No subject

for two of the bombs. Both say Dulmatin assembled the triggers and helped make 
all three bombs. But unlike Amrozi, neither Samudra nor Ali Imron said Dulmatin 
detonated the Sari bomb.

Ali Imron's testimony is the most recent, given to police on Thursday night 
after he was flown to Bali from East Borneo, where he was arrested on Monday. 
He took police to a boarding house in Denpasar which was the headquarters for 
the bomb plot. Police knew it existed, but not its location. Ali Imron still 
had the key to the front door. He told police that he and Samudra had paid a 
year's rent in advance, posing as cargo agents and telling the landlord they 
were from Sumatra. 

It was to this house that Amrozi delivered the van and explosives. Ali Imron's 
story is that he and Idris helped Dulmatin make the bombs, promoting Idris, who 
hitherto had been described by police as a quartermaster who arranged 
accommodation and supplied the mobile phones. They combined potassium chloride, 
TNT and an unidentified black powder and tested a small bomb in the garage. 
Alarmed neighbours where told an electrical implement had exploded. They 
believed the explanation, but the plotters had taken an alarming risk which 
would have horrified better disciplined terrorists.

When it comes to events on the night of the attack, important elements of Ali 
Imron's testimony are hard to believe.

Police say Ali Imron told them that Samudra, the overall commander, remained in 
the safe house in Denpasar. Ali Imron described himself as the "field 
commander". He said he and another plotter drove the van with the bomb to Jalan 
Legian. Who was the other man? Ali Imron wasn't sure. He thought his name was 
Jimmy, which might be an alias for Iqbal. This is farce. Police have never 
heard of Jimmy before. Ali Imron was the "field commander" of a conspiracy 
about to commit mass murder, he was transporting the bomb - and he didn't know 
the identity of the man sitting next to him. "He's lying," police said.

Police said Ali Imron claims he stopped the van 800 metres from the Sari Club, 
got out and was picked up by Idris, who had been following on a motorbike. The 
van drove on, Ali Imron and Idris returned to Denpasar to the al-Ghorobah 
mosque near the safe house. Their roles ended, they prayed for success and were 
in the mosque when the bomb exploded. They expressed their joy.

Three days later, Ali Imron changed his story, claiming that Idris detonated 
the Sari bomb. By then however his testimony had little credence, containing 
too many inconsistencies. Police believe he is lying to minimise his role. By 
escalating the role of Idris from quartermaster to master bomber, it is 
possible that Ali Imron is sacrificing a more expendable Idris to protect 
someone else, possibly himself.

Ali Imron says Iqbal or Jimmy parked the van outside the Sari Club and went 
into Paddy's. This links neatly with what already has been established by DNA 
on body parts recovered from Paddy's and which were identified as belonging to 
Iqbal. He took a backpack bomb into the bar and was killed when it exploded. 
How this happened is a matter of intense speculation.

Samudra, when caught on November 21, boasted that Iqbal was a suicide bomber, 
which Indonesian police never tire of denying, justifiably afraid of allowing 
the conspirators to claim a martyr as a role model for their "Jihad". 

Police claim Ali Imron's account supports their version of an accidental early 
detonation. This is that Samudra used a mobile phone to detonate the third bomb 
near the American consulate in Denpasar. The signal prematurely detonated the 
Sari and Paddy's bombs, catching Iqbal unawares.

But there is no evidence to back this theory, and even the police have no idea 
how one mobile could activate three mobiles simultaneously with a single 
message. Another version is that the mobile message to activate the consulate 
bomb somehow "crossed over" into the two other mobiles, although police once 
again are unable to explain how this could happen. These attempts at 
explanation lack credibility, especially since Amrozi is insistent that the 
three mobiles had to be activated individually.

The consulate bomb harmed no one. It was clearly a symbolic attack on the 
United States. "Destroy America," Samudra shouted when he was arrested. But 
Samudra has made no reference to this bomb. 

So is Ali Imron telling only part of the truth to conceal a greater guilt by 
his mentor? Why give only this pathetic gesture to Samudra? He was their 
inspirational leader, the toughest and most experienced terrorist among them, a 
religious zealot who had fought in Afghanistan, and who, police say, has 
confessed to participating in a series of bomb attacks in Indonesia in December 
2000.

