[Kabar-indonesia] 1 of 2: China's "Caribbean" in the South China Sea

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SAIS Review - The School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Volume 26, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2006

China's "Caribbean" in the South China Sea

By James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara

Abstract

Can the United States accommodate the rise of China
without the strife that typically accompanies a
disturbance to a settled equilibrium? Discerning how
China views the seas will help answer this question.
We argue that vocal strategists in Beijing look to
Alfred Thayer Mahan for guidance on maritime strategy.
Mahanian sea-power theory has predisposed many in
Beijing to regard the South China Sea much as
Americans once regarded the Caribbean Sea: as a
preserve where commercial and political imperatives
demand dominant naval power. Adjusting U.S. strategy
to deter and conciliate a more assertive China is a
critical task confronting Washington.

----

China's policymakers and military planners are casting
their strategic gaze seaward. As they do so, the South
China Sea holds as much importance for them as the
Caribbean did for the United States a century ago
during its initial rise to global power. Indeed,
Chinese leaders increasingly view command of the sea
as vital to their national interests. To fuel China's
booming economy, large volumes of imported energy
resources as well as a growing volume of exports must
pass through the South China Sea's shipping lanes,
where the U.S. Navy now rules the waves. As Chinese
planners develop a naval strategy to address their
interests in these waterways, many have consulted the
writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, America's "evangelist
of sea power," who at the turn of the century
furnished the intellectual rationale for an expansive
U.S. maritime strategy.1 Judging from their writings
and public statements, many Chinese thinkers read
Mahan's works in a manner that could prod China toward
naval competition with the United States, long the
guarantor of East Asian maritime security. Even if
Washington and Beijing can avoid a direct competition,
however, the logic of sea-power theory promises to
permanently complicate U.S. naval planning in the
Asian littoral.

Understanding China's naval strategy is part of the
larger challenge of coming to grips with China's rise.
Pundits and policymakers debate whether the United
States, currently enjoying a prolonged "unipolar
moment" of global dominance, can accommodate the
emergence of a potential challenger to its supremacy
without the strife that often accompanies a
disturbance to a stable international equilibrium.2
Some analysts wave the question away, going so far as
to declare that, in this age of globalization,
economic interdependence has rendered great-power
geopolitical competition moot.3 In their telling,
rising powers no longer vie with dominant powers to
rule the waves or control key points on the map.4
Geopolitics has been relegated to the dustbin of
history—and not a moment too soon.

Such views are most likely premature—perhaps
dangerously so, given their real-world policy
consequences. Thomas Friedman is closer to the mark
when, pointing to the emergence of China, he declares
that economic interdependence raises the costs of
geopolitical ventures but does not end geopolitics
altogether.5 China's leadership declares itself intent
on a "peaceful rise" to regional eminence, but even a
peaceful rise does not rule out a buildup of
diplomatic, economic, and military power—the
implements of a classical, geopolitically minded
foreign policy.6

The available evidence shows that influential Chinese
strategists do think in geopolitical terms about the
proper uses for the "comprehensive national power"
China is amassing, and this includes naval power.7
U.S. foreign-policy thinkers understandably
concentrate most of their attention on the situation
in the Taiwan Strait, which dominates headlines and is
without question one of the region's most volatile
flashpoints. When they do think beyond the
China-Taiwan standoff, they typically assume that
China will move eastward into the broad Pacific as it
builds up sea power. But Beijing is likely to find its
attention drawn southward rather than eastward. It has
no obvious need to contest U.S. naval mastery in the
Pacific in the foreseeable future. By contrast,
economic development is a real and urgent priority for
China's leadership, which increasingly views
prosperity and regaining the nation's "central"
position in Asia as the keys to the survival of the
communist regime, and here it views the South China
Sea as crucial.8

Development requires fuel, along with a host of other
commodities normally transported by sea.9 Accordingly,
Beijing has come to view energy security as a vital
national interest. The sea-lanes in the South China
Sea, which convey shipments of oil and gas from Africa
and the Middle East into East Asian waters and thence
into Chinese seaports, promise to preoccupy Chinese
naval planners for many years to come. It behooves the
Bush administration to think ahead and consider how a
Mahan-inspired Chinese maritime strategy could affect
the equilibrium in the South China Sea and how U.S.
strategy should respond to this new reality. Upholding
the interests of the United States and its Asian
partners while accommodating China's legitimate
interests on the high seas promises to be a challenge
of the first order for the administration and its
successors.

