No subject


Tue May 1 19:37:24 MDT 2007


organizational chart of Jemaah Islamiyah showing Abu Bakar Basher the Imam 
(spiritual leader) and “Usama bin Laden” as a respected figure. General Pastika 
pointedly noted that several of the suspects had been trained in Afghanistan, 
but he made no further claim to al Qaeda connections. 

His conclusions: The bombings were carried out by a network of Indonesians 
connected to the Jemaah Islamiah. The attacks were carefully planned over a 
period of months. They were in accordance with the objectives of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah, which are to create an Islamic state in Southeast Asia comprising 
areas of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. 

Indonesia must acknowledge its “unreadiness, including awareness of the 
institutions and societies” that carry out terrorism. “We are now in a capacity-
building mode....Now we need the support of our friends,” he said. 

General Pastika spoke without a text and proved adept at questions which probed 
some of the political implications in Indonesia. He stoutly defended the public 
interview of Ali Imron, the alleged bomb builder, whose claims have been 
contradicted by other suspects. 

Q: Before the bombings the government was in denial about terrorists, and there 
was no political cohesiveness. Do you see now that the government is more 
united? 

A: In the first weeks of the investigation there were many doubts. But because 
the investigation was successful, we hope for a ‘trickle up’ as well as 
a ‘trickle down’ effect. Now the political conditions are conducive for further 
investigation. Now no one can say there is no terrorism. Now there is support 
for the police and also for other institutions. There is a “desk” for anti-
terrorism in the office of the coordinating minister for political affairs, 
comprised of senior officers from various services. That’s trickle up. Trickle 
down means that within the police force, and also among prosecutors and judges, 
there is an eagerness to learn and to improve. 

Q: Referring to Ali Imron’s public re-enactment of constructing the bomb, was 
it good for your public relations but bad for due process? Will it be more 
difficult to convict him in court? 

A: Of course there are negatives as well as positives in this action. But we 
were determined to show people there is no doubt. These people are always 
blaming some other people when things go wrong. I wanted to show that 
Indonesians are capable of building the bomb. If there is no response to 
incidents like these I worry there will be other incidents. We got a positive 
response from the public. We have to re-educate those who have been brainwashed 
by the misuse of Islamic teaching. People in the villages don’t understand the 
outside world. They are simple. They have a strong but a wrong mind. But don’t 
underestimate their common sense. They need re-education. Our leaders should 
take action. This is a message to our leaders. 

Q: Why do you think the Balinese reaction to the bombing has not been one of 
revenge and retaliation against Muslims in Bali? 

A: I am Balinese and I understand their reaction. Of course they are angry. But 
when they are angry they pray, they have a ceremony or gamelan performance. 
Perhaps they blame themselves. But I can tell you there will be no horizontal 
conflict in Bali. 

Q: The U.S. Senate is considering $50 million in assistance for the war on 
terrorism. What would be your priorities for help? 

A: There are three areas of possible assistance to the police: intelligence, 
striking force, and investigation. We have special needs for Brimob [mobile 
brigade] that is the striking force of the police. Unfortunately, help to 
Brimob is an issue in the United States because of its human rights violations. 
Brimob has a long history of being the elite unit of the police. But in Aceh, 
many young men were quickly recruited without proper qualifications or 
training. This unit violated human rights because of their lack of training and 
experience. I was myself in Brimob at one time. Now we are having a re-
selection process. 

Q: Will there be more terrorist acts in Indonesia if there is war in Iraq? 

A: There has been a lot of reaction in Indonesia about U.S. plans to attack 
Iraq. There have been demonstrations by students, organized by political 
parties. But I don’t see a direct connection to possible terrorism because 
these demonstrators are not connected to a terrorist network or radical 
elements of society, in my observation. 

Q: Ali Imron’s interview was contradicted by some other evidence, some of which 
suggested that Dr. Azhari [a Malaysian] constructed the bomb. Do you believe 
Imron’s account and can your evidence stand up in court? 

A: Ali Imron did not say Dr. Azhari was his student but that Azhari 
was “junior” to him. Do we believe Ali Imron? Not 100 percent; but we never 
taught him how to talk. He is a teacher in his madrassah. Sometimes he bluffs, 
but he [convincingly] explained how to build a bomb. 

Q: Is there evidence of a connection between the Laskar Jihad and the Bali 
bombers network? 

A: After the Bali bombing the Laskar Jihad announced they were disbanding. Up 
to now there is no evidence of cooperation between the groups, but we are still 
investigating. 

Key Points Of I Made Pastika’s Remarks 
Indonesia has been a victim of terrorism. The Bali bomb of October 12, 2002 
shocked Indonesia and the world, but Indonesia had been victimized by acts of 
terrorism before, as evidenced in the series of bombings throughout Indonesia 
in 2000 and 2001. Now we have a better understanding of how these seemingly 
isolated events may be inter-connected. 

