[Kabar-indonesia] 5 of 5: ICG: Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis

[JoyoNews at aol.com]

-5 of 5-

I B. Australia

Timor-Leste's southern neighbour is one of its largest
donors and both co-owner and joint owner of the oil
resources of the Timor Sea. It was first to answer the
government's request for help in May 2006 and now has
940 soldiers and 140 police in Dili. Contrary to the
belief of some in Timor-Leste, Indonesia and Australia
itself, it has no conceivable interest in another
unstable country to its north to add to the Solomon
Islands and Papua New Guinea - the so-called "arc of
instability". 

The current crisis has produced a very different
relationship between Australian and key actors in
Timor-Leste than in 1999, when Australian soldiers
arrived in ravaged East Timor as saviours. While
Australians were again first in line to assist in
2006, three factors have made their reception very
different: a fraught relationship with Alkatiri; the
oil issue; and their inability in Timor to prevent new
violence. 

Prime Minister John Howard in late May made no secret
of his belief that Timor-Leste had not been well
governed. This was seen widely as a direct criticism
of Mari Alkatiri.[88] Alkatiri told anyone who would
listen that Australia and its media were leading a
campaign against him because he had refused to bow to
Canberra's demands in the Timor Sea negotiations - a
conspiracy theory in wide circulation in Dili.[89]
That Australia had been so quick to respond to the
government's request for help reinforced baseless
suspicions that it was looking to intervene.[90] 

Differences over oil in the Timor Sea have made for
sometimes difficult relations over the last two years,
but they do not drive relations with Timor-Leste from
state, the revenue will mean Canberra's perspective.
For Australia, an already wealthy added income; for
Timor-Leste it may be the key to escaping the
appellation of "one of the poorest countries in the
world". Whatever the difference in perception, the
dispute seemed to be resolved in January 2006 when a
treaty was signed equally dividing the oil and gas
revenue of the Greater Sunrise Field, but the question
of whether the gas will be processed in Darwin or
eastern East Timor remains unanswered.

A third reason for changed attitudes towards Australia
has been the inability of Australian troops to be
everywhere at once. In 1999 when they entered East
Timor, Indonesian forces were gone, and most of the
Indonesian-backed militias had fled or were fleeing.
It was not a situation of widespread civil unrest.
Many in Dili in 2006 faulted the international forces
in their first few months on the ground for being too
slow to respond to calls for help and too lacking in
good intelligence to prevent attacks or identify
perpetrators. The perceived slowness to respond, when
most of the attacks in the capital were led by
loromonu youth, reinforced perceptions that the
Australians were partial toward the latter, in line
with an anti-Alkatiri stance. These perceptions were
mitigated somewhat by images of Australian troops
providing personal security for Alkatiri during the
FRETILIN central committee meeting in June.

All this has made Australia a less than beloved
protector this time around. Its reluctance to see its
troops placed under a unified UN command, despite the
wishes of the Timor-Leste government, is not making
things easier.[91]

C. Indonesia

Indonesia's record of misrule and brutality in East
Timor through 1999 has been extensively documented but
both countries have bent over backwards since to put
relations on a normal, even warm footing. There is no
evidence whatsoever that Indonesia sought to take
advantage of its neighbour's difficulties as the
crisis unfolded, and while it was prepared for the
arrival of refugees in West Timor, only a handful of
Timorese crossed over. Most who fled were Indonesian
citizens. Over the last two years, the border has been
mostly quiet, but a few incidents, most notably in
January 2006, underscore the need for a well-trained,
professional patrol that can prevent incursions and
manage local tensions if they arise. The militias that
wreaked such havoc in 1999 are no longer a serious
security threat.[92]

The one issue that has arisen was the reported
appearance in Dili of weapons from the Indonesian army
munitions factory, PT Pindad. Even if confirmed - and
no evidence has surfaced - it would more likely be due
to mafia-like gun running in the region than any
Indonesian policy.[93]

D. Portugal

Portugal, the ruler of East Timor for 450 years before
the 1975 Indonesian invasion, proudly claims that it
is Timor-Leste's largest donor. Its interest is
overwhelmingly cultural, focused in particular on
schools, for Portuguese language instruction, and the
courts, where its influence is steadily eroding the
Indonesian legacy. If Australia was seen as
anti-Alkatiri, Portugal was seen as his defender, in
part because of the Maputo group's enthusiastic
support for making Portuguese the national language
and other steps toward the "lusafication" of
Timor-Leste.