Mahan's Sea-power Evangelism

Alfred Thayer Mahan exhorted a United States long
fearful of overseas political entanglements to build
up its "sea power," based on the "three pillars" of
overseas commerce, naval and merchant fleets, and
naval bases scattered along the sea-lanes to support
fuel-thirsty warships.10 While there was a circular
quality to Mahan's theorizing—the navy protected a
nation's trade, which in turn furnished the tariff
revenue needed to support the navy—the commercial
component of sea power seemed to hold pride of place
in his thinking. Mahan's self-perpetuating logic
clearly holds a powerful allure for advocates of sea
power, no matter what the country or historical epoch.

As America rethought its tradition of political
non-entanglement, where was it to apply its nautical
energies? Mahan urged his countrymen to accumulate sea
power to assure the United States an equitable share
of trade in China, a "carcass" destined to be devoured
by "eagles"—the great imperial powers—as a part of the
"onward movement of the world."11 If the United States
did not defend its share of the China trade—Mahanian
thought had a strong zero-sum cast to it—it would lose
out, risking the nation's prosperity, which was
thought to depend on overseas markets for manufactured
goods.12 Although he claimed to deplore the prospect
of war with the imperial powers, Mahan seemed resigned
to conflict if one of them injected "the alien element
of military or political force" into peaceful seagoing
commerce.13

To gain reliable access to the China trade, both
merchant shipping and the U.S. Navy needed secure
communications with East Asia. Communications, wrote
Mahan, was "the most important single element in
strategy, political or military."14 The "eminence of
sea power" lay in its ability to control the sea lines
of communication. The power "to insure these
communications to one's self, and to interrupt them
for an adversary, affects the very root of a nation's
vigor. . . ."15

If the United States hoped to assure its
communications with overseas markets, proclaimed
Mahan, its navy must build a fleet with the capacity
to "fight, with reasonable chances of success, the
largest force likely to be brought against it" in
regions vital to U.S. maritime traffic.16 For Mahan
the ultimate goal of such a battle fleet was to impose
"command of the sea," defined as that "overbearing
power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from
it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and
which, by controlling the great common, closes the
highways by which commerce moves to and fro from the
enemy's shores. This overbearing power can only be
exercised by great navies."17

Mahanian Thinking in China: Sea Communications and
Naval Strategy

Chinese military officers have studied Mahan since the
1950s. The imprint of Mahanian concepts is visible
throughout the policy continuum in Beijing, from the
writings and pronouncements of strategic thinkers to
official policy statements to the force structure that
is quickly taking shape at Chinese shipyards and
airfields.18 For instance, Chinese scholars of sea
power repeatedly quoted Mahan's muscular definition of
command of the sea at a Symposium on Sea-lane Security
convened in 2004 by the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the
State Council's influential foreign-policy think
tank.19 Wang Zaibang, then the vice president of
CICIR, opened the symposium by quoting Mahan's dictum
approvingly.20 Few if any Chinese participants
dissented from Wang's Mahanian outlook during the two
days of the symposium.

Nor was this an isolated case. Writing in China
Military Science, Major General Jiang Shiliang,
director of the Military Communications and
Transportation Department of the People's Liberation
Army's (PLA) General Logistics Department, uses Mahan
to justify China's control of maritime communications
in the seas adjacent to China's coasts. "In modern
times," declares General Jiang, "securing the absolute
control of communications [is] turning with each
passing day into an indispensable essential factor in
ensuring the realization of national interests"
(emphasis added). Economic development, the top
priority for China's leadership, depends on "the
command of communications on the sea, which is vital
for the future and destiny of the nation."21

Zhang Wenmu, an analyst at CICIR, likewise points out
that China relies increasingly on maritime
communications to supply its economy with raw
materials. Invoking Mahan, Zhang contends that
economic prosperity hinges on stationing naval forces
at strategic locations to assure Chinese shipping of
safe passage through the sea-lanes. "It is extremely
risky for a major power such as China to become overly
dependent on foreign import without adequate
protection." Beijing needs to assemble a powerful PLA
Navy as swiftly as possible, girding itself for the
"sea battle" that is the "ultimate way for major
powers to resolve an international [economic] dispute.
. . ."22