Why give Samudra only one bomb, and the least important? Why not all three, 
especially the Sari bomb, which was what the plot was all about? He was the 
fittest, the most deserving to deliver such a devastating message to their 
enemies. He was also in command, the man most willing and able.

More light needs to be shone into this world of shadows, to establish what are 
truth, deception and lies. In only three months, the Indonesian police have 
done a remarkable job, and there is every reason to accept their confidence 
that they will arrest the suspects still at large, especially those they want 
most: Idris, Dulmatin, Wayan and another bomb expert, Dr Azhari, a Malaysian.

They have struck a significant blow against JI in Indonesia. One of their 
prisoners is Mukhlas, another brother of Amrozi, and he is their most important 
captive so far. Mukhlas, 42, a religious teacher and veteran terrorist who 
spent more than 10 years in Malaysia, is said to be JI's operations commander 
for South-East Asia, the No. 3 man in the hierarchy. Like Samudra, another big 
loss for JI, Mukhlas went to Afghanistan and is accused of initiating the plan 
for the bomb attacks and ordering its execution.

Another prisoner is Mubarok, who was captured with Ali Imron. Mubarok played no 
direct role in the bombings but on Mukhlas's orders financed the operation, 
using part of the $90,000 which a separate cell got by robbing a jewellery 
store in Serang, East Java, two months before the bombing.

The arrests give an alarming insight into JI's capabilities. The group was able 
to provide a cadre of committed, experienced terrorists with sophisticated 
technical skills, along with the resources to finance and plan the operation. 
But they exposed a fatal weakness: a reliance on passionate amateurs to be the 
ground troops, in recruiting Islamic fundamentalists from religious schools.

Mukhlas recruited two blood brothers, Amrozi - whose carelessness in buying the 
van in his own name gave police their initial breakthrough - and Ali Imron, 
plus two stepbrothers. 

A difficult task for JI will be replacing the veterans Mukhlas and Samudra. But 
there is no shortage of eager volunteers among the fundamentalist Islamic 
religious schools of Indonesia and Malaysia.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Bali: counting cost and rebuilding tourism 
By Simon Osborne
UPI Business Correspondent
Published 1/21/2003 12:17 PM

JAKARTA, Indonesia, Jan. 21 (UPI) -- The bombing in Bali last Oct. 12 killed 
nearly 200 people, knocked half a percentage point from Indonesia's gross 
domestic product growth of 3.5 percent, and exposed the country's frailties as 
a safe tourist destination.

Hotel occupancy rates in Bali dropped to single figures after the blasts. To 
break even they need about 20 percent to 40 percent occupancy. The tourism 
business is worth $5.4 billion in revenue to Indonesia each year, with Bali, 
which attracts 1.5 million tourists per year, accounting for a third of that 
sum.

Spotting the goodwill of Western tourists toward the Kalimantan rainforests, 
the Sumatran tiger and the orangutan, Indonesia's Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism had designated 2002 as National Eco-tourism year. It was a catchy title 
designed to appeal to the environmentally sensitive, post-modern traveler, 
though beyond invoking the "eco" buzzword, there was no particular effort made 
to protect any creature unlucky enough to be born in an Indonesian forest or to 
stop slashing and burning its habitat. In the middle of 2002, land clearance 
fires in Indonesia smoked up all of the neighboring countries.

A similar commitment to image over substance had emerged at the Association of 
South East Asian Nations Tourism Forum in Yogyakarta in January 2002. ASEAN 
tourism ministers and industry players agreed to promote the region as a safe 
destination for tourists. Predictably, nothing was materially done to make the 
region safer, but in the spirit of pro-activity they decided to brand the area 
as being harmless.

The response of embassies to the bombing was to rationalize after the event, 
with travel warnings issued by British, Japanese, Australian, German and United 
States governments advising their vacationers not to travel to Bali. The advice 
now of the British Embassy is that the situation in Bali has "stabilized." By 
this choice of words, they simply mean that there has not been another bomb.

Fourth quarter arrivals to Bali usually account for 30 percent of the year's 
total. November 2002 arrivals fell to 32,000 tourists, when more than 100,000 
would normally be expected. In December, visitor numbers picked up to 63,000. 
Surprisingly, occupancy rates at the hotels in the busy Kuta Beach area, the 
scene of the bombing, fared better in December than the secluded boutique 
hotels of central Bali, which would not ostensibly appear such attractive mass 
targets to terrorists.

