[Kabar-indonesia] 5 Reports on RI-Australia Security Pact: AFR: No Military Alliance [+2 Op-Eds]

[JoyoNews at aol.com]

5 Articles:

- AFR: Security pact with Indonesia no
  military alliance

- Age: Downer commits to security treaty

- Age: Turning our backs on people in need
  [Aust. govt will do nothing to help the 
  oppressed of Papua, says Scott Burchill, 
  lecturer at Deakin University]

- The Australian: Fence-menders have made 
  a good job of it [Op-Ed by Dennis Shanahan]

- Canberra Times: Why trying to appease Indonesia 
  doesn't work [By Bruce Haigh, Ex-Australian 
  diplomat]

Australian Financial Review
Friday, June 30, 2006

Security pact with Indonesia no military alliance

by Morgan Mellish, Bali

The Australian government said yesterday that a security pact being
negotiated with Indonesia would not be a military alliance like the
one Australia has with the United States.

Speaking at the end of the eighth Indonesia Australia Ministerial
Forum in Bali, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said the agreement
would include areas such as counter-terrorism, trans-boundary crime,
co-operation in defence matters and hostage situations.

He said it would be subject to public scrutiny before it was signed,
probably before the end of the year.

"This will not be a security alliance of the kind that we have with
the United States of America," Mr Downer said.

"This is a framework agreement on security co-operation."

Australia, under former prime minister Paul Keating, signed a security
treaty with Indonesia in 1995 but it was torn up by Jakarta in 1999
amid the tensions surrounding Australia's involvement in East Timor's
independence.

"This isn't to be compared to the agreement that was signed in 1995,"
Mr Downer said. "This whole process will be very transparent."

The forum in Bali was attended by 11 Indonesian and five Australian
ministers, including Attorney-General Philip Ruddock and Immigration
Minister Amanda Vanstone. It followed a meeting earlier this week
between Prime Minister John Howard and Indonesian President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, aimed at patching relations between the two
countries.

Senior ministers from both sides said relations - which were sorely
tested by Australia's decision in March to grant asylum to 42 West
Papuan refugees - had improved during the week.

Indonesia's Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Mr Boediono, said

the Howard/Yudhoyono meeting had laid the foundation for improved
ties. "The Indonesian side expresses its highest appreciation to
Australia's swift response to help us in the aftermath of the
earthquake in Jogjakarta," he said.

Other issues discussed included Australia's aid to Indonesia,
including an extra $30 million for the Jogjakarta earthquake, border
security, illegal fishing, a prisoner exchange deal and what Indonesia
can do to attract foreign investment.

Australia's aid to Indonesia is now expected to total $2 billion over
the next five years.

Mr Downer said: "We had a good discussion about how Australian
investment in Indonesia can be stimulated and the importance of the
Indonesian parliament passing the new investment law, which is
currently before [it]."

Earlier in the day, Mr Ruddock and Indonesia's Minister for Law and
Human Rights, Hamid Awaluddin, said they had almost completed a
prisoner exchange agreement.

Under the deal, expected to be completed in September, all prisoners
except those facing the death penalty in Indonesia will be eligible
for exchange once they have exhausted all legal avenues.

Mr Ruddock said it was yet to be decided what would be the minimum
time a prisoner would have to serve before being eligible for
exchange.

However, it would be less than half the sentence.

"This is an issue of potential double jeopardy," Mr Ruddock said.

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The Age (Melbourne)
Friday, June 30, 2006

Downer commits to security treaty

Mark Forbes, Indonesia Correspondent, Bali

A MEETING of Australian and Indonesian ministers has committed to
forging a new security treaty by the end of the year.

It pledged to consider any public opposition and stated it would not
be an ANZUS-style military alliance.

The ministerial forum in Bali endorsed the resumption of co-operation
following a four-month diplomatic rift sparked by Australia granting
asylum to 42 Papuans.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Indonesian counterpart Hassan
Wirayuda said the forum had built on breakthrough talks between Prime
Minister John Howard and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on Monday.

Mr Downer said the security treaty would be a significant step
forward, providing a broad framework for activities including
counter-terrorism and border protection as well as boosting military
ties.

"What we are not talking about is a military alliance of the type
Australia has with America. This is a framework agreement on security
co-operation," he said.

