flow to the river.

Will the industries be relocated too? Where will they go? 

There are 15 factories that will be relocated, perhaps to Krian, in Sidoarjo. 
But for now we are prioritizing on relocating businesses, because we are 
still concentrating on the villagers.

So that toll roads don't get flooded, have there been plans to build flyovers 
and raise 
railway lines? 

The toll road will be raised 1.5 meters higher, even though it was previously 
raised to 2 meters. So, if we raise it more, I'm worried it will affect the 
flyover at Siring village. Technically, that comes under the authority of PT 
Jasa Marga and I will just go along. Most importantly, we should not disturb any 
of the infrastructure, the toll roads, railway lines, and the Porong highway.

Will the mudflow in Porong upset the spatial planning of Sidoarjo district? 

This sudden change in the environment enables us to change the spatial 
planning, given that it's flexible. In such a case, we might use the land affected 
by the mudflow as an industrial zone, because Porong is actually an area where 
construction materials are produced. This district has been divided into four 
development units. Its center is Sidoarjo, in the south it's Porong 
subdistrict, in the north it's Taman subdistrict and on the west it's Krian subdistrict.

In other words, Porong will become the industrial center once the mudflow 
stops? 

The recovery process will take time. Reconstruction and rehabilitation also 
will take 
a long time. So, in the long run, this area is to be an industrial zone.

Initially, what was the Porong area for? 

It was intended for housing as well as industry, including the mining 
industry, but parts of it were also to be a conservation area. But because of this 
natural calamity, we will not divert it to an industrial zone. Of course, we 
plan on industries that are non-polluting.

According to geological data, Porong contains a lot of oil and gas. 

For sure, if the Porong area is pulled towards west Sidoarjo, there would be 
potentials for gas and oil at Wunut and Krembung, and those resources could 
even be found offshore. 

Looking at this mudflow, will other gas explorations be permitted at Porong? 

I don't know yet how things will evolve, whether we should allow it or not, 
because it is all tied up in the government structure. The local government 
cannot be independent; it must be linked to national interests, given our 
shortage in gas and oil. Every prospective oil and gas resource must be used to the 
maximum benefit. 

Before this catastrophe, what did Lapindo Brantas contribute to Sidoarjo? 

So far, there has been no income from Lapindo. Sidoarjo gets no portion of 
the profit sharing because it is seen as an area that does not produce oil and 
gas. We last received Rp1.9 billion per year. But that is part of profit 
sharing from other areas, because we are seen as an area devoid of natural 
resources. Yet Lapindo has been exploring since 1997. So, Sidoarjo gets some profit, 
but it does not fit in the category of a producing area. Even then, the amount 
has been reduced. In 2004, we only received Rp45 million.

What was the reason for this reduction? 

We never got any explanation.

What if the mudflow doesn't stop? What will Sidoarjo become in two years' 
time? 

Well, maybe Porong River will be blocked up, because this is where the 
mudflow tends to flow before going out to sea. Besides, Sidoarjo is only 5 meters 
above sea level. And that height only applies to Tarik subdistrict (bordering 
Mojokerto regency). In fact, some of the coastal areas are only half a meter 
high. 

Can Porong subdistrict collapse? 

I am asking geologists to explain this to the people. I also ask geologists 
to be transparent in doing so. 

What if Porong River gets clogged by the mud? 

Then the railway lines will be shut down, also the toll road. All access to 
Porong will be blocked by the mud.

What impact would that have on the economy? 

Everyone has been impacted. In this subdistrict, everything has been ruined, 
whatever the sector, including the economy, all is in shambles. We should have 
anticipated this danger. The toll road is the artery of the East Java economy.

With this mudflow disaster, what difficulties do you face? 

The most difficult problem is how to treat the people well. Their rights have 
been violated, and we must do as much as we can to recover the losses. But 
the victims are not just the people; I have been suffering since the outset. 
That is why, I ask for all parties to care about this. Actually, I threw that 
stone not in frustration, but because I wanted to measure my strength. But at 
some point, I will do it again. But I don't have the urge right now. I'm still 
waiting for an inspiration (laughing).

Were you visited by paranormals? 

I don't care too much for that. The paranormals demand all kinds of things. 
Some ask for money, others come to seek licenses, signatures, stamps and even 
signatures of the Regional House of Representatives. I said, if they want to 
help fight the mudflow, just come to the site, without any written agreement 
from me.

sidebar: Win Hendrarso 

Date & Place of Birth 

Surabaya, July 12, 1954

Education 

MA, August 17 University, Surabaya (1998) 
BA, Gajah Mada University, Faculty of 
  Political & Social Sciences (1979)

Career 

1986 - Employee Inspector, Provincial Inspectorate Department 
1989 - Pro Tem Official, Inspectorate Department of Pasuruan City 
1994 - Inspector, at the Inspectorate Department of East Java Province 
1997 - Chief, Public Services and Administrative Bureau of the East Java 
          Provincial Government 
1999 - Regional Secretary at Sidoarjo 
2000 - Regent of Sidoarjo 
2005 - Regent of Sidoarjo
 
-End 2 of 2-

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Joyo Indonesia News Service
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