Western tourists remained nervous and in general stayed away, with the increase 
in December being the result of Christmas visits from stoic, north Asian 
tourists seduced by the bargains. Additionally, there was heavy demand for 
short breaks from Jakarta residents for whom a hazardous Bali is still 
preferable to the urban nightmare of Indonesia's capital.

"This tragedy has put Bali in a high position," the Head of the Bali Tourism 
Authority declared. "Nobody blames Bali."

Whether this declaration that all publicity is good publicity is no more than a 
gormless gaffe, it represents one in a series of official attempts to gloss 
over the new role of Indonesian tourist as soft terrorist target. Having lulled 
tourists into a false sense of security with the 2002 ASEAN campaign, there 
seems no reason why anyone should not believe that he remains in a state of 
denial.

Having collared the alleged gang of bombers, all of whom cheerfully confessed, 
though none of these confessions are admissible as court evidence, the 
Indonesian government allocated $4.6 million for a global promotional campaign 
to lure back tourists to Bali. Its gift for responding to serious problems with 
appealingly titled campaigns had temporarily deserted the spin doctors, who 
gave the marketing drive the un-poetic name of "Bali, get into it."

'The Government is expecting that by the end of 2003 the country's tourism 
industry would regain its attractiveness for world travelers," Minister of 
Culture and Tourism I Gede Ardika said.

Private enterprise, no doubt fearful of the effects of government and ASEAN 
platitudes, responded with their own crusade. The Bali Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Chairman I Gede Wiratha said, "Bali businessmen have decided to join 
hands, without involving the government, to launch their own campaign to assure 
world travelers that Bali is safe."

They decided to call their campaign "Bali for the World." In recognition that 
merely joining hands would be unlikely to prevent the physical devastation of 
another bomb, their workmanlike solution has been simply to offer discounts on 
holiday packages.

What the tourist is being asked to predict is whether lightning can strike 
twice in the same place. Tourists returning to Bali have made a calculated 
decision that there will be no second attack. Thankfully, fewer people in the 
South Tower of the World Trade Center were as dismissive when its neighbor was 
struck. The Bali bombers took the ferry across to the island, and drove into 
Kuta Beach. There is nothing to stop another group of terrorists following the 
same path, and there are no reports of other sleeper cells being arrested.

So are there any causes for optimism? Even though they were not the 
perpetrators, the Indonesian based Islamic group Laskar Jihad announced its 
dissolution immediately after the Bali bombing, realizing they and their human 
rights risked becoming as endangered a species as the Sumatran tiger.

Whilst there is no news of potential terrorists being incarcerated, the 
implications of the empty jail cells may be just as revealing. In Indonesia, 
potential terrorists now risk being silently exterminated in a publicity-free 
way for which the custodians of Guantanamo Bay camp might be full of envy. As 
the career aspirations of bombers are curtailed, a greater future danger for 
tourists in Indonesia could be that of kidnapping. This form of crime, long 
popular in neighboring Philippines, has never been popular among Indonesian 
thugs, but may prove to be a money-spinner for them in future.

Behind the scenes, there are tangible efforts that promise to make Bali a safer 
place. Still to be formally announced or publicized is the prospect of a 9/11 
emergency and accident response system, similar to that for visitors to the 
United States, which will be implemented for international tourists to Bali. 
This scheme, which will be surcharged to air tickets in the form of an 
insurance premium, will be backed by the International Association of Travel 
Agents and will accommodate a well-equipped hospital and a fleet of 
helicopters. Emergency teams will be incentivized by a reward for the first to 
respond to a call-out.

Whilst responses and medical treatment should improve as a result, this program 
cannot prevent the planting of bombs, and so it is understood that to deal with 
the residual terrorist threat, the Indonesian government has approached anti-
terrorist consultancy vehicles established by foreign governments. They will be 
mandated to provide pre-emptive, counter-terrorism operations in Bali.

Beyond the gnomic comments of Indonesian politicians and travel agents, there 
may be some hope that the Bali of the future will be a safer place, but until 
then, beware the glib re-assuring spin from Indonesia's beleaguered hospitality 
industry. 
-- Copyright © 2001-2003 United Press International
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BBC
Monday, 20 January, 2003, 08:20 GMT 
Timor ex-police chief convicted 

A special Indonesian human rights court has sentenced a former East Timor 
police chief to three years in jail. 