Mr Downer stressed "there will be no secret treaty" - in a dig at
Australia's only previous security treaty with Indonesia, secretly
negotiated by former prime minister Paul Keating but torn up after
Australia's involvement in East Timor's independence in 1999.

"This whole process will be very transparent," Mr Downer said. "People
will be able to make public submissions long before this treaty is
formally ratified.

"This will be a very important but a very practical and realistic step
forward in bilateral relations."

Dr Wirayuda said the treaty would provide an "umbrella" for closer
co-operation but would not be a formal military pact.

A joint declaration said it would "provide a treaty-based expression
of strong support for each country's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, including Indonesia's sovereignty over Papua".

Australia also pledged an additional $30 million to reconstruct the
earthquake zone around Yogyakarta.

A total of more than $2 billion in Australian aid would flow to
Indonesia over the next five years, the forum was told.

-------------------------------------------

The Age (Melbourne)
Friday, June 30, 2006

Turning our backs on people in need

The Government will do nothing to 
help the oppressed of Papua.

By Scott Burchill

POLITICIANS constantly face the danger of believing the rhetoric and
PR that is written for them at vertiginous moments in the political
cycle.

After the initial pretext for invading Iraq collapsed when no weapons
of mass destruction could be found, speech writers in the United
States, Britain and Australia produced an alternative, if
retrospective, justification for violating Iraq's sovereignty: ending
Saddam's tyranny and extending the blessings of democracy to a
benighted country and region.

Little, if anything, was heard about this before March 2003. At a news
conference on March 6, President George Bush declared that WMD was the
"single question" that justified the invasion, a view subsequently
repeated until it became untenable a few months later. Eliminating the
threat posed by Saddam's WMD was also the sole basis of US
congressional authorisation for the war.

Spreading democracy by force wasn't a theme in Australian foreign
policy either until a new rationale for the war and the occupation had
to be found quickly.

Given the increasingly vicarious flavour of Australia's foreign and
defence policies under the Howard Government, it was not surprising
that a fictitious pretext constructed by spin doctors in Washington
for opinion management in the US would be mimicked here.

It takes an awful lot of self-indoctrination to look at what has been
done to Afghanistan and Iraq over the past five years and claim, as
John Howard did recently in Chicago, that no power in history "has
brought to bear the righteous force or generous countenance of the
United States of America". The ingratitude of both peoples, expressed
in their irrational anti-Americanism and cruel resistance to the use
of righteous force against them, is therefore inexplicable.

In his most definitive statement yet on the moral foundations of
Australian diplomacy, Alexander Downer recently outlined the role that
promoting freedom and democracy plays in the Government's foreign
policy. Not since Robespierre have we heard such a commitment to the
highest moral and political virtues.

Largely plagiarised from neo-conservative pamphlets and White House
press releases, Downer's statement reflects the zero-sum world view
from Washington rather than the more subtle multilateral perspective
normally favoured by middle powers.

Although an attempt to rewrite the history of catastrophic Western
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ideology of Downer's
approach is best illustrated by applying it to the case of Indonesia
generally, and Papua specifically.

In the article, Downer argues that "we are supporting values that
deliver practical success for ordinary people. We are delivering
tangible outcomes for people who deserve the opportunity to forge a
future of their own." It's a commendable commitment, except that in
the case of Papua we are seeking to deny people the opportunity "to
forge a future of their own" by opposing their right to
self-determination.

The only "tangible outcomes" for them are persecution if they stay and
off-shore processing on Nauru if they succeed in escaping the
territory.

According to the Foreign Minister, "we need to promote moderation at
the expense of extremism. We need to foster societies where there is
tolerance for everyone except the intolerant" and, it appears, those
in Indonesia's eastern province who seek a political future outside
the repressive control of Java's political elite. Kopassus and the
rest of the Indonesian military (TNI) are known for many things.
Moderation towards the country's population isn't one of them.

"In democracies, people can freely express their disagreements with
governments," says Downer. "They can exercise their right to influence
governments and hold them to standards of accountability through
public comment, political activism and, ultimately, by voting." True
enough, unless the country is Indonesia, where democratic rule
mysteriously permits political repression and persecution, larceny,
cultural attacks and lengthy prison terms for people who "freely
express their disagreements with governments" or merely raise an
unofficial flag. This is behaviour we wouldn't hesitate to brand state
terrorism if it were occurring in Iran or North Korea.

