[Kabar-indonesia] 2: Tempo Cover Story: Blaming Bakrie [+Minamata Disease Looms]

[JoyoNews at aol.com]

4 Tempo Cover Story Reports (2 of 2): 

- Opinion: Blaming Bakrie

- Death at the Well's Rim 

- Breathing Mud [People whose 
  houses were hit by the hot mudflow 
  are suffering from acute respiratory 
  infections. Minamata disease looms 
  over the affected population.]

- Interview/Sonny Keraf, deputy head 
  of the DPR's (House of Representatives) 
  Commission VII, which oversees the 
  environment

Tempo Magazine
No. 43/VI
June 27 - July 03, 2006 

Opinion 

Blaming Bakrie 

AN accident last week caused almost 5,000 people to flee from their homes in 
Sidoarjo, East Java. Flowing hot and malodorous mud covering more than 100 
hectares of land, has flooded the homes and villages of the local population, 
and led to the closure of the Porong-Gempol toll road. The human and material 
costs incurred cannot be ascertained as yet, but one estimate chalks it up to 
Rp300 billion. The next question is: who will bear this monumental burden? 

Vice President Jusuf Kalla said that the company responsible for the accident 
must be held accountable for the damages. He is right, but determining which 
company is easier said than done. This is because while PT Lapindo Brantas 
holds the oil and gas exploration rights in the area, the drilling is being done 
by another company, PT Medici Citra Nusantara. 

If the drilling company had followed all the procedures, the problem would be 
a simple one. Since it is compulsory for all drilling companies to have their 
operations covered by insurance, most of the damages would have been settled 
by the insurance company involved. But accusations have since emerged that the 
accident happened as a result of procedural violations. If this is true, the 
insurance company is certain to reject any claims thereof. So, who will 
compensate the affected residents of Sidoarjo for their physical and material losses 
and their mental anguish? 

Jusuf Kalla asked the Bakrie Group to take on the initial responsibility for 
the losses. This was not without reason, as the majority shareholder in both 
PT Lapindo Brantas and PT Medici Citra Nusantara is the Bakrie family and 
employees of their group of companies. Fortunately, Nirwan Bakri reacted positively 
to the recommendation and submitted a check for Rp5 billion to the local 
government, as initial compensation for the victims. The gesture is commendable, 
although it was a bit belated. 

Now, we await the next step. And this will indeed be a test for the Bakrie 
Group, and determine what kind of public image and reputation it will carry in 
the future. If all the victims manage to receive satisfactory and timely 
compensation, the Bakrie Group, which claims to be a world-class company, will be 
assured the reputation of a company that adheres to corporate social 
responsibility. 

But if the responsibility is passed on to their partners or other parties, 
the company is likely to lose its standing among the national and international 
business communities. Furthermore, it will meet with fierce opposition if it 
decides to pass off the compensation it must pay to victims, as operational 
recovery costs, charging them to the provincial and local governments. 

We still hope that the Bakrie Group will prove its world-class worthiness as 
a corporation that can remain a source of national pride. 
 
-------------------------------------------

Tempo Magazine
No. 43/VI
June 27 - July 03, 2006 

Cover Story 

Death at the Well's Rim 

Mud and gas emissions at oil and gas installations happen regularly, 
often due to the operator's negligence. 

NIGHTS in Gaoqiao, as in other Chinese villages, are usually still, 
interrupted by the sound of crickets and the cold wind. But not that one particular 
night. An ear-splitting explosion tore the skies of Gaoqiao. Thousands of local 
people were shocked out of their snug beds. Some tried to find out what 
happened. Even before their eyes were fully opened, waves of hot air and stench 
permeated the villagers' homes. 

Some rushed out of their homes. However, many stayed inside after tightly 
shutting windows and doors. It proved to be the wrong choice. They inhaled more 
poison into their lungs that way. In a matter of minutes, thousands started 
convulsing. 

Local hospitals panicked. They were swamped by 243 bodies and thousands who 
were affected by hydrogen sulphide and with skin burns. They came from 28 
villages. Around 41,000 were evacuated away from Gaoqiao. The following day, the 
Chinese government announced that the explosion on that December 23, 2003 night, 
was caused by a blowout in the Chuangdongbei, Gaoqiao gas field. It was 
managed by Sichuan Petroleum Administration, owned by China National Petroleum 
Corporation. 