Among those who turned to Mahan for guidance on
maritime strategy was Admiral Liu Huaqing, who
commanded the PLA Navy during the 1980s and continues
to shape Chinese strategy in retirement. Dubbed
"China's Mahan" by analysts outside China, Admiral Liu
was the chief purveyor of Mahanian sea-power theory in
Chinese policy circles.23 He urged Beijing to build a
navy symmetrical to the U.S. Navy. By the mid-21st
century, Liu argued, the PLA should put to sea a navy
that was centered on aircraft carriers and could
project Chinese power into the furthest reaches of the
Pacific while vying with the U.S. Navy for global
supremacy.24

Liu shared Mahan's interest in the strategic value of
certain geographic assets and prescribed a phased
naval buildup designed to assure Chinese control of
these assets. China's immediate objective, he
declared, should be to construct a navy capable of
controlling the waters within the "first island
chain," which runs from southern Japan through Taiwan
and the northern Philippines, roughly parallel to the
Chinese landmass. For Liu and like-minded thinkers,
wresting control of the island chain from "foreign
forces"25 was crucial to breaking free of containment
and assuring Chinese access to the high seas.26 Only
then could they turn their attention to the "second
island chain," further out in the Pacific, and to
direct global competition with the U.S. Navy. Taiwan
remains of permanent importance to China's maritime
strategy, regardless of whether Beijing follows Liu's
advice to stage a breakout from the island chains in
pursuit of a blue-water strategy or turns its
strategic gaze elsewhere.

Sea-power Theory in China's 2004 Defense White Paper

Liu, like many thinkers of Alfred Thayer Mahan's day,
entertained a romantic view of naval war. The works of
Mahan, "the new Copernicus," lent themselves to
fanciful visions of glory at sea.27 Theodore
Roosevelt, who once told Mahan he "absolutely" shared
his views on foreign policy, "valued the blessings of
peace," says one diplomatic historian, but also
"sought a big navy . . . because it was such fun to
have a big navy" (emphasis added).28 For Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, Imperial Germany's prophet of sea
power, Germany's High Seas Fleet was less a means to
political ends than an end in itself. Let politicians
tend to policy, declared Tirpitz on one occasion; "I
build ships."29 Concludes one analyst, it was "a
misunderstood Mahan which the Germans adopted," and
much the same could be said of Imperial Japan, whose
strategists espoused Mahanian concepts with similar
zeal.30

Similarly, notwithstanding the elegance of Liu
Huaqing's vision of Chinese sea power, he seemed to
have no pressing political objectives in mind that
should impel China to build a blue-water navy or to
compete with the United States for global maritime
supremacy. In today's China, by contrast, economic and
strategic imperatives drive the formulation of policy
and strategy—and these imperatives increasingly beckon
the attention of Chinese maritime strategists
southward, to China's sea lines of communication with
Africa and the Middle East. It is here, not in the
broad expanses of the Pacific common, that Beijing is
most likely to apply the Mahanian logic espoused by
Admiral Liu.

For evidence, look no further than Beijing's most
recent Defense White Paper, China's National Defense
in 2004. Published in December 2004, the document
represents the Chinese leadership's most authoritative
appraisal yet of China's strategic environment and the
strategies needed for China to thrive in that
environment. A panel convened by the Washington-based
Center for Naval Analyses affirmed that the White
Paper had been fully vetted and approved by state,
Chinese Communist Party, and military organs—making it
the best publicly available guide to Chinese maritime
thinking.31

The White Paper evaluates China's surroundings in
terms that would have been familiar to Mahan. Its
framers seem to have been of two minds about strategic
conditions in East Asia. "Peace and development," they
proclaim, "remain the dominating themes of the times."
They hail globalization for fostering economic
development, seeming to prophesy an era of peace and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, while in the
next breath contending that "factors of uncertainty,
instability and insecurity are on the increase" in
China's environs. "New and profound readjustments have
taken place in the relations among the world's
countries," with "the balance of power among the major
international players" undergoing a fundamental
realignment. Until "a fair and rational new
international political and economic order" is
established, says the White Paper, "struggles for
strategic points, strategic resources and strategic
dominance" will "crop up from time to time." As a
result, the "military factor plays a greater role in
international configuration and national security."32