Hulman Gultom was convicted for failing to stop his subordinates carry out two 
attacks in 1999, as violence raged over East Timor's vote for independence from 
Indonesia. 

He is the fourth person to have been convicted by the court, which has been 
criticised by human rights activists for acquitting 11 other defendants. 

The court found that Gultom, former police chief of East Timor's capital Dili, 
failed to stop attacks on the home of a prominent pro-independence leader, 
Manuel Carrascalao, in April 1999, and on a church building in Dili in 
September 1999. 

A total of 14 people were killed in the attacks.

Presiding judge Andriani Nurdin said Mr Gultom "has been found guilty of grave 
human rights violations". 

Gultom, who remains free pending an appeal, complained about the verdict. 

"I have risked my life to prevent the riots but I have been found guilty," he 
said. 

Flaw 
The Jakarta court was set up because of international pressure on Indonesia to 
tackle human rights abuses committed as it withdrew from East Timor. 

Before the verdict on Gultom was handed down, only three defendants had been 
found guilty. 

One of these, the notorious pro-Jakarta militia leader Eurico Guterres, was 
sentenced to 10 years in jail in November. 

At least 1,000 people were killed before, during and after East Timor's 
overwhelming vote, in August 1999, to break away from 24 years of Indonesian 
rule. 

Rights experts have noted that a key flaw of Jakarta's human rights court is 
its failure to try top officers, including the presiding commander at the time 
of the violence, General Wiranto. 

In December, the panel of five judges found Dili's former military commander, 
Lieutenant Colonel Soejarwo, guilty for similar charges, including a September 
1999 attack on the office and home of Roman Catholic Bishop Carlos Ximenes 
Belo, just days after the vote. 

Soejarwo has said he would appeal against the verdict. 
*****
COURT RECORD:
Four people guilty
Eleven acquitted
Three await verdicts
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Age (Melbourne)
Raids raise fears of renewed violence
January 21 2003
By Jill Jolliffe, Atsabe, East Timor

The hamlet of Tiarlelo is only a few kilometres from Atsabe, itself 25 
kilometres from the East Timor border, but the rough jungle track that leads to 
it emphasises its isolation. 

When well-armed, masked assailants struck at nightfall on January 4, it was 
close enough for gunfire to be heard in the town, but distant enough for it to 
be cut off from help.

When police arrived at first light, they found one man dead and three people 
wounded, including two children. In a simultaneous attack at Laubuno, 14 
kilometres away, two were killed and several wounded.

Four more bodies have been found since, leaving a death toll of seven. One was 
hanged, another decapitated, and two men who had been kidnapped days earlier 
were buried in shallow graves.

The use of automatic weapons and the discovery of bullet casings from 
Indonesian-issue SKS rifles raised fears that the attacks represented a militia 
incursion from West Timor.

The arrest several days later of eight armed men in the Liquica region 
confirmed the concern. Testimony was given in Dili court that seven armed 
groups had crossed the border to kill former resistance leaders, under orders 
from members of the Indonesian army.

Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta said he was convinced that there was no 
Indonesian Government strategy to destabilise East Timor, but there might be 
rogue Indonesian elements involved. 

"With all Indonesia's troubles, East Timor is not on its radar screen at the 
moment," he said. "My concern is how we can get senior officials in Jakarta to 
pay attention, and alert Megawati (Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's President)."

To this end he called in Kristio Wahyono, head of Indonesia's diplomatic 
mission. The ambassador had earlier told The Age that he had travelled to 
Atambua to consult commander Lieutenant-Colonel Tjuk Agus and militia leader 
Joao Tavares.

"Both told me no ex-militias had crossed the border and attacked Atsabe," he 
said. "If anyone did, there were certainly no instructions from the Indonesian 
military."

After the attacks, East Timor's President Xanana Gusmao headed an emergency 
meeting in Dili, after which UN administrator Kamalesh Sharma signed an 
agreement allowing the new East Timor Defence Force to mount a counter-
insurgency operation in the area. This waived existing accords placing the 
force under UN command and ignored a clause of the Timorese constitution 
prohibiting the army's use internally. 

A week later the scene around Atsabe evoked the years of guerrilla resistance, 
with camouflage-clad East Timorese scouring the jungle for infiltrators, 
commanded by Sabika, a former resistance hero who is now a lieutenant-colonel. 
Before 1999 their weapons were few and their clothes ragged, but now they 
carried American-supplied M16 rifles and wore neat, new uniforms. 