What happened in Porong, Sidoarjo, East Java is similar. The difference is 
that at Gaoqiao, only gas spewed out of the well's opening. No mud. 
Nevertheless, the sulfurous-smelling gas killed hundreds of people. 

The tragedy spurred the worried Chinese government into action. They 
immediately sent a disaster management team to the village, at temperatures ranging 
from 0-4 degrees Celsius. Their first step was to burn the gas, to keep it from 
spreading. Later, the team injected 260 tons of mud and cement to cover the 
well. 

"The operator is to blame," said San Huashan, Deputy Director for 
Occupational Safety and State Administration of China as quoted by Xinhua news agency. 
"They didn't prepare the necessary equipment to handle high-pressure sulfuric 
gas." The fault, said San, started with the operator in underestimating the gas 
production capacity and contents in the well. 

The team also discovered a series of other operating errors, including 
outgoing gas not being burned and a pressure control valve deliberately removed. 
That negligence resulted in a fatal explosion­ that will go down in history. Nine 
months later, the court sentenced six employees of Sichuan Petroleum to 
prison terms ranging from three to six years. 

The mining business is not immune from accidents. In Indonesia, a similar 
incident happened at the Randublatung-A well in Sumber village, Blora, Central 
Java, on February 2002. The toxic and smelly gas caused 4,400 people to feel 
nauseous and dizzy. The Blora Police recorded that around 300 were treated as 
outpatients and two were hospitalized in Cepu Hospital due to coughs and 
breathing difficulties. 

The Pertamina well, which was located 100 meters from the residential area, 
was estimated to have 6 million barrels of reserve hydrocarbon. The gas 
enshrouding Sumber village contained ethane, propane, butane, pentane, carbon 
dioxide, and hydrogen sulfide. To locate the leak, said the head of Extinguishing 
Operations, R. Sujatmo, Pertamina injected heavy mud into the well. The 
state-owned oil & gas company also poured thousands of liters of water through 
2.3-kilometer-long pipes. 

Geology and oil consultant Untung Sumartoto explains that gas blowouts 
followed by water and earth such as in the Banjar Panji-1 well, Porong, seldom 
occur. "Usually only gas or oil," says Untung. 

Albert Tilaar, a consultant who previously worked in a foreign mining company 
says that the Porong incident also happened in Riau. "Mud spewed out and 
turned into a hill," he says. In another area, "A tractor and its driver were 
sucked into the earth." However, the disaster was over once the mud and cement 
were injected into the mine. 

-- Efri Ritonga, Sohirin, L.R. Baskoro 

---------------------------------------------

Tempo Magazine
No. 43/VI
June 27 - July 03, 2006 

Cover Story 

Breathing Mud 

People whose houses were hit by the hot mudflow are suffering from acute 
respiratory infections. Minamata disease looms over the affected population. 

THE villagers at Renokenongo, Sidoarjo regency in East Java are becoming used 
to the stench of rotten eggs. For nearly one month, hot mud mixed with 
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) continues to spout from the earth's bowels. 

Flowing hot mud has now become an unstoppable disaster, spreading to 
neighboring villages such as Jatirejo and Siring. Local residents find themselves 
forcing their lungs to breathe polluted air. Consequently, more than 800 people 
have to be treated. Some have no choice but to stay in hospital wards. 

"The majority of the patients suffer from acute respiratory tract infection," 
said Police Commissioner Hadi Wahyana, head administrator of Bhayangkara 
Hospital in Porong, which had suddenly been inundated by patients. The symptoms 
are difficulty in breathing, dizziness, nausea, and vomiting. Some patients even 
suffer from digestive problems such as diarrhea. 

The surrounding gas-polluted air whose smell is similar to sulphur becomes a 
more serious threat to those with a history of chronic lung illness, like 
76-year-old Suwoto. The life of the Renokenongo villager could not be saved 
although he was treated at the hospital for several days. Abdul Syukur Achyar, 57, 
from Jatirejo, suffered the same fate and died on the same day. 

