[Kabar-indonesia] Tempo-1: Coup d'Etat! Habibie's "Decisive Moments" [4 reports]

[JoyoNews at aol.com]

4 Tempo Magazine Cover Story Reports (1 of 2): 

- Habibie's Book Of Problems 

- Opinion: Coup d'Etat! 

- Prabowo Subianto: 
  "The charges were 
  too harsh" 

- A Question of Timing 

Tempo Magazine
No. 05/VII
Oct 03-09, 2006 

Cover Story 

Habibie's Book Of Problems 

B.J. Habibie's book, Decisive Moments, has started a new polemic. Lt. Gen. 
(ret) Prabowo Subianto demands that the author revise certain sections. Habibie 
refuses to do so. Some generals have commented on the 535-page book to Tempo. 

AFTER seven years of seclusion in Germany, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie returned 
home bringing a big surprise. Two weeks ago, the former Indonesian president 
launched a new book entitled Decisive Moments, the story of the dramatic 
transfer of power from President Suharto to Habibie on May 21, 1998. Habibie wrote 
about members of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) operating 
outside of the command of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) commander-a post which 
at that time was held by General Wiranto. 

According to the book, this led Habibie to remove Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo 
Subianto from his post as Kostrad commander. Habibie reveals the precarious tale 
which took place in the inner circle of the Palace during his initial days in 
office. 

The book caused sparks to fly as soon as it was publicly released. A polemic 
ensued, which was widely covered by the media. Prabowo urged Habibie to revise 
the book. "I was commander of 34 battalions. If I wanted to [stage a coup], 
why didn't I do it then?" he told reporters at a press conference in Jakarta 
last week. Habibie, however, rejected Prabowo's request because, "the book is 
based on my notes," the former President asserted. The author even encouraged 
other generals to speak out. 

Tempo contacted some generals for statements regarding the events of May 21, 
1998. Some were open, others were tight-lipped. Lt. Gen. (ret) Sintong 
Panjaitan, Habibie's former adjutant, was in the latter category. He said: "I will 
soon write a book which cannot be questioned." 

Wiranto, one of the central figures in Indonesia's post-Suharto politics, was 
not ready to give a comment. Through his close friend, Lt. Gen. Suady 
Marasabessy, his response to Tempo was, "I don't want to corner anyone. This is the 
fasting month, after all." 

                                                       * * *

The notes which Habibie referred to as the foundation of his new book began 
on May 21, 1998, the day he replaced Suharto as President. 

Habibie moved quickly. On that night, assisted by four of his close 
associates, he put together the cabinet. All went smoothly except for one thing: 
filling the post of the ABRI commander. 

Some people considered for the position included: Gen. Subagyo Hadisiswoyo, 
who at that time was Army Chief of Staff (KSAD), Lt. Gen. A.M. Hendropriyono 
and Lt. Gen. Junus Yosfiah. Habibie, however, was unable to make a final 
decision. 

A source in the Palace inner circle told Tempo that Habibie appeared to 
vacillate. "A decision made in the morning, which was changed that afternoon and 
again later that night," said the source. When the meeting ended at 2am on May 
22, the name of the new commander was still undecided. 

The final decision was made the next morning. Habibie selected General 
Wiranto, the ABRI commander in the Suharto cabinet, to fill this important post. "My 
impression is that Wiranto is honest and has high moral and religious 
values," Habibie explained. At about 6am, he conveyed his decision to Wiranto by 
telephone. 

Habibie was relieved, although the situation in Jakarta was growing tense. 
Thousands of university students continued to swarm around the House of 
Representatives (DPR) building in Senayan. They were divided between supporting 
Habibie and demanding a special session. 

That morning, Habibie was ready to head for the State Palace to announce the 
new cabinet. At about 7:30am, Sintong Panjaitan entered his office. He asked 
the President to receive Army Special Forces (Kopassus) commander, Maj. Gen. 
Muchdi Purwopranjono and Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen. These two had brought a letter 
from Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto and Senior General Abdul Haris Nasution. 