Having established that military power remains crucial
to Chinese foreign policy, China's National Defense in
2004 sets an ambitious agenda for the PLA: to craft a
force structure capable of "winning both command of
the sea and command of the air. . . ." The document
instructs the PLA Navy to build new warships, in
particular amphibious vessels, to acquire
special-purpose aircraft, and to make maximum use of
precision weaponry and information technology.33 To
the question of where Beijing will put these
capabilities to use, the Center for Naval Analyses
panel concluded:

 Left unstated was how far off the Chinese littoral
these aspirations extend. To the degree that these
aspirations extend into the Pacific, it could augur an
incipient competition over the international commons
of the East Asia littoral with the United States, in
the areas in which the U.S. has long held
superiority.34 

In all likelihood, China's understandable
preoccupation with economic development, and thus with
secure seaborne supplies of oil and gas, will
predispose Beijing to focus its bid for "command of
the commons" within the first island chain—on the
Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China
Sea.35 If so, and if the Mahanian conception of
command of the sea as "overbearing power" which
"drives the enemy's flag" from the oceanic common
prevails, the "incipient competition" with the United
States, the current naval hegemon, could become a
reality in the not-too-distant future—but not in the
waters Liu Huaqing foresaw.

A Mahanian Analysis of the South China Sea

Before proceeding, it is worth appending one important
caveat to our analysis. Given the secretive nature of
the Chinese political system, it is impossible to
gauge with precision the extent of Mahan's influence
on China's maritime strategy. Nor is it possible,
without access to internal debates among political and
military leaders, to tell how closely and how well
Mahan's disciples in China have studied his works. As
suggested previously, some past naval powers have
appreciated Mahan's works only superficially or have
bent his sea-power theory to their own purposes.36
China may do the same—if it has not already.

It is possible to say with confidence that a vocal
faction in Beijing propounds some of Mahan's
fundamental ideas with gusto, that geopolitical
thinking resembling that of Mahan shaped China's 2004
Defense White Paper, and that the emerging PLA Navy
force structure lends itself to a Mahanian naval
strategy.37 It behooves Western analysts and
policymakers to consider how a Beijing versed in
Mahanian ideas will view littoral waters such as the
South China Sea, assuming the advocates of Mahanian
strategic thought win out in the cacophony of voices
clamoring for the attention of top leaders. It also
behooves them to ponder the consequences should
Beijing, like past naval powers, misinterpret or
misuse sea-power theory.

A close reading of Mahan that includes not only his
more famous works such as The Influence of Sea Power
upon History and The Influence of Sea Power upon the
French Revolution and Empire but also his more
geopolitically minded works such as The Problem of
Asia and The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present
and Future would incline Chinese strategists to think
of the waters contiguous to China's coasts much as
American strategists of Mahan's day thought of the
Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico: as a domain that
engaged their nation's vital interests and in which
dominant sea power was essential.38 Beijing might
regard the Yellow, East China, and South China seas as
a single expanse—China's answer to the Caribbean. Or,
it might regard these seas as discrete bodies of
water—as multiple "Caribbeans" in which the PLA must
assert command of the sea in order to fulfill the
requirements set forth in China's National Defense in
2004.

Either way, Mahanian logic will rivet China's
attentions on the sea lines of communication that
traverse the South China Sea. This would be in keeping
with longstanding traditions: Beijing has long
regarded the South China Sea as something of a
national preserve. Indeed, it laid claim to the entire
sea in 1992, in effect codifying its position in
domestic law.39 In recent decades China has signaled
its willingness to use naval force to back up its
maritime claims. In 1976 Chinese forces wrested the
Paracel Islands from Vietnam. In 1988 the PLA Navy
pummeled a Vietnamese flotilla and occupied several of
the strategically placed Spratly Islands, subsequently
stationing anti-ship missiles on Woody Island, an
island in the archipelago. In 1995, following the U.S.
withdrawal from the Philippine Islands, Beijing seized
Mischief Reef, an islet located within the
Philippines' 200-mile exclusive economic zone. It
fortified Mischief Reef in 1998. In short, China has
obtained outposts that extend its outer defense
perimeter, flank vital sea-lanes, and give it a
measure of control over the approaches to the Strait
of Malacca—the conduit for one-sixth of world trade,
not to mention vital oil and gas shipments bound for
China, Japan, and other East Asian economic powers.