Suwoto suffered a relapse on Monday, two weeks ago. The following day, he was 
taken to Bhayangkara Hospital. After one week, his condition did not improve. 
The father of six was referred to the Sidoarjo Hospital. But the medical team 
there could not do much. Suwoto's life could not be saved. "The polluted air 
made his condition worsen and it was hard to get him well again," said Hadi, 
who had been treating Suwoto since 2004. 

Professor Mukono, head of the Center for Environment Research at Airlangga 
University in Surabaya said that the gas explosion accelerated Suwoto's and 
Syukur's deaths. The dirty gas they inhaled triggered their deteriorating health. 
The visible symptoms were nausea, dizziness and palpitations. 

Not wanting to be trapped in possibly poisonous, gas-polluted air, a growing 
number of residents in the muddy area have begun to evacuate. Pasar Baru 
Porong which was made available for refugees became increasingly crowded. 

Staying at home and breathing in a pool of mud is no longer a choice because 
their health would deteriorate anyway. Look at what happened to 49-year-old 
Jatirejo resident Suparman and his family. Because they stayed at home, his 
wife, child and he himself had to be checked in to a hospital for respiratory 
problems. 

It is not only the rotten-smelling, polluted air that is a threat. Water at 
the disaster location may be polluted with mercury, sulphide, nitrate, and 
ammonia, which can cause people to become really sick. 

A team of experts from the November Tenth Technology Institute of Surabaya 
(ITS) declares that based on sample tests, the water content there shows quite a 
jump in chemical content. Mercury content is now 2.565 milligrams per liter 
(quality standard is 0.002 mg per liter); sulfide, 1437.5 mg per liter (quality 
standard, 0); nitrate, 6.60 mg per liter (quality standard, 0.06); and 
ammonia, 154.5 mg per liter (quality standard, 0). 

Mukono reminds people of the lurking danger of these permeating chemicals. 
Free ammonia, for example, when it touches the skin, will cause irritation and 
itching. The same illness will appear if there is direct contact with nitrate. 

A bigger threat has also been predicted. "If mercury enters the body and 
stays for a long time, Minamata disease can occur," said Mukono. The disease which 
starts after consuming mercury-polluted food (Latin hydrargyrum, Hg), struck 
Minamata, Japan, in the 1950s, causing the deaths of hundreds of people. 

Minamata happens when people consume food or water containing mercury for 20 
years or more. The mercury in the body will trigger central nerve problems. 
That is what people in the Sidoarjo area, which has had hot mudflows for a 
month, must be aware of. 

-- Dwi Wiyana, Sunudyantoro, Rohman Taufiq (Surabaya) 
 
--------------------------------------------

Tempo Magazine
No. 43/VI
June 27 - July 03, 2006 

Interview 

Sonny Keraf: There's reluctance to probe 
because Aburizal Bakrie is in government 

THERE is little point in belaboring the issue: the damage is done, the rice 
fields are destroyed. The hot gas and mud gushing out of Banjar Panji-1 well, 
owned by Lapindo Brantas Inc. at Renokenongo village in Sidoarjo, East Java, 
has been going on for close to a month. Last week, Energy & Mineral Resources 
Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro declared the disaster to be caused by "a drilling 
error" and not by the recent earthquake. 

Lapindo Brantas, a subsidiary of Energi Mega Persada and a company under the 
Bakrie Group of companies, initially blamed it on the May 27 Yogyakarta 
earthquake. The regulatory body BP Migas, which monitors upstream oil and gas 
activities, such as this exploration site, concurred with the statement. But Sonny 
Keraf, deputy head of the DPR's (House of Representatives) Commission VII, 
which oversees the environment, among other issues, disagrees. "They're just 
manipulating information," he retorted. 

Sonny's ire towards BP Migas seems to have reached its peak. He points at 
rocketing cost recovery figures, while oil and gas production drops. In 2002, 
cost recovery­ was reported at US$3.1 billion, but the following year, it became 
US$5.3 billion. Last year, it kept rising to US$7.5 billion. 

On Tuesday, last week, Sonny gave a special interview to Tempo reporters 
Akmal Nasery Basral, Philipus Parera and photographer Cheppy A. Muchlis at his DPR 
office. Excerpts: 

How can this Lapindo Brantas disaster be happening? 

If you take it back upstream, it most likely began from the tender that was 
won by a company belonging to one group of companies. Because they belong to 
the same group, there could have been a lack of control towards the drilling 
company.

