[Kabar-indonesia] The Indonesia Challenge [by Richard Woolcott]

[Joyo at aol.com]

Canberra Times (Australia)
Tuesday, October 31, 2006

The Indonesia Challenge

By Richard Woolcott

FIFTEEN years ago I visited Boston to participate in a
seminar on Indonesia at Tufts University. In a taxi driving
through heavy rain between the airport and the university, a
colleague from the Asia Society in New York applied what he
called his taxi driver test on knowledge of Asia.

He asked the driver, "do you know where Indonesia is?"
Thinking we wanted to change our destination, the driver
frowned and replied, "sorry, buddy, I don't go outside the
main suburbs when it's raining."

Now, with President Bush's "global war on terror", with
which Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer have
so closely linked Australia, Indonesia - with about
220million people - is now much more on the American radar
screen than it was a decade ago. In fact, Bush is soon to
visit Indonesia.

The manner in which Islam evolves in Indonesia is, however,
of much greater importance to Australia.

What are the implications for our relations with Indonesia
of the "war on terror", including action against Islamic
extremists, the occupation of Iraq and of the handling
domestically of the Islamic community here?

September11, 2001, and its aftermath drew Australia much
closer to the Bush Administration, but it did not change our
geographical location in the East Asian region, or the fact
that our northern neighbour is the country with the largest
Muslim population in the world.

We need to acknowledge the different situations and
interests of Australia and the United States in actions to
combat terrorism and in dealing with Islam.

The United States is a super power in a monotheistic
hemisphere that is nominally Christian from Alaska and
Canada in the North to Tierra del Fuego at the southern end
of South America.

Australia's power and religious environment is totally
different. In our region, Christianity is a minority
religion in an area that includes very large Islamic,
Buddhist and Hindu communities. In addition to Indonesia,
Malaysia and Brunei also have Islamic majorities, while
Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand have substantial
Muslim minorities. What we are witnessing in the Islamic
world, including in Indonesia, is a titanic struggle for the
hearts and minds of Muslims between the moderates and the
modernisers, on the one hand and, on the other, the
conservatives and the fundamentalists, including the
relatively small number of those who are prepared to use
indiscriminate terror.
It is vital to Australia that the moderates and the
modernisers prevail in Indonesia. In this context, we should
examine carefully the concept of "war" on terror as well as
the implications of our very different policies towards
Iraq. The phrase "global war on terror" is itself
misconceived. It has proved a politically expedient slogan,
but it has served to distort rather than define a complex
challenge. Referring to it as a war actually accords the
terrorists the status of soldiers, or warriors, when most
are misguided ideologues. I am not underestimating the
dangers posed by terrorists and jihadists, but it is not a
war in the real sense against the armed forces of a
particular country or countries. More correctly, it is
coordinated action to combat indiscriminate acts of
violence, similar to actions to combat AIDS, Third World
poverty and drug trafficking, each of which claims more
lives than terrorism.

The war in Iraq has had a huge impact on Islam in Indonesia.

Indonesia opposed the original invasion for three reasons.
First, the government of Megawati Sukarnoputri believed in
2003 that it would stimulate anti-American sentiment in
Indonesia and much of South-East Asia. Secondly, it was a
war of American choice not endorsed by the Security Council,
which undermined the United Nations' founding principle of
collective security. Thirdly, many in Indonesia would see
it, despite statements to the contrary, as a reflection of
Western antipathy towards Islam.

When President Yudhoyono came to power in October 2004, the
invasion had taken place and the occupation was continuing.
Indonesia's concerns were reinforced by the fact that the
conflict had led, not to the hoped-for decrease in
terrorism, but to a substantial increase in terrorism in the
Middle East and in Indonesia itself. Additionally, the
ongoing conflict provided greater recruiting opportunities
for Islamic extremists and jihadists in Indonesia and
elsewhere in the region.

In Iraq the damage is done. We have to live with our
mistakes, including our participation in the invasion. The
issue now is to replace slogans with a practical and a
negotiated exit strategy. Political rhetoric suggesting any
change in policy is wanting to "cut and run" is foolish. In
reality, there are only two choices facing the United States
now, namely escalation or disengagement.

Statements that a withdrawal of remaining coalition of the
willing forces would give a great victory to the terrorists,
including jihadists in Indonesia, puts the cart before the
horse. It was the original invasion and the subsequent
occupation, without taking into account Indonesian or
Malaysian views, in contrast to the first Gulf War in 1991,
that has provided the opportunity for Islamic extremists to
strengthen their influence. The continuing occupation is
widely regarded as making the situation worse, not better.

There is no doubt that Islamic identity is more apparent in
Indonesia now than a decade ago.

This is due, apart from the Iraq situation, to the
replacement of the authoritarian orthodoxy under Suharto by
a democratically elected President and Parliament, and to
the strengthening of the Islamic school network. So far,
however, the increase in Islamisation is limited and
Indonesia remains a moderate Islamic secular state. The
President and his ministers are strongly opposed to Islamic
extremism and terrorism. We forget that more Indonesians
have been killed in terrorists' attacks in Indonesia than
Australians and other foreigners.

How Australia acts towards its own Islamic community can
also have repercussions in Indonesia. We need to avoid
grandstanding for domestic political reasons in this
context.

Yudhoyono, despite his strong opposition to terrorism and
extremism, has been reluctant to respond to political
demands from Australia to ban Jemaah Islamiah because of the
danger of radicalising many Indonesian moderates. Moreover,
as JI has the inclusive meaning in Bahasa Indonesia of
Muslim Brotherhood, a blanket ban is politically difficult.

The extensive publicity and the exploitation of cultural
differences as a result of occasional offensive statements
or foolish actions tend to place all Muslims in a negative
light.

Most Muslim Australians, however, want to be good citizens.
They tend not to gamble or drink alcohol and are generally
family and community orientated. Our political figures
should take the lead in distinguishing between a necessary
level of vigilance against possible acts of terrorism here
and the temptation to appeal to crude popularism for
political advantage.

While Australia must maintain firm opposition to Islamic
extremism and continue to work closely with regional
countries, especially Indonesia, in opposing terrorism, we
have a special need to follow a more sensitive, carefully
considered and more sophisticated approach to issues with
important religious overtones in Indonesia.

Richard Woolcott was Australia's ambassador to Indonesia
(1975-78) and chairman of the Australia Indonesia Institute
(1992-98).

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Joyo Indonesia News Service
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