How might a Mahan-inspired Chinese maritime strategy
unfold in the coming years? Mahan thought of the
Caribbean and the Gulf in military terms from an early
date. In his short work The Gulf and Inland Waters he
analyzed the geopolitical value of ports such as New
Orleans, Mobile, and Pensacola, hinting at the
direction his thinking would later take.40 His most
exhaustive geopolitical analysis of these waters came
in two essays: "The Strategic Features of the Gulf of
Mexico and the Caribbean," which appeared in Harper's
in 1887, and "The Isthmus and Sea Power," which
appeared in The Atlantic in 1893. Both were reprinted
in The Interest of America in Sea Power, published in
1897—timing that could not have been accidental. War
with Spain was looming, and with it the United States'
opportunity to make itself the undisputed master of
the Caribbean littoral. Consider the latter article
first, as it was the Isthmus, the "gateway to the
Pacific for the United States," that gave Mahan's
maritime strategy for the region its overarching
purpose.41 Building a canal in Nicaragua or Panama and
safeguarding the approaches to it were of paramount
importance to Mahan. He reminded readers that the
Isthmus had been a thriving transit point for trade
between Atlantic and Pacific, and thus "a point of
general interest to mankind," even before a manmade
waterway joined the oceans. He contended that
"enterprising commercial countries," because of

 the very characteristics which make them what they
are . . . are led perforce to desire, and to aim at,
control of these decisive regions. . . . Consequently,
in every age . . . there will be found manifested this
desire for control; sometimes latent in an attitude of
simple watchfulness; sometimes starting into vivid
action under the impulse of national jealousies, and
issuing in diplomatic rivalries or hostile
encounter.42 

Such had been the history of the Isthmus. The
"decadent military kingdom of Spain" had depended on
treasure from Mexico and Peru and tribute from the
Philippine Islands, which had "flowed towards and
accumulated around the Isthmus." Great Britain had
relied on it for trade and commerce during its mortal
struggle with Napoleon. As Mahan argued:

 Where factors of such decisive influence in European
politics were at stake, it was inevitable that the
rival nations, in peace as well as in open war, should
carry their ambitions to the scene; and the unceasing
struggle for the mastery would fluctuate with the
control of the waters, which, as in all maritime
regions, must depend mainly on naval preponderance,
but also in part upon possession of those determining
positions, of whose tenure Napoleon said that "war is
a business of positions." Among these the Isthmus was
chief43(emphasis added). 

For Mahan it was an iron law of international
relations that nations found their "surest prosperity"
through control of the seas. This drew the great
powers' attention to the Isthmus. Mahan posited that
"control of the Central American Isthmus means naval
control, naval predominance, to which tenure of the
land is at best a convenient incident." He concluded
that the United States had the "predominant interest"
on the Isthmus because of its peculiar geography,
which inhibited "rapid and secure communication
between our two great seaboards." Thus

 our interest is both commercial and political, that
of other states almost wholly commercial. . . . no
settlement can be considered to constitute an
equilibrium, much less a finality, which does not
effect our preponderating influence, and at the same
time insure the natural rights of other peoples.44 

Applied to the South China Sea, Mahan's logic would
impel China, an "enterprising commercial country" by
any standard, to assert a predominant interest in safe
and secure passage through the Strait of Malacca and
its approaches. Like Mahan's America, China needs to
assure seagoing communications along its
coasts—communications that could be menaced by foreign
forces operating from Taiwan, along the northern edge
of the South China Sea and at the junction between the
East China and South China seas. More importantly,
Beijing is wary of entrusting its energy security to
the U.S. Navy or other regional navies. China sees
economic development, and in turn energy security, as
the keystone of state power—giving it dual commercial
and political motives in the South China Sea similar
to those Mahan claimed for the United States. The
logic of sea power will keep China's gaze locked on
these waters, regardless of whether it enters into
outright competition with the United States or assumes
a more conciliatory, collaborative stance.