Do you mean there are indications of collusion? 

If you and I belong to one group and you won the project I tendered out, it's 
most likely that I would not be tightly controlling, steering or reprimanding 
you and your operation. The police must trace the links between Lapindo 
Brantas and the contractor to find out if there has been a case of collusion or 
not. This will impact on the control mechanism, including the selection of 
technology and equipment used. There could have been cost-cutting measures in order 
to ensure the highest profit possible, and in the process, they failed to 
adhere to standard operating procedures. 

What is the basis for such an accusation? 

When Lapindo Brantas, BP Migas and the Energy & Mineral Resources Department 
cited shifting plates as a consequence of the Yogyakarta earthquake [as the 
cause of the mudflow] at a hearing with Commission VII, I became suspicious. 
This uniform explanation looked like the information had been manipulated, 
because later we found out that was not the cause of the mudflow. 

An independent team has now been formed. Would you believe in this one? 

I don't have faith in this team. I am not convinced BP Migas will be 
objective and not interefere. This has been the experience with Newmont Minahasa when 
a similar team was formed by the Department of the Environment. Members of the 
team were not free to announce their findings because of interventions from a 
number of people. So, not all the findings were publicized. The problem is, 
if this team is to be totally independent of BP Migas, we are faced with a 
technical glitch: who will fund the investigation? Aside from that, I hope there 
will be a monitoring team from the public, perhaps from Walhi (Indonesian Forum 
for the Environment) or the community of geologists involved in the oil 
business. This is important because we know that Lapindo Brantas is owned by the 
Bakrie Group. I worry that there might be a reluctance in exposing all of this, 
because Pak Aburizal Bakrie is now in the government.

Why are you worried? 

At the beginning, I said there was a tendency to blame the disaster on 
natural causes. I got the impression that maybe this was because Lapindo was owned 
by the Bakrie Group.

Did you see for yourself how it was handled on the ground? How was it? 

There were interesting factors. First, good coordination was lacking between 
the parties involved, ranging from BP Migas and Lapindo Brantas to the 
provincial and regency administrations, and other offices. Research institutes from 
different universities would come and go on their own, taking samples from 
different sites, so that the findings would vary significantly. This is the result 
of weak leadership in managing disasters. 

Secondly, there is virtually no effective communication with the communities. 
Let's say, the first few days of the disaster, people are still busy with 
trying to understand this phenomenon. But one week after that at the most, there 
should have been a powerful figure-one who is feared yet credible-to appear on 
the scene and explain the whole thing to the people. This function should 
have been done by BP Migas, because according to the laws, this is the 
organization that has the authority to do so.

Thirdly, a resident who worked at the oil drilling site and whose home was 
right across from the well, said there was no clear emergency measures taken 
after the disaster happened. Only after the local regent took some action did 
Lapindo provide the heavy equipment needed to construct a dam, together with the 
people. But that was a week after. It was too late.

What about the contents of the mud itself? 

That's also interesting. At the Commission VII hearing, the government, as 
well as Lapindo said that the mud was not toxic and dangerous (containing B3). 
That was an irresponsible statement. One of the Commission VII members, Catur 
Sapto Edi (of PAN), who knows well about B3, said that was a big mistake. 
Because on the ground, they found gobs of black oil, like tar floating over mud. 
That alone would indicate a presence of B3. Later, the Surabaya Institute of 
Technology and others found fenol and other chemicals.

(Based on East Java Governor's decree No. 45/2002 regarding group III 
water-water for animal and fish breeding-the allowable fenol content level is 1 
miligram per liter. The sample from the mud located 40 meters from the 
Porong-Gempol toll road registered three times the allowable fenol content, i.e. 3.37 
miligrams per liter-Ed.) 

The Environment Minister was heard to say that mud was not poisonous. 

That shocked me too. In a radio talk show with Commission VII Chairman 
Agusman Effendi on June 12, Pak Rachmat Witoelar said that the mud was not B3. I 
sent an SMS message to ask him about it and he replied that he got the 
information from the site. Fortunately, he then revised his statement.

Is the Rp200,000 compensation offered to people adequate? 