Although he wants to give precisely the opposite impression, the
democratic attributes that Downer accurately defines are largely
absent from many parts of Indonesia, suggesting a move away from what
he calls "militaristic" and "authoritarian" government has yet to be
fully made there. By regularly citing Indonesia as a democratic
transition state in the region, the Foreign Minister cannot explain
the persecution Australia's Immigration Department believes 42 Papuan
asylum seekers would face if they were forcibly sent home.

Downer claims that "it is a recurring theme in Australian foreign
policy that where an oppressed people stand for freedom and democracy,
Australia plays its part". The part that Australia is playing in
Papua, however, is helping to deny "an oppressed people" an
opportunity to "stand for freedom and democracy", because good
political relations with Jakarta are more important.

His suggestion that Australia is "acting to support these values with
our neighbours" must ring hollow around the Freeport gold and copper
mine at Grasberg, and throughout the benighted territory of Papua.

Scott Burchill is senior lecturer in international
relations at Deakin University.

-------------------------------------------------

The Australian
Friday, June 30, 2006

Fence-menders have made a good job of it

John Howard and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono deserve credit for finding
common ground, writes Dennis Shanahan

ON Tuesday morning, as a disconsolate John Howard prepared to leave
the Indonesian island of Batam after watching Australia's dispiriting
defeat in the FIFA World Cup, he received a message of commiseration
from his host, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It was a personal
message and the sort of deft touch and sympathy for Australia's
feelings to be expected from the accomplished moderate leader of the
world's largest Muslim country.

On Monday morning the two leaders had greeted each other warmly as
they exercised in the already steamy heat of early morning on the
resort island, where they were meeting. Yet only 48 hours earlier
there had been suggestions the Indonesians would not agree to the trip
and Howard would be publicly snubbed for his June 15 letter of
complaint to SBY about the early release of Abu Bakar Bashir and for
failing to pass new immigration rules on boatpeople.

There was Indonesian resentment over Australia's decision to grant
asylum to 42 Papuans who fled Indonesian control in March. Both
leaders were under pressure from their political opponents. There were
divisions on both sides. And Bashir, more of a problem for Yudhoyono
than Howard, was taunting and baiting the Australian public and the
families of Bali bombing victims.

In Australia, Howard was accused of handing over our sovereignty to
Indonesia by changing the immigration laws; in Jakarta, he was accused
of undermining Indonesia's sovereignty by not returning the Papuan
asylum-seekers. In Australia, Yudhoyono was accused of being soft on
terrorism; in Indonesia, he was accused of giving up sovereignty.

In Australia it was reported SBY was considering scuttling the talks
and the defence treaty with Indonesia was in doubt. What the
speculation hadn't counted on was the political will of both leaders
to wear some domestic criticism, to overrule some of the judgments
within their respective governments and to exercise leadership
diplomacy.

It was a tricky situation, but both leaders came away with enough to
put the vital relationship back on track, as some Indonesians and
Asian newspapers saw it.

"SBY, Howard set about patching up relations", said The Jakarta Post's
headline after the meeting. Kompas bluntly said: "Papuan issue settled
in Batam", and its editorial noted the spirit to restore ties was
obvious.

There were similar headlines in Hong Kong and Singapore; The Wall
Street Journal Asia said: "Leaders break impasse".

If the Asian media judgment is to be accepted - and it so often is
when relations are bad between Australia and Indonesia - then the
talks achieved a lot. Of course, expectations of what would or could
be achieved had been set high in Australia and Indonesia, with
Opposition foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd setting out conditions
for control of Bashir based on the UN convention Howard cited in his
letter to SBY, while Indonesia wanted guarantees on Papua.

The legal decision to grant asylum to the 42 Papuans plunged political
relations between Australia and Indonesia to the lowest point since
Canberra's support for East Timor's independence in 1999, when Jakarta
withdrew its ambassador in protest. The early release from prison of
Bashir, the radical cleric who taunts Australia and supports terrorist
acts, caused equal resentment among the Australian public. Relations
plunged to a seven-year nadir.