Habibie ordered Sintong to go out and accept the letter. He returned a moment 
later and suggested that Habibie receive the letter in person. At the door to 
his office, Habibie unfolded the letter, then read it. The letter recommended 
that Subagyo be appointed as the ABRI chief and Prabowo as the Army Chief of 
Staff (KSAD). 

Kivlan Zen told Tempo how the letter was made that very morning. At about 3am 
on May 22, Prabowo ordered him to go and meet Nasution. The order was short: 
ask the Senior General to write Habibie a letter, so that Subagyo can be the 
ABRI chief. Kivlan claimed that the suggestion to make Prabowo the KSAD was his 
initiative and not Prabowo's. 

After Habibie read the letter, Muchdi and Kivlan asked for instructions. 
Habibie answered succinctly, "I have read the letter." Then the two generals again 
said: "Give us instructions." Habibie's response was the same. "I have read 
the letter," then went back into his office. 

At 9am, President Habibie headed for the Palace. Troops were visible 
everywhere, alongside the tanks. Habibie entered the Palace from the west gate. 

In his book, Habibie said that Wiranto was already waiting at the Palace 
steps. The ABRI chief asked to meet him in private. Habibie invited him in. 
Wiranto then reported that Kostrad troops from outside Jakarta had moved into the 
capital. There was a concentration of forces at Habibie's residence in Kuningan, 
South Jakarta, and in front of the State Palace. 

Habibie concluded that the Kostrad commander was moving troops without 
informing the ABRI commander. He immediately ordered that, "before the sun sets, the 
Kostrad commander must be replaced. All forces under his command are to 
return to their respective units." 

Wiranto was surprised and asked who his replacement would be. "It's up to 
[you] the commander," answered Habibie. 

That morning at the Palace, a throng of domestic and foreign reporters were 
waiting for the announcement of the new cabinet appointments, which had been 
delayed for some hours. Alarming rumors were circulating, among them that 
Habibie had failed to form the cabinet. This doubt vanished as soon as Habibie 
announced his cabinet. The President immediately started work and received a number 
of ministers. 

Wiranto called while he was with some ministers. The ABRI commander proposed 
the Commander of the Siliwangi Regional Military District, Maj. Gen. Djamari 
Chaniago, as the new Kostrad commander. However, Djamari could only be 
appointed the next day, because Prabowo had been removed and a new commander had to be 
chosen before sundown, Wiranto suggested Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang, the ABRI 
chief's assistant for operations, as the interim Kostrad commander. Habibie 
agreed. 

According to Subagyo, after the cabinet announcement, the ABRI commander 
ordered the Kostrad commander and the Kopassus chief to be removed that same day. 
The appointment ceremony was held at 3pm that day. Yet Prabowo was not present 
when the ceremony was to be held. Subagyo maintains that according to some 
information, Prabowo was at the Palace. "I don't know what he was doing there," 
he told Tempo. 

Meanwhile, an aide reported to the President that Prabowo Subianto wanted to 
meet him. Habibie was confused whether or not to meet with Prabowo in such a 
situation. In his book, Habibie clearly indicated that he was uneasy. 

However, he finally decided to meet Prabowo after lunch in the guest room of 
Wisma Negara. Four of Habibie's aides stood at a discreet distance. Thareq, 
Habibie's son, was present at the meeting. On seeing that Prabowo was unarmed, 
Habibie felt more relaxed. 

Habibie wrote that Prabowo spoke in English. 

"This is an insult to my family and my father-in-law's family. You have fired 
me as the Kostrad commander," Prabowo said. 

Habibie replied, "You are not fired, you're being replaced." Habibie 
explained the reason for the replacement, namely the report from the ABRI chief 
regarding the Kostrad troops heading for Jakarta. 

"I intended to ensure the President was safe," said Prabowo. 

Habibie retorted, "That is the responsibility of the Presidential Security 
Detail which answers directly to the ABRI commander. It is not your job." 

"What kind of President are you? You are naïve," exclaimed Prabowo, in an 
angry tone. 

"I don't care. I am the President and must take care of the national 
situation," said Habibie. 

Citing his father's and father-in-law's names, Prabowo asked Habibie to be 
allowed to command the troops for three months. Habibie refused. Prabowo 
shortened his request to three weeks, but Habibie firmly denied his request. 