I don't think that all the people around the affected area will get 
compensation. At the site, I found people who lived very close to the dam who claimed 
not to have gotten anything. I don't know if they were telling the truth or 
not. So the distribution of the compensation is likely to be unevern. I don't 
know what the follow-up is.

How would the compensation be evaluated on the basis of the damage affecting 
them? 

There is a part of the independent team that is doing the assessment, both 
regarding the material and non-material damage. The material aspect includes 
damaged rice fields, homes and their health. Non-material items cover such 
factors as loss of work days, because of the consequent illness, or because of the 
time spent to prevent their homes from being flooded with mud. Then, to what 
extent have their wells and water sources been affected. We must also assess the 
loss incurred by the toll road, not just on the operator Jasa Marga, but on 
the users whose activities have been affected. We're not even including the 
local factories whose operations had to be halted. Commission VII has made its 
position clear on this. First, all losses must be borne by Lapindo Brantas. 
Secondly, to ensure that the funds to cover the losses are not included as cost 
recovery. If those funds become part of cost recovery, the central and 
provincial government will have to bear the losses as well.

In other words, the people are the victims, the people must pay? 

Correct. And that's not fair.

Are there indications Lapindo will con­sider these losses as part of the cost 
recovery? 

Last year, Commission VII held a long debate with BP Migas on the parameters 
of cost receovery, because there were a number of unclear issues on this. Of 
course to BP Migas the standards were clear but in practice many items remain 
unclear. Let me give an extreme example, the medical cost of an expatriate's 
domestic staff is included as cost recovery. This results in an incredible loss. 
That is why we are concerned that Lapindo Brantas will claim these 
compensation funds as cost recovery, with the reasoning that this disaster occurred 
during the drilling process.

But Commission VII's recommendation is not binding. 

Commission VII will request BP Migas not to approve this. 

Are you sure BP Migas will do this? 

That's the problem. I see BP Migas as being very weak but because this is a 
political decision, BP Migas should be a lot more decisive.

Why is BP Migas so weak? 

They actually have quite a few experts among them. I worry this is just a 
problem of leadership. Perhaps Pak Kardaya (Kardaya Warnika, BP Migas chief-Ed.) 
lacks firmness when using his authority. I don't know whether he is unable to 
control the oil and gas companies because of pressure from the government, or 
from other sources. 

But the BP Migas chief is selected by the DPR? 

Yes, Pak Kardaya was chosen by Commission VII. So we must empower him more. 
Also, the Energy & Mineral Resources Department should push BP Migas to be 
stronger in representing the government's interests in monitoring and overseeing 
these upstream operations. If we find negligence on the part of Lapindo, BP 
Migas must be accountable. If necessary, Pak Kardaya must resign. 

What would be an example of procedural negligence? 

As reported in the media, Medco apparently had reminded Lapindo that a casing 
should have been installed at the core of the drilling site. The police must 
investigate this to find out the level and intent of the negligence. If this 
is proven, there must be a criminal as well as a civil, legal action. If 
necessary, Lapindo's operating licence must be withdrawn because it has caused 
public losses. 

How can we guarantee that these investigations are objective? 

This is where I think the results of the independent team are important. With 
all the expertise we have, they must investigate and comb through each 
document, including seismic and other technical papers. If all these documents can 
be accessible to all, including the media, the work of the police can also be 
monitored, particularly if there is an observation team from an organization 
like Walhi and geoscientists. Outside monitoring teams are vital to remind the 
independent team investigating the disaster, not to neglect-whether intentional 
or not-documents and certain evidence.

Dr. Alexander Sonny Keraf 

Place & Date of Birth 

* Flores, June 1, 1958

Education 

* PhD -- Catholic University, Leuven Institute of Philisophy, Belgium (1995)

Career 

* Deputy Chairman, DPR Commission VII (2004-to date) 
* Minister of Environment (1999-2001) 
* Professor of Postgraduate Program on Environment, University 
  of Indonesia (2001-  to date) 
* Member, Ethics Council of Indonesia Corruption Watch (1998-1999) 
* Lecturer, Unika Atmajaya University, Jakarta (1995-to date)

Organizational Affiliations 

* Head, Environmental Issues and Social Services Section of the 
  PDI-P Executive   Board (2005-2010) 
* Member, PDI-P Education and Training Board (2001-to date)
 
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Joyo Indonesia News Service
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