[Kabar-indonesia] The Australian: JI's Killer Network Spreads

[Joyo at aol.com]

The Australian
Monday, October 9, 2006

Killer network spreads

Zachary Abuza

Zachary Abuza, a leading scholar on terrorism in Southeast Asia, 
warns that the threat posed by al-Qa'ida affiliate Jemaah Islamiah is
rising.

IT'S bombing season in Indonesia. This month marks not only the fourth
anniversary of the first Bali bombing, it also marks one year since
the most recent Bali bombing.

And although progress has been made against al-Qa'ida's terrorist
affiliates in the region, it would be naive to write off Jemaah
Islamiah's capacity to strike again.

To be sure, in the wake of last November's death of master bomb maker
Azahari bin Husin, the local police feel more confident about JI's
diminishing capabilities. After all, Indonesia can claim the arrest of
330 members and more than 250 successful prosecutions.

Anyone who follows Indonesia can only be impressed with Jakarta's
successful counter-terrorism efforts at a time of democratic
transition. Counter-terrorism has not come at the expense of civil
liberties or brought Indonesia back to the repression of Suharto's New
Order. Still, despite some progress, we have a growing JI problem.

Any strategy that is based on decapitation is bound to fail. After
all, these terrorist groups can recruit, train and tap new leaders
faster than they can be neutralised. Terrorist organisations are
social networks and require a holistic strategy.

Nor is decapitation foolproof: 18 known and hardened JI leaders are
still at large. They are charismatic, highly trained and violent. More
alarming, they represent a cross-spectrum of society in education and
class; some with nothing more than Koranic education and jihad
experience in Afghanistan to middle-class, university-trained
professionals.

There is speculation that JI has factionalised. In 2005, Noordin
Mohammad Top announced a new group, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad. TQJ
represents the JI faction that has a decidedly anti-Western,
pro-bombing agenda, but it is not clear the degree to which it is
still within the formal JI structure.

The General Guidelines for Al-Jemaah Islamiah Struggle -- otherwise
known as the PUPJI -- outlines the three phases of jihad: iman (faith
of individuals), hijrah (building a base of operations) and then jihad
qital (fighting the enemies of Islam). Right now, JI is focusing on
the iman and hijrah until it has the capability for jihad qital. To
that end, it is employing a three-tined strategy: recruitment and
proliferation of cells, engaging in sectarian conflict and engaging in
social welfare.

Top wrote an 82-page tract based on the theoretical model espoused by
Abu Musab al-Suri, al-Qa'ida's leading theorist, on how to establish
loosely affiliated jihadi cells. With a secure base in MILF camps in
Mindanao, JI can effectively regroup.

JI is also redoubling its "uhud project" of fomenting sectarian
violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus in order to create a pure
Islamic zone from which it can emanate. Since 2004, bombings, targeted
assassinations, and raids on military-police facilities have become
regular. Attacks, including the beheading of three schoolgirls, are
meant to undermine confidence in the state and give members a sense of
defending their religion. JI is out to undermine the Malino Accords
and engage in Islamist vigilantism.

Finally, JI is adopting a Hamas-style model, focusing on social work
and charity -- what I refer to as the "inverse triangle" -- to build
up its popular support and forge greater links to Islamist parties and
organisations.

JI was founded as a covert militant organisation out of frustration
over the quietest organisations, such as Darul Islam. There was some
overt activity, but it was neither a primary focus nor a concrete
strategy opted by the leadership. Indeed, in some cases it seemed to
cause a backlash within the organisation. In 1999, Abu Bakar Bashir
established the Majelis Mujihidin Indonesia.

JI embedded members or co-opted two Saudi charities (Al Haramain and
the IIRO) and their Indonesian counterparts (KOMPAK and MERC) that
were used to support militant activities. While JI benefited from
these relations, they were always ancillary organisations, created to
assist jihadist activities. This is changing. With the war on terror
and concerted police pressure on their militant activities, JI has
adopted new strategies.

The humanitarian catastrophe caused by the December 2004 tsunami that
killed more than 165,000 people drew out three militant Islamist
organisations and charities linked to JI: the MMI, the Laskar
Mujihidin and MERC. All of these organisations had been active in the
sectarian bloodletting in 1998-2001 but were in retreat following the
October 2002 Bali bombing. The tsunami gave them a new strategy to
complement their terrorist activities.

Following the June 2006 earthquake in Java, the MMI received a
contract from the World Food Program to help deliver 95 tonnes of
food. Australian diplomatic pressure forced the WFP to cancel the
contract, an act that the MMI called "racist". It was not racist, but
legally mandated. Bashir was designated by the US Department of the
Treasury and proscribed under the UN Security Council's 1267 committee
on April 13, 2006. The MMI's acting chairman, Abu Jibril, was
designated on January 22, 2003. Technically it is illegal for Bashir,
Jibril or any organisation connected to them to raise money.

In the coming years, JI will spend significant material and human
resources on overt activities for four key reasons.

First, there have been token arrests and release of key leaders, for
whom militancy is simply an unavailable course of action. Moreover,
they have experience in running JI's overt arms in the past.

Second, the Government has tolerated this in the belief that these JI
leaders can be weaned from violence; that it is better to have them
involved in overt and non-violent activities, which are welcomed by
the state.

Third, few politicians are willing to expend the political capital or
incur the wrath of the Islamist parties to try to halt their
activities.

Fourth, JI wants to emulate the Prosperous Justice Party, the fastest
growing party, which increased its share of the vote from less than 2
per cent in 1999 to almost 8 per cent in 2004; in large part because
of its social welfare program, not its call for sharia.

In short, JI has taken advantage of an opening at the same time that
militancy had become counter-productive and as political will to take
on the terrorist infrastructure waned. JI's emphasis on da'wah
(preaching) and charity will make JI more durable over the long term.

While the Indonesian Government has shown remarkable resolve in going
after and putting people on trial for direct participation in
terrorist acts, it has not targeted JI's social networks.
Inexplicably, JI is still not criminalised, so that mere membership is
not a crime.

Indonesia has defaulted in its obligations to both freeze the assets
and ban fund-raising of those on the UNSC's 1267 list. The Government
announced that: "As a responsible member of the UN, we will follow
Resolution No. 1267, which obliges us to ban those on the list from
travelling." Yet the Government made no mention of Indonesia's
concurrent financial obligations. Jibril and Bashir continue to
fund-raise. Aris Munandar, likewise, was designated, but KOMPAK's
operations continue.

While the Indonesian branch of Al Haramain was designated on January
22, 2004, it is operating under a new name. There is little evidence
that the Indonesians have seized any of the assets or halted the
activities of the IIRO, which was designated on August 3, 2006.

The unwillingness to take on the terrorist infrastructure is
regrettable and negligent. JI has a very long-term timetable. By
pursuing overt strategies, JI is able to forge closer ties with
Islamists who might otherwise eschew their violence. JI is thus no
longer seen as a radical fringe, though its agenda has not changed.

There is scant evidence that JI can be weaned off terrorism. Anyone
who doubts this should ask themselves whether Hamas has been tempered
because it has social welfare organisations and a leading role in
politics. The answer is no. It remains a terrorist organisation,
precisely because of its vast social networks. No wonder Hamas is a
model that JI seeks to emulate.

Zachary Abuza is associate professor for political science and
international relations at Simmons College, Boston, in the US. He is
in Australia this week.

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Joyo Indonesia News Service
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