In the middle of this heated debate, Sintong Panjaitan entered the room and 
said, "General, Pak President does not have much time. Please leave the room." 

Habibie stopped him: "A minute," he said. 

Prabowo asked for some time to speak to Wiranto by telephone. Habibie agreed. 
An adjutant called Wiranto, but there was no answer. For a second time, 
Sintong entered and reminded him about the President's busy schedule. Habibie 
hugged Prabowo and sent greetings to his father and father-in-law. 

The meeting was over. 

                                                        * * *

The story of what happened eight years ago is now becoming the talk of the 
town. Prabowo has since appeared in a number of publications, denying charges 
that he had mobilized troops without the knowledge of the ABRI commander. 
Prabowo said that at that time, all troops in Jakarta were under the authority of 
the Jakarta Regional Military District commander, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. 

Sjafrie, who is now the Secretary-General at the Defense Department, verified 
this. On May 14, said Sjafrie, the ABRI commander gave him a mandate to take 
control of troops in Jakarta. The forces which arrived from the various 
provinces also arrived on his order. So, "If there were troops coming without his 
knowledge, where did they come from?" he asked. 

Several generals from the inner circle during the events of May 21 have 
spoken with Tempo. And they are not alone. If everything goes according to plan, on 
Tuesday of this week a number of figures will also give their own version of 
events in Jakarta. Among them will be Dien Syamsuddin, Fadli Zon, and Muchdi. 

The sparks generated by Habibie's book will certainly awaken many historical 
observers from their lengthy slumber. 

-- Wenseslaus Manggut, Kurie Suditomo, Wahyu Dyatmika, Edo Poernomo 

sidebar: The Previous 16 Hours... 

IT was no ordinary Wednesday. In the span of a few hours, a number of 
important events took place on May 20, 1998. Some ministers resigned en masse. 
Suharto announced he was going to resign as President. His Vice President, Habibie, 
would be President. Here is a partial listing of some important events which 
took place in the 16 hours before Habibie's inauguration. 

At about 5pm 

Ginandjar Kartasasmita calls. This Coordinating Minister for the Economy, 
Finance & Industry, announces that he and 14 other ministers refuse to serve in 
the Reform Cabinet currently being put together. 

At about 7:30pm 

Habibie meets with Suharto at his family residence, known as Cendana. After 
deciding on the new ministers' lineup for the Reform Cabinet, Suharto lays out 
his agenda: on Thursday, May 21, the cabinet appointments would be announced; 
on Friday they are to be sworn into office; on Saturday he will resign as 
President and Habibie will take up his presidential duties. 

On the way home, Habibie invites four coordinating ministers and all of the 
ministers under Ginandjar's coordination for a meeting at 10pm, Western 
Indonesian Time. 

At about 9:45pm 

Habibie reveals to the ministers that the Reform Cabinet has been formed. He 
also informs them of Suharto's plan to step down on Saturday and to ask a 
number of ministers who have stated their resignation to stay on in office. 

At about 10:45pm 

Habibie contacts the President during the meeting, but fails to get through. 
Through State Secretary/Minister Saadilah Mursyid, the President announces his 
decision to resign at an earlier date: the next day at 10am. 

At about 1am 

Habibie tries to get some sleep, but decides to return to his office at 4am. 
"I covered some pillows with a blanket to make it look like [to my wife] I was 
lying under the covers." 

At about 6:50am 

Habibie meets with ABRI commander General Wiranto. In a meeting lasting until 
7:25am, Wiranto says he received a presidential instruction signed by Suharto 
to work for public security and national stability if things get out of 
control. 

At about 8:30am 

Habibie heads for the State Palace. His plan to meet first with Suharto at 
Cendana fails because Suharto is unwilling. 

At about 9:10am 

Habibie is sworn into office as President. 

Source: Decisive Moments. 
 
----------------------------------------------

Tempo Magazine
No. 05/VII
Oct 03-09, 2006 

Opinion 

Coup d'Etat! 

IF Ibnu Khaldun were still alive, he would enjoy the recent dispute between 
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and Prabowo Subianto. After all, the 15th century 
intellectual known as the founder of the modern historical method was of the 
opinion that history cannot be written based on facts alone, but must be linked to 
the context and paradigms around the time that the incidents happened. 