In response to the crisis, 120 GNR gendarmes arrived
in Dili in June. The Portuguese-Australian
relationship is somewhat cool, since Portugal, unlike
Malaysia and New Zealand, refused to accept Australian
command. In the Security Council, the Portuguese
pointedly stress the need for UN command of any future
forces, a barb directed at the Australians.

VII. CONCLUSION

The crisis in Timor-Leste stems from the legacy of
resistance to the Indonesian occupation;
post-independence institutional failures, particularly
in the security sector; and divisive policies on the
part of the ruling party, FRETILIN. The UN
Secretary-General's August 2006 report to the Security
Council notes:

Critics accuse FRETILIN of having used its dominant
position in Parliament and its superior political
machinery to narrow the space available for political
debate or challenge, including within the party
itself. The party's use of its overwhelming
parliamentary majority and the weakness of the small
and fragmented opposition mean that Parliament is
often not seen as an effective check on the executive.
The executive is also accused of politicising or
attempting to politicise the machinery of government,
most notably the institutions at the core of the
crisis, F-FDTL and PNTL.[94] 

One of the most important steps to ending the crisis
is thus one that outside actors have least influence
over: reform within FRETILIN. Several other measures -
some already underway - are also important: 

A. Resolving the Political Impasse at the Top

Xanana Gusmao, Mari Alkatiri and to a lesser extent
Taur Matan Ruak, hold the keys to resolving the
impasse at the top. Unless the first two are willing
to get past mutual distrust and discuss how to
overcome the security forces' polarisation and heal
the east-west split, it is unlikely foreign technical
aid can do much. The new SRSG could be critical in
building bridges. Rogerio Lobato's prosecution might
be a lightning rod that could enable much blame to be
put on a third party but Xanana and Alkatiri may need
to think the unthinkable - foregoing any role in the
2007 elections so new leaders can emerge. Alkatiri's
defiant stance, before and after he resigned, and
Xanana's polarising speeches, however accurate their
content, have made a bad situation worse. Discussing
solutions, a Timorese leader said sadly: "We may have
to sacrifice some of our heroes". 

B. Preparing for the Commission of Inquiry Report

The report, scheduled for release in mid-October 2006,
will be explosive no matter what its contents. It will
cover all the most sensitive cases: the F-FDTL
shooting on 28 April; the shootout between Alfredo and
F-FDTL on 23 May; the attacks on Taur Matan Ruak's
home and police headquarters; the killing of the
unarmed police on 25 May; and the distribution of
weapons. How far up will responsibility go? Who will
be named, who exonerated? If it finds senior leaders
responsible, will they step down pending investigation
and prosecution? How will fair prosecutions be
guaranteed given the state of the courts? The UN, the
government, security forces and community leaders all
need to have responses ready, including proposals for
prosecutions that will ensure fair and reasonably
speedy trials; information dissemination strategies so
that commission findings are not distorted; and
security preparations to deal with possible protests
and demonstrations. 

C. Dealing with the Petitioners and Major Alfredo

The army petitioners' case must be resolved.
Everything is on hold until the commission of notables
under Ana Pessoa completes its examination of the
original grievances. That first step will not
necessarily satisfy the petitioners, and solutions, if
identified, may not be implemented; nor will they
necessarily resolve the larger political problem of
how to deal with rebels whose desertion has decimated
the army. Taur Matan Ruak has said their return would
give the defence force a bad image and might create a
precedent for a coup.[95] 

However, leaving close to 600 soldiers outside the
system is a time bomb, even if they are mostly
disarmed. Salsinha and Alfredo and a few other leaders
will clearly not be able to return. But jobs will need
to be found for the others, on condition they were not
involved in violence or criminal activity, either back
in the F-FDTL or as civilians. The commission's
findings may to some degree vindicate the original
complaints of discrimination; those issues can be best
addressed by putting in place clear regulations on
recruitment, dismissal and promotions; improving
management; and instituting a civilian oversight
mechanism. 

D. Security Sector Review

As a matter of urgency and as required by Security
Council Resolution 1704 establishing UNMIT, the
government needs to undertake a national security
review that will clarify the roles of the defence
force, police and intelligence agencies; command and
control arrangements, including in emergencies; and
civilian oversight mechanisms. It should also identify
and begin drafting legislation to improve management
of the security sector, including a law on military
assistance to the civil authorities. The government
should establish a national security council on which
the commanders of the defence force and police sit
together with their respective ministers. In addition
to a better definition of its role, the F-FDTL needs a
plan for gracefully retiring many of the veterans whom
it absorbed in 2001. The phased exit of that
generation would also help address some of the
regional imbalance in the officer corps.