The South China Sea, China's Caribbean, bears partial
resemblance to the real Caribbean. The similarities
and differences illuminate China's likely maritime
strategy in the region. Mahan observed that the
Caribbean had only one great power along its coasts:
the United States. The Caribbean was "pre-eminently
the domain of sea power," and the United States was
the American republic best suited to assert command of
the sea there. It already held "the position of
pre-eminent commercial importance" in the Gulf of
Mexico, namely the mouth of the Mississippi, and it
had the potential to build up dominant sea power to
defend its interests on the Isthmus, the other
position of surpassing "mercantile or strategic
consequence."45

Mahan also viewed naval power as the key to
controlling the Isthmus and its approaches. The "roads
which on either side converge upon the Isthmus lie
wholly upon the ocean, the common possession of all
nations. Control of the latter, therefore, rests
either upon local control of the Isthmus itself, or,
indirectly, upon control of its approaches, or upon a
distinctly preponderant navy." True to form, the sea
lines of communication were uppermost in Mahan's mind.
"Communications are probably the most vital and
determining element in strategy, military or naval . .
. for all military operations depend on
communications, as the fruit of a plant depends on
communications with its root." Positions in the
Caribbean and the Gulf derived their value solely from
"their potential effect upon these lines of
communication."46

In Mahan's thinking, the potential effect of a
geographical position on maritime communications
depended on three characteristics: its proximity to
the sea-lanes, its "inherent or acquired"
strength—that is, the ease with which it could be
defended—and its "natural or stored" resources.
Pensacola and New Orleans made good sites for navy
yards by all three standards. Although Key West lacked
resources, warships based there would give the United
States "reasonable control" of traffic through the
Strait of Florida.

Cuba had "pre-eminent intrinsic advantages" as a base
adjacent to all routes to the Isthmus. It was "not so
much an island as a continent," with great resources
of its own and an elongated shape and multiple harbors
that would make it difficult to blockade. It was
especially useful to an inferior navy—such as the U.S.
Navy of Mahan's day—that could shift operations from
"side to side" and find "refuge and supplies in either
direction." Jamaica, which held a central position
flanking all major routes to the Isthmus, would make
an acceptable alternative—but only for a naval power
dominant enough to compensate for the island's
relatively small size, its meager resources, and the
presence of nearby Cuba, which would inevitably
overshadow the island.47

Chinese strategists steeped in Mahan would likely draw
several lessons from this geopolitical analysis. The
South China Sea, like Mahan's Caribbean, is a domain
of sea power, with only one great power—China—along
its littoral.48 The Malay Peninsula and the Sumatra
archipelago together form a large isthmus that to
Chinese eyes must bear a striking resemblance to the
Central American Isthmus that obsessed Mahan. And the
Strait of Malacca is Southeast Asia's answer to the
Panama Canal: a conduit for vital seagoing commerce.

China, like the United States of the 1890s, has to
contend with a "distinctly preponderant navy" operated
by a global hegemon. It cannot have escaped Beijing's
notice, however, that today's U.S. Navy, like the
Royal Navy of Britain's imperial era, has global
responsibilities that limit its ability to concentrate
force in any one theater. China can hope to amass a
local superiority of force in nearby waters, as the
United States did at the turn of the 19th century
despite its overall inferiority to the Royal Navy.

China needs bases athwart the sea lines of
communication. Focusing on the southernmost reaches of
the South China Sea, however, will tend to remind
Beijing of Taiwan's geopolitical importance. Chinese
strategists think of Taiwan as a critical asset—a
useful base in Chinese hands, a barrier to China's
maritime interests so long as it remains in hostile
hands. Taiwan also holds Itu Iba, or Peace Island, the
largest island in the Spratly archipelago, along with
the adjacent Center Cay and Sand Cay islets. While
most analysts have understandably emphasized the
islands' economic potential, pointing to undersea
deposits of oil and gas, they would offer the PLA Navy
a naval outpost far superior to Mischief Reef, which
lacks resources and would be difficult to defend in
wartime. Gaining control of Taiwan, then, would pay
geopolitical dividends for a sea-power-minded Beijing
in more ways than one.

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