Just look at the dispute between B.J. Habibie and Prabowo Subianto, two men 
who were close at the end of the Suharto regime, and who now-in the democratic 
era-are arguing over their common past experiences. 

The debate was triggered by the launch of Habibie's book Detik-detik yang 
Menentukan (Decisive Moments) two weeks ago. The 549-page book contains Habibie's 
account of the downfall of Suharto and various incidents that occurred when 
he became President of Indonesia. 

Detailed in the book is General Wiranto's report of unknown soldiers around 
the palace and his official residence and their demand that President Habibie 
move to the palace. It was this report that prompted President Habibie to order 
Armed Forces chief General Wiranto to dismiss Prabowo from his position as 
commander of the Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad). Prabowo then came to see 
Habibie and asked for his dismissal to be delayed three months, but the request 
was denied. 

This incident is a historical fact, but Prabowo rejected the details of the 
conversation featured in the book. Prabowo then gave media interviews and held 
a press conference because he felt there was an insinuation that he had 
planned a coup and had disobeyed orders. The former son-in-law of President Suharto 
also tried to meet with Habibie, to ask that the book be revised, but Habibie 
refused to meet him. 

Prabowo has not given up. He says he will write a book to clarify the charges 
he feels are untrue. This is the best way to resolve the problem in the 
current democratic environment. Differences of opinion, especially those involving 
the story of a face-to-face meeting, should be laid bare before the public in 
the form of books written by the two protagonists. Then, let the public and 
historians debate, investigate and reach their conclusions. 

This is because history, in the words of Napoleon, "is the version of past 
events that people have decided to agree upon." The book with the most 
convincing contents, for example, backed by authentic documentation and the accounts of 
others, will be the most trusted version and become historical notes. But 
even this is not the final word, because history can be revised in the future, if 
new and highly credible evidence emerges. 

We hope that Prabowo's book, which we trust will be written, will be 
additional material for historians to analyze the birth of Indonesian reforms, 
characterized by considerable death and destruction. This will add to the information 
in books written by such figures as General Wiranto, the late Professor 
Doctor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen. There is also the report 
by the Joint Fact-Finding Team and tons of media articles. We hope that other 
people such as General Endriartono Sutarto and Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin 
will follow suit with their versions of the events. 

The more books written by those involved with and those who witnessed the 
change of power, the more information there will be for future generations to 
understand the mental struggles of the past. In this way, wisdom can be used to 
bring about greater progress for the nation and the people. 

One result will be the effort to find answers to various unanswered 
questions. For example: why did the riots happen, and why did the military seemingly 
allowed them to happen? Who was behind them, and who should bear the 
responsibility? 

The public needs to know what really happened and what politicians and senior 
officials actually did at this time of crisis, given that most of them are 
still active in politics, and even harbor ambitions to reach the top. Because a 
crisis is the best time to test the integrity and character of a person, the 
public needs to know what they did during these "decisive moments." 

Of course, all the information from these history-makers must be viewed 
critically because if Ibnu Khaldun were still alive, he would not immediately 
accept the conclusions of Habibie in his book. Perhaps he would ask Habibie if his 
support for General Wiranto and his dismissal of Lt. Gen Prabowo Subianto was 
because he really trusted the Indonesian Armed Forces chief, or because this 
former aide of President Suharto held in his hand President Suharto's 
Instruction Number 16/1998 (dated May 18, 1998) appointing him as Supreme Commander of 
Operations to Maintain the Nation's Security and Unity? 

We will never know Habibie's response because Ibnu Khaldun died a long time 
ago and he will never live again. But the beauty of living in a democracy is 
that any person can become an Ibnu Khaldun and benefit from the differences of 
opinion that take place in a critical society. 
 