E. Getting the Police Back on the Streets

The Dili police, rotting from within thanks to the
policies of Rogerio Lobato, disintegrated in late
April. A major vetting process is now underway, in
effect requiring police to reapply for their jobs, be
screened and then be mentored process before or as
they return to work. As of late September, 25 of the
900 who wish to do so are back on duty. There may be
no alternative to the slow and cumbersome screening
process but at this rate, Dili will be fortunate if a
full complement is back by the May 2007 elections.
Screening is also to be undertaken in the rest of the
country, even though for the most part, police
operations outside Dili and Ermera have not been
seriously affected. It would be worth reviewing the
process after a month to see if it can be streamlined.
Just as important as screening the old police is
reviewing recruitment procedures for newcomers, among
other things to ensure geographic balance. The role of
the three special units of the police so politicised
by Rogerio Lobato should also be re-examined, with a
view toward absorbing them back into the regular
police until the security review is completed and a
restructuring based on identified needs can take
place. 

F. Healing the East-West Rift and Getting the
Displaced Back Home

Healing the social divide the petitioners' demands and
subsequent violence opened requires reconciliation of
political leaders but will also not happen if the
displaced, 140,000 as of September, half in Dili, have
no homes to return to and fear leaving the camps. A
program of the ministry of labour and community
reinsertion, Simu-Malu (mutual acceptance), involves a
plan based on the three pillars of security,
reconciliation and housing.[96] It is predicated on
the assumption the displaced will trust their leaders
but if anything is lacking in Dili it is trust. To
move forward, the displaced must be convinced their
concerns are being heard at the highest level, the
government can guarantee their safety, and
amelioration of their plight is imminent. One step
that can be taken is to publicise the number of
weapons collected and the number still in circulation,
because the latter is far lower than rumoured. Once
immediate needs are addressed, reconciliation through
community projects and other initiatives can start. 

G. Improving Oversight of the Courts and Judicial
Recruitment

If the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry
recommends prosecutions, as it surely will, they will
be as politically-charged as any in Timor-Leste's
short history. Fair trials cannot be guaranteed in the
court system as currently constituted, and the UN's
track record of recruiting high-quality judges for
Timor is poor. Due process will be important as never
before; the judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers
need to be world-class. If justice is mishandled as it
has been until now, the work of the commission could
end up being more destructive than constructive.

H. Preparing for the 2007 Elections 

The UN handles the technical aspects of elections well
but the preparations for May 2007 are as much
political as technical. The government and UNIMIT must
ensure that the social and political fissures the
crisis has exposed do not widen as politicians
campaign. Getting agreement on a code of ethics would
be one step; focus group discussions to understand and
respond to local security concerns before and during
the campaign would be another. But the most important
guarantor against violence might be for the more
controversial figures in the capital to sit this
election out voluntarily. 

I. Job Creation for Urban Youth

Timor-Leste has a shockingly high unemployment rate,
verging on 44 per cent for urban youth.[97] Jobs and
economic opportunities will not end street violence
but they would help prevent the rent-a-mob phenomenon
which adds to the precariousness of civil order. Some
of the oil revenues now coming on line should be
immediately plowed back into quick impact,
labor-intensive programs; reconstruction of burned and
damaged homes might be a place to start. Another idea
circulating in Dili is for a national conservation
corps that could simultaneously employ large numbers
of youths and help protect the environment.

J. Adoption of the CAVR Recommendations

Last but not least, the government should adopt and
begin implementing the recommendations of Chega! the
report of the Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e
Reconciliaciao, CAVR. At 44 pages, they are detailed
and practical and provide useful guidelines for policy
changes. Particularly pertinent are:

- Section 3.4: right to security of the person, a
national commitment to non-violence;

- Section 4: promoting and protecting the rights of
the vulnerable;

- Section 5: promoting and protecting human rights by
effective institutions, especially parliament, courts,
the public service, the provedor (ombudsman) and the
Church;

- Section 6: developing security services that protect
and promote human rights. The recommendations on the
police, defence force and other security agencies are
particularly relevant; and

- Section 9: reconciliation in the political
community.