However, SBY went out of his way to make it clear that he has strong
personal links with and regard for Howard, and the Prime Minister
reciprocated. In a meeting at risk of being scuttled, there was
agreement to set an end-of-the-year deadline for a new defence and
security pact and progress on prisoner exchange as well as aid and
investment agreements.

On the two most contentious issues, the two leaders, in their letters
and at a joint press conference, tried to calm public feelings and
restore diplomatic balance.

Howard gave a strong guarantee on Papua, declaring that Canberra
supported Indonesian sovereignty and would not allow Australia to be a
staging post for separatism. While continuing to press for further
action against Bashir - or "that man", as Howard calls him - the Prime
Minister also tried to assuage domestic concerns and balance Bashir
against the Australian decision to grant asylum.

"Australia respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Indonesia, including sovereignty over Papua. Australia does not
support separatism and secessionist movements in Indonesia. My
Government does not wish to see Australia becoming a staging point for
any such activities," Howard said in his second letter to SBY.

This addressed the fear in Jakarta that the asylum for the 42 Papuans
presaged moves by Australia to foster a new breakaway movement, as was
the case in East Timor, that would lead to Indonesia losing the
resource-rich province of Papua.

There were barbs and concessions in both leaders' letters. SBY noted
the guarantee on Papua, then defended Indonesia on the issue of
Bashir's early release. He pointed out that many Indonesians had died
in terrorist bombing attacks and that he could not have interfered
with the court's decision to release Bashir, just as Howard could not
interfere with court decisions in Australia.

Given that Bashir is a bigger threat to SBY and moderate Islam in
Indonesia than he is to Howard or Australia, the Indonesian President
went as far as he could in trying to placate the Australian audience.

Besides, his statement that he had to consider the rule of law, human
rights and democratic rights in dealing with Bashir is a refreshing
sign of the dramatic changes that have occurred in Indonesia.

Labor's demands for 24-hour surveillance became a touchstone, yet
neither Howard nor SBY could deliver. However, the latter emphasised
that Bashir's release would not weaken Jakarta's anti-terror stand and
gave a written guarantee Indonesia would take "pre-emptive and
preventive" action against terrorists. Also, people suspected of being
involved in terrorist activity - and let's not forget Bashir has
convictions related to terrorism, although they specifically relate to
immigration breaches - would be kept under close surveillance.

In the context of the main bones of contention, the progress made
wasn't enough for critics in Indonesia and Australia. However, given
the state of relations between the countries before the meeting, what
was achieved at Batam has to be seen as a huge advance for Yudhoyono
and Howard.

--------------------------------------------------------

Canberra Times (Australia)
June 29, 2006

Why trying to appease Indonesia doesn't work

By Bruce Haigh

WHAT a pity that John Howard, his cabinet and advisers are not
students of history. If they were, they would not seek to appease
Indonesia. As a diplomatic tool it has been tried time and time again
and failed.

In the 1970s and 80s, criticism of the Suharto regime by the
Australian media led to Australian governments doing cartwheels to
appease Indonesia.

When Peter Hastings, the venerable foreign affairs editor of the
Sydney Morning Herald, was banned from going to Indonesia because of
his criticism of Suharto, the Australian Government sought to placate
Indonesia. They did not defend freedom of the press, the SMH nor
Hastings' right to express an opinion on a regime that everyone in the
Australian Government knew was rotten to the core.

Criticism of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor from whatever
quarter in Australia brought forth strictures and equivalent hand
wringing. When the ABC office in Jakarta was closed by Indonesia in
the mid-80s, it was the ABC that was criticised by Australia.

This Government might think it has hit upon a unique solution to the
present difficulty with Indonesia over West Papuan asylum-seekers, but
there is nothing new in its approach.

In 1985, in response to OPM (Free Papua Movement) activity along the
border with West Papua and PNG, the TNI (the Indonesian Armed Forces)
conducted military operations, including across the border, which
resulted in thousands of West Papuans fleeing into PNG as refugees and
seeking asylum. Australia refused to take any, on the grounds it would
upset Indonesia. At the same time, the Australian Government put
pressure on the ABC to rein in Shaun Dawney's coverage of the issue.

Three West Papuans made their way to Boigu Island, Australian
territory not far off the coast of PNG, where they claimed refugee
status.