---------------------------------------------

Tempo Magazine
No. 05/VII
Oct 03-09, 2006 

Cover Story 

Prabowo Subianto: "The charges were too harsh" 

HAVING earned three stars at the age of 46, he became the youngest general in 
the history of the TNI (Indonesian Military). He shone among his fellow 
officers. Prabowo's name began to be noticed when he became commander of the 
Special Forces (Kopassus) in 1996, a job he held for the next two years. Following 
his term with the red berets, he was appointed commander of the powerful Army 
Strategic Reserves (Kostrad).But Prabowo's meteoric rise came to an abrupt end 
a day after President Suharto resigned from office on May 21, 1998. Prabowo, 
who at the time was Suharto's son-in-law, got sidelined. Born in Jakarta on 
October 17, 1951, he was named commander of the Armed Forces Staff Command 
College before finally deciding to take early retirement. 

Last week, after former President B.J. Habibie launched his book, Detik-Detik 
yg Menentukan (Decisive Moments), Prabowo once again became the talk of the 
town. According to the book, Prabowo was relieved of his Kostrad command 
because he activated an 'illicit unit.' 

Reacting to the accusation, Prabowo called a press conference last Thursday 
to give his version of the story. Tempo reporters Jobpie Sugiharto, Fajar WH 
and Purwanto attended the press conference and later asked Prabowo some 
additional questions. Excerpts: 

How do you explain the presence of Kostrad troops at the National Monument 
(Monas)? 

All commands were in the hands of the operations commander: the Jakarta 
Military Commander (Kodam Jaya). Units of the Marine Corps, Special Forces, Kodam 
Jaya, Kodam Siliwangi (West Java), Kostrad and Kopassus at the time were under 
Kodam Jaya commander, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie (Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin). His objective 
was to secure Jakarta city, which had been burning for days before that. The 
authorities wanted to bring back a sense of stability to prevent further capital 
flight. Charging the troops with a coup attempt is too harsh. 

What did you do when the troops were concentrated at Monas? 

Since the 1997 economic crisis, we have been under attack. As a fighter and a 
patriot, I wanted to defend the nation from capital flight. Anyone in my 
position at the time would do anything to protect the country. When I was 
cashiered, I accepted it. Who wouldn't want a position? Because position is the 
vehicle in which to dedicate oneself to the people and the state. If one is not 
given a position, well, thank God for it…I no longer held any responsibility. 

Is it true that Kostrad forces outside the command were on the move? 

Even if that were true, so what? Would there have been a coup? If I wanted to 
[I could] I commanded 34 battalions. Why didn't I do it? Lt. Col. Untung had 
only two battalions and he was able to pull the September 30 PKI (G30S/PKI) 
coup. So, it depends on the individual. 

How did you end up bringing 44 Islamic associations to Habibie? 

The situation at the time was tense. Many people didn't want Habibie to 
replace Suharto. In my view and that of my colleagues, there should be a 
constitutional change. I met with the leaders of 14 Islamic mass organizations at Jalan 
Suwiryo 6 (in Menteng, Central Jakarta) on the evening of May 21, 1998. 
Witnesses to this event are still around. Then, I took them to Pak Habibie at about 
11pm. The next day, I was shocked to find out I was being charged with 
activating and leading troops to surround the city. 

Is it true you were actually bringing with you the support of those mass 
associations to retain power, given that you were Suharto's son-in-law? 

(Growing red with emotion) All troops were under the command of the 
operations commander, the Kodam Jaya general. If I had gone to Central Java, my troops 
would be under the Kodam Diponegoro command. If I went to South Sumatra, they 
would be under the Kodam Sriwijaya command. That is the command structure in 
the military! The Kostrad operations assistant was assigned to the command post 
under Pak Sjafrie (garrison headquarters). All the other operations 
assistants convened at the garrison, close to the Kostrad headquarters. He was the one 
in control. You understand what I'm trying to say?

In your view, why did Habibie relieve you of your Kostrad command? 

This is my political assessment: I was part of Cendana (Suharto's residence). 
Perhaps Habibie thought it wouldn't be politically correct. That's normal, 
isn't it? That's what happens when there a leadership change in any company. I 
regret there was a need to announce the reasons why. He should have just said, 
"you're dismissed." 

Is there any link to Habibie's statement that he didn't want any officer who 
could meet the President without going through the approval of the Armed 
Forces Commander in Chief? 