Mr Sharma said on Friday that East Timorese forces had arrested 66 people, 
identified as militia members by the local population. However, most of those 
arrested were members of Colimau 2000, a religious group widely suspected of 
robbery and extortion. Denounced by neighbours, they were arrested and handed 
over to police for transport to Dili jails. In Lemeia Kraik, known as a Colimau 
stronghold, 59 people, including children, were arrested, to the disquiet of 
human rights observers. Of 31 Colimau members taken to court on Friday, 28 were 
freed for lack of evidence.

The facts emerging from the Liquica district arrests are more worrying. They 
suggest that these were militia incursions and were backed, as Mr Ramos Horta 
suggested, by junior Indonesian officers.

Miguel Freitas Metan, 45, is among those remanded for 30 days on immigration, 
security and illegal arms charges. Speaking in Dili prison, Metan, a native of 
Liquica, said he had lived since 1999 at Hali-Ulun, near Atambua in West Timor. 

He said seven militia units received instructions from Indonesian army officers 
with East Timorese links to cross the border for guerrilla actions. 

During the 14-day trek to Liquica, his group of eight men had a change of heart 
and surrendered in their home village on January 14. Members of the other six 
groups are still at large.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Australian
Timor's incursion crisis plea
By John Kerin and Monica Videnieks
January 22, 2003

EAST Timor is facing the greatest threat to its stability since independence 
with its security forces struggling to repel Indonesian military-backed militia 
raids - and claiming Australia won't fully commit its peacekeepers to the 
struggle.

A senior East Timor government official said yesterday the security situation 
in the fledging nation had deteriorated to its worst level since before 
independence last May. 

"Militia are coming across the border (from Indonesian West Timor) in an 
organised fashion and people are once again living in fear," the official told 
The Australian yesterday. 

"We need help and if Australia wants to ensure continuing stability for East 
Timor then these elements need to be dealt with. Australia has forces here and 
it must do something." 

The official claimed the UN peacekeeping force was refusing to get involved in 
what UN commanders insisted were local policing matters, and East Timorese 
police and defence forces were unable to cope. 

The Timorese want Australian troops, in particular, to give direct military 
assistance in combating the internal security threat, which they say is 
sponsored and supported by elements of Kopassus, the Indonesian army's 
notorious special forces. 

The security deterioration could force Australia, which currently has 1000 
peacekeepers in the troubled new nation, to maintain troops there into 2004 and 
beyond. The UN peacekeeping mandate expires in May but the Australian 
Government is already expected to extend its commitment at least to the end of 
the year. 

East Timorese politicians and officials believe the UN force is scaling down 
its security role at a pace too fast for the local police and military to cope 
with. 

There have been two serious incursions so far this month by West Timor-based 
militias. 

According to a police report obtained by The Australian, on January 13 a group 
of nine militia armed with homemade knives and guns attacked villagers in the 
Bazartete district near Liquica. About 100 villagers overpowered and captured 
six attackers. 

Under interrogation, militia leader Miguel Metan admitted to having "been armed 
by Kopassus" with the instruction to "kill the village chiefs, political 
leaders and those who go against them". 

Earlier, on January 4, six militiamen armed with AK-47s attacked another 
village and killed four East Timorese. They were driven off only after 
Portuguese troops assigned to the UN force intervened. 

The East Timorese claim they appealed for Australian help to repel the January 
4 raid but were rebuffed. 

Labor's foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd, who recently met East Timor's 
Foreign Minister, Jose Ramos Horta, said the deteriorating security situation 
was gravely concerning. 

"At a time when John Howard is forward deploying 1500 troops to Iraq, we face 
an emerging security crisis in East Timor where Australia's 1000 peacekeepers 
are already stretched to the limit," Mr Rudd said. 

"The Government of East Timor is now deeply concerned about the increasing 
penetration of its sovereign territory by militia forces from the West," he 
said. 

He urged Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to raise with the Indonesian 
Government the role of Kopassus forces in co-ordinating militia raids into East 
Timor. 

But a spokesman for Mr Downer said last night he had met Mr Ramos Horta only 10 
days ago and the East Timor Government had made no request for extra help. 

"If there was a serious problem you would think it would have been raised at 
that meeting." 

The spokesman said Australia's peacekeepers in East Timor were under the 
command of the UN, bound by the mandate and subject to the direction of its 
commanders.