None of these steps are easy. The crisis escalated
because of individuals: individuals with personal
interests and power bases, individuals making
decisions without consultation, individuals trying to
determine policy unilaterally. The way out is through
institution-building, particularly in the security
services, precisely so that the actions of individuals
will not carry so much weight.

Jakarta/Brussels, 10 October 2006

----------------------------

APPENDIX A

MAP OF Timor-Leste 

Appendix B

GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abilio Mesquita alias Mausoko: deputy police commander
for Dili who led attack on Taur Matan Ruak's house in
May 2006.

Alcino Baris: interior minister, replaced Rogerio
Lobato in June 2006.

Alfredo Alves Reinado (Major): head of military
police, deserted 3 May 2006; involved in shootout with
F-FDTL 23 May; arrested 26 July, escaped 30 August
2006. 

Alito "Rambo": gang member reputed to be involved in
23 May shootout.

Ana Pessoa: minister for state administration in
Alkatiri government, member of Maputo group; heads
Commission of Notables tasked with investigating
petitioners' grievances. 

APODETI - Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor
(Popular Democratic Association of Timor) formed in
1974, only Timorese party to favour integration with
Indonesia. 

Associação dos Antigos Combatentes das Falintil - the
Ex-Combatants Assocation, a veterans association
established by Rogerio Lobato. 

CAVR - Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e
Reconciliaciao, Commission on Truth, Reception and
Reconciliation. 

Claudio Ximenes: president of the court of appeal in
Timor-Leste.

CNRM - Conselho Nacional de Resistancia Maubere
(National Council of Maubere Resistance), founded by
Xanana in 1988 as the highest political body of the
resistance.

CNRT - Conselho Nacional da Resistancia Timorense
(National Council of Timorese Resistance), formed
under the name CNRM in 1989 by Xanana Gusmao; it
represents the entire East Timorese resistance
movement, including FRETILIN.

Cornelio Gama: also known as Elle Sette (l-7),
dissident FALINTIL commander, brother of Paulo Gama
(Mauk Moruk).

Convergência Nacionalista - pact between UDT and
FRETILIN to work together for the resistance, signed
March 1986.

CPD-RDTL - Conselho Popular pela Defesa de Republica
Democratica de Timor Leste (Popular Council for the
Defence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor),
dissident group that was a major source of internal
security problems in the first years after
independence.

CRRN - Revolutionary Council of National Resistance,
first national front of the Timorese resistance,
formed 1981.

Domingos de Oliveira: see Kaikeri. 

FALINTIL - Forcas Armados de Libertacao Nacional de
Timor-Leste (National Liberation Forces of East
Timor), formed on 20 August 1975, originally
FRETILIN's military wing, became non-partisan under
Xanana Gusmao's leadership 1987; dissolved on the
creation of the East Timorese Defence Force, February
2001.

FALINTIL-FDTL or F-FDTL - the formal name of the
Timor-Leste Defence Force after independence in May
2002.

Falur Rate Laek: commander of Battalion I, F-FDTL, had
been FALINTIL fighter, worked as auxiliary in
Indonesian army early 1980s, switched back to
resistance 1983.

FDTL - Forcas Defensa Timor Lorosae (Timor-Leste
Defence Force), created in February 2001.

FRETILIN - Frente Revolutionaria do Timor-Leste
Independente (Revolutionary Front of Independent East
Timor), started as ASDT (the pro-independence
Association of Timorese Social Democrats, formed in
1974); changed name in September 1974; after civil war
with UDT, it declared the independence of the
Democratic Republic of East Timor on November 28, 1975
on the verge of Indonesian invasion.

Gardapaksi - pro-integration group of Timorese youth
created by Indonesian military, responsible for
attacks on pro-independence supporters.

Gascao Salsinha: Leader of 159 soldiers who signed
petition to President Gusmao on 9 January 2006
alleging discrimination in F-FDTL, sacked in March
2006; based in Gleno, Ermera.

GNR - Guarda Nacional Republicana, Portuguese
paramilitary police unit.

Isabel Pereira: wife of Taur Matan Ruak,
representative of Timor-Leste on TL-Indonesia Truth
and Friendship Commission.

Ismail Babo: deputy commander of PNTL for operations,
involved in Gleno incident, 8 May 2006, never returned
to police command.

Jose Ramos-Horta: born 1949 in Dili, co-founder of
ASDT (the Timorese Social Democratic Association),
which became FRETILIN; won the Nobel Peace Prize with
Bishop Belo in 1996; foreign minister in first
Timor-Leste government, became prime minister in July
2006.