A leader will make a decision based on the information he or she gets. Access 
to information is vital. Perhaps he wanted only one way in. 
 
-----------------------------------------
 
Tempo Magazine
No. 05/VII
Oct 03-09, 2006 
 
Cover Story 

A Question of Timing 

The end-of-Ramadan holiday in 1991, Istiqlal Mosque, Central Jakarta…
STATE Minister of Research & Technology Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie sits among 
the cabinet ministers. They were all respectfully waiting for the arrival of 
President Suharto. Suddenly someone whispered in Habibie's ear, "I want to help 
you with the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals." ICMI is an 
organization consisting of a number of Muslim scholars (ulama) and intellectuals. 
At that time, ICMI, which was headed by Habibie, was less than a year old. 

Habibie immediately looked behind. "Who are you?" The whisperer, a 
middle-aged man wearing a batik shirt replied politely: "I'm Wiranto, sir." At that 
time, Wiranto was still the Chief of Staff of the Jakarta Regional Military 
District holding the rank of brigadier-general. 

This meeting reportedly formed the embryo of the Habibie-Wiranto 
relationship. Who would have guessed that seven years later, at the Istiqlal Mosque, the 
two would become central figures on the national political stage during the 
post-Suharto period? Wiranto was the first to meet with Habibie on the morning of 
May 21, a few hours before Suharto stepped down as President. 

In his new book, Decisive Moments, Habibie said that he was very impressed 
with Wiranto. "This general is honest, ethical and moral," he wrote. Habibie, as 
Vice President, automatically became the new President following Suharto's 
resignation. Wiranto also received a strong position. He held Presidential 
Instruction 16/1998, which gave him a mandate to secure the country. This letter 
resembled the March 11 Order (Supersemar) which General Suharto obtained in 
1966, paving the way for him to take power for 32 years. 

The public first became aware of Wiranto when he became the aide-de-camp or 
adjutant of President Suharto in 1989. He stayed with the Senior General for 
four years. Wiranto's military career began two decades earlier, in 1968, when 
he graduated from the National Military Academy in Magelang. 

After a stint as the presidential adjutant, he went on to hold all of the key 
military posts, including Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) chief and 
Army Chief of Staff. In early 1998, he reached the pinnacle of his military 
career when he was appointed as Armed Forces (ABRI) commander, followed by 
National Security Minister. 

Being a top military leader in the hub of a political crisis carried a lot of 
power. The Indonesian Military was continually suspected of wanting to 
declare a state of emergency and take over power. In his book entitled Witness at 
the Eye of the Storm, published three years ago, Wiranto admitted this fact. 

This does not mean that the issue of a coup never existed. In the same book, 
Wiranto said that he was accused of disobeying Suharto on those fateful days 
in May 1998. The person reporting this was Kostrad commander Lt. Gen. Prabowo 
Subianto. Detecting that there was a plan to get rid of him, Wiranto-together 
with Army Chief of Staff Gen. Subagyo H.S. and Jakarta Regional Military 
District commander, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin-immediately went to see Prabowo at 
the Suharto family residence, known as Cendana. "I got mad at Prabowo," wrote 
Wiranto. 

This Prabowo-Wiranto feud added another dimension to some critical times in 
the history of the Indonesian Republic. This rivalry was an old one. Prabowo's 
father, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, in his book Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang, 
published six years ago, wrote, "General Wiranto is the one who no longer 
conceals his hatred of Prabowo." 

At the height of this conflict, according to the Sumitro version, was the 
rumor that Prabowo had mobilized a renegade force and surrounded Habibie's home a 
day after Suharto's downfall. Sumitro is convinced that Wiranto was the one 
who orchestrated Prabowo's discharge from military duty. 

Despite such rumors, during the transition period (1998-1999) Wiranto was, 
nevertheless, offered the chance to become Vice President on three separate 
occasions. The offers came from the likes of Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid. He 
turned them all down. In his book, Wiranto implies that the time was not right. 

In 2004, Wiranto felt that his turn had come. But, as we all know, he was 
eliminated in the first round of Indonesia's first direct presidential elections. 

-- Wahyu Dhyatmika 
 
-End 1 of 2-

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Joyo Indonesia News Service
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