They were brought to Thursday Island. For their trouble, they were put
in prison and their claims were not heard. Chris Hurford, the Labor
minister for immigration, argued that they were economic refugees, and
if accepted they would be the thin edge of the wedge. Thousands more
would follow. These assertions were made without any evidence to back
them up. And so these poor unfortunates sat and rotted for weeks and
then months. Inter- departmental meetings were held, with the
Department of Immigration making a range of excuses for not granting
visas, including claims of the thin edge of the wedge to keeping
Australia free from disease. The issue even went to cabinet.

In the event, as a result of pressure from public opinion, the
churches and the media, the West Papuans were given protection visas
and released. Thousands more did not follow. The Indonesian Government
coped (as it always does). It was not put to them by Australia or any
other country that it should at the very least modify its repressive
military occupation of West Papua.

The recent excising of the whole of Australia from the migration zone
in response to Indonesian criticism of the granting of refugee status
to 42 West Papuans is by far the greatest over-reaction in the history
of appeasement toward Indonesia.

It goes without saying that it will not work. It will, however, lead
to greater demands being made by the Indonesians, emboldened by what
they see as Australian weakness.

Some commentators would have the human rights of the West Papuans as
the price of a good relationship with Indonesia. In other words, the
indigenous population of West Papua should be hostages to the fortunes
of the good relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

And all this based on the gutlessness of the Australian Government in
not saying to the Indonesians "get your house in order; stop your
military behaving badly in West Papua, treat the West Papuans with
dignity and respect, restore an environment in which they can enjoy
freedom of expression and association".

If it were left to John Howard and Kim Beazley, the Acehnese would
still be under the iron heel of the TNI, the tsunami put paid to that
- at least for the time being.

But the Indonesian Government, like the Japanese Government in the
1930s, has little control over the military.

The elected Government of Indonesia is weak because of the unique
position of the military in being charged with the responsibility of
holding together the ethnically diverse archipelagic republic. This
role ensures that the military remains central and crucial to the
politics of the republic.

The recent tenor of the diplomatic relationship between Australia and
Indonesia was spelt out with the appointment of Bill Farmer, former
head of the Department of Immigration, who oversaw Tampa, children in
detention and the Pacific solution, as Australian ambassador to
Indonesia. As a result of that particular record, Farmer's moral
authority to the position has been diminished.

Decent Indonesians do not respect those decisions for which they share
responsibility. They do not respect John Howard and therein lies the
problem. For as much as they want Howard to back off over West Papua,
they see the ease with which he was prepared to do so as part of his
deep- seated racism, expressed equally towards Aborigines, West
Papuans and by implication towards themselves, the Javanese.

Howard panicked over the Indonesian reaction to the granting of
refugee status to the 42 West Papuans because of fear that the
Indonesians would again open up the boat people pipeline, hundreds, if
not thousands, being facilitated once again though Indonesia to
Australia. Australia allegedly closed off this pipeline through
agreement reached with the Indonesian authorities. If you believe
that, you would believe that the Indonesian intelligence agencies have
not been involved in East Timor.

The people-smuggling operation from Indonesia to Australia was at best
condoned by the TNI and the Indonesian police on the basis of
kick-backs, and at worst, controlled by them. The latter is far more
likely in view of TNI control over illegal logging, prostitution, gem
mining and the movement of goods and provision of services throughout
the archipelago.

Therefore, to bring about a cessation of people-smuggling,
compensation would have needed to be provided through the local TNI
command structure on a continuing basis. In view of the above, perhaps
now it is a little easier to understand the difficulties John Howard
has created for himself.

If he had quickly processed the refugees arriving by boat and welcomed
them as valuable members of the Australian community, he would not
have given the Indonesian Government the big stick with which to hit
him over the head. They would have had no leverage over Australian
policy or sovereignty.

As a firm believer in Australia's military history, John Howard - and
Kim Beazley - should know that weakness begets weakness and strength
begets strength.

Government and Opposition are peas in a pod.

Where are the people who can put together policies which will
strengthen Australia as a nation?

The author is a political commentator and a retired Australian diplomat. 
During his time with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade he 
worked in Indonesia.]

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Joyo Indonesia News Service
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