Kablaki: Alfredo loyalist, one of the petitioners
involved in the attack on the government palace on 28
April 2006, killed in shootout with F-FDTL on 23 May.

Kaikeri, real name, Domingos de Oliveira: logistics
commander of the F-FDTL training centre in Metinaro,
killed in assault on F-FDTL headquarters on 24 May
2006. 

Kilik Wae Gae: FALINTIL chief of staff, died in 1984
under disputed circumstances; wife became a FRETILIN
central committee member and eventually deputy
minister for state administration in the Alkatiri
government.

L-7 (Elle Sette): see Cornelio Gama.

Lere Anan Timor: F-FDTL Chief of Staff, FRETILIN
central committee member, target of complaints by
Westerners dismissed from defence force in March 2006.

Loromonu - western part of Timor-Leste.

Lorosae - eastern part of Timor-Leste, roughly from
Baucau eastward.

Lu'Olo (Francisco Guterres): speaker of parliament,
president of FRETILIN; born in Ossu, Viqueque. 

Mari Alkatiri: prime minister of Timor-Leste until
July 2006; secretary-general and co-founder of
FRETILIN; spent all of Indonesian occupation in exile,
mostly in Mozambique; Lawyer by training, chief
negotiator on oil with Australia. 

Maubere - Timorese word used derisively by the
Portuguese to refer to Timorese, adopted by FRETILIN
as national identity.

Mauk Moruk: FALINTIL brigade commander involved in
1984 coup attempt against Xanana Gusmao, brother of
Elle Sette (Cornelio Gama).

Mausoko: see Abilio Mesquita.

Nicolau Lobato: prime minister of East Timor from 28
November 1975, named president in 1977, killed by
Indonesian troops 1978; older brother of Rogerio
Lobato. 

Oligari Asswain: FALINTIL deputy brigade commander
involved in coup attempt against Xanana Gusmao 1984.

Paulo Gama: see Mauk Moruk.

Paulo Martins: head of the Timor-Leste police service,
had been secretary to police chief under Indonesians.

Provador - ombudsman.

Railos: see Vicente da Conceicao. 

Rogerio Lobato: former interior minister and vice
president of FRETILIN; defence minister of short-lived
FRETILIN government in 1975; spent Indonesian
occupation in Angola and Mozambique; returned to Timor
Leste in October 2000; named minister in May 2002,
sacked in June 2006.

Roque Rodrigues: defence minister of Timor-Leste.

Sagrada Familia - a cult-like organisation through
which Elle Sette developed a separate power base in
the Baucau area.

Simu-Malu - mutual acceptance, a community
reconciliation program, also involving assistance to
displaced persons. 

Tara (Major): F-FDTL officer who deserted with Major
Alfredo, leader of Ten District movement.

Taur Matan Ruak: F-FDTL commander.

Tilman (Major): F-FDTL officer who deserted with Major
Alfredo.

UIR - special riot control unit of Timor-Leste police.

UNAMET - United Nations Mission to East Timor, 11 June
to 30 September 1999.

UNMISET - United Nations Mission of Support in East
Timor, 20 May 2002 to 20 May 2005.

UNMIT - United Nations Integrated Mission in
Timor-Leste, August 2006 with six-month mandate.

UNOTIL - United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, 20 May
2005 to August 2006.

UNTAET - United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor, 25 October 1999 to 20 May 2002. 

UDT - Uniao Democratica Timorense (Timorese Democratic
Union), group formed on 11 May 1974 that initially
favored continued ties with Portugal but came to
support independence.

Vicente da Conceicao (Railos): former F-FDTL soldier
sacked in December 2003, claims to have received guns
from Rogerio Lobato on Alkatiri's orders to kill
political opposition; originally from Liquica, had
been a FALINTIL fighter during the resistance; after
independence worked in the training academy of the new
armed forces in Metinaro.

Xanana Gusmao (Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao): president of
Timor-Leste; born 20 June 1946 near Manatuto, joined
FRETILIN in May 1975; became commander in chief of
FALINTIL in 1981 and created national front movement,
moving resistance beyond its FRETILIN base.

Xavier do Amaral: born in 1937, became first president
of Timor-Leste in November 1975, founder of FRETILIN;
in April 2002, soundly defeated by Xanana Gusmão in
the presidential elections; now head of opposition
party.


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