-- Terrorism is a borderless crime: it can happen to anyone, anywhere, and can 
strike us whenever. As a practical matter, it is impossible to fight terrorism 
without engaging into international cooperation. By necessity, law enforcement 
institutions of different countries have to learn and get used to working 
together. Indonesia’s capacity-building efforts to fight terrorism can only be 
attained through interaction and assistance from others. As the threat of 
international terrorism rise, police cooperation will be a key feature of 
international security trend in this decade. 

-- The Bali bombing is one of the worst terrorist attacks in Indonesia. It 
caused at least 202 dead and 300 injured. It led to immense social, economic, 
and political setback for Indonesia. Tourism in Bali dropped from 50,000 to 
3,500. Massive lay-offs occurred and Indonesia’s international image was 
harmed. 

-- In the course of our investigation of the Bali bombing, the Indonesian 
police received full support from the international community, especially from 
the home-government of the victims (FBI, Scotland Yard, Australia Federal 
Police, etc). The police investigation involved 350 police personnel, and 200 
foreign police. We were able to apprehend 31 suspected terrorists, and in the 
process we also unraveled the terrorist networks which committed a series of 
attacks in Indonesia in 2001 and 2000. 

-- Our investigation has also the networks of the Jamaah Islamiyah in Indonesia 
and neighboring states including Malaysia, The Philippines and Singapore. We 
have captured the leader of Jamaah Islamiyah from Singapore who ran into hiding 
in Indonesia. We have also detained Abubakar Basyir who is regarded as the head 
of Jamaah Islamiyah and is suspected to being the leader of the radical Islamic 
movement in Southeast Asia. 

-- The terrorist groups can be categorized into 3 levels. First, those who wish 
to commit terrorist acts in order to take a “short cut to heaven” 
by “sacrificing” themselves in the cause of jihad. Secondly, those who want to 
do violence in others as a measure of revenge and retribution against the 
United States and its allies, who are held responsible for the suffering of 
Muslims in Palestine and Iraq. Third and the highest level, those who are 
motivated by ideological and political ambitions, and who wish to create an 
Islamic state, negara Daulah Islamiyah consisting of Malaysia, Singapore, The 
Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia and Southern Thailand. Historically, this 
group originates from the rebellious Darul Islam movement who have existed in 
Indonesia for a long time. This radical group has planted their influence in a 
small yet hardline segment of society in Indonesia and Malaysia, mainly nesting 
in and self-contained exclusive madrasah and pesantrens. After studying the 
economic, social, and educational profile of these terrorists, I have come to 
believe strongly in the role of education as one of the essential long-term 
tools to fight terrorism. These men became terrorists because their minds were 
twisted and brainwashed in a milieu where they were deprived of the kinds of 
knowledge that are available to many of us in this room today. 

-- Among those terrorists who were captured, some had committed jihad in 
Afghanistan, The Philippines and Ambon. 

-- These terrorists have the capability to strike terror with minimal support. 
Remember: the Bali bomb operations cost merely Rp100 million, which is equal to 
about US$10,000. They are also very militant, highly disciplined and dedicated 
to their cause. Nationalism and nationhood mean little to them, if at all. Some 
of their ranks have command technological sophistication. Many have little 
knowledge of the international world. 

-- The modus operandi is to regard Singapore and Malaysia as an economic zone 
to make money and accumulate funds, to use the Philippines as a training ground 
and Indonesia as an area of operation. 

-- In developing their jihad operations, they followed two methods. First, to 
seek and gain entry into conflict areas (Poso and Ambon for example), and if 
possible to aggravate the conflict itself. Conflict areas make for easy entry 
point and give more room for their operations due to weak law enforcement, they 
can roam around freely and undetected, and they can get logistical support with 
ease. Secondly, through bomb making, which serves as a tool to create a massive 
sense of insecurity, mistrust and in-fighting which in the end is hoped to 
weaken the Government and the political order in general.
-- General Pastika is a career police officer who has headed several high 
profile investigations in recent years. In East Timor he was the liaison 
between UNAMET, the UN administration, and the Indonesian government. He headed 
the investigation of the murder of 3 UN workers in Atambua, West Timor. After 
three months he was assigned to Papua where the OPM (independence movement) 
held hostages in Merauke. Subsequently he headed the investigation of the 
murder of Theys Eluay, a Papuan political leader, and the assassination of two 
American and one Indonesian teachers near Timika. He said the latter 
investigation was “about 75 percent finished” when the 10/12 bombing occurred, 
and he was transferred to head the Bali investigation. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Jakarta Post.com
Latest News
2/24/2003 7:44:21 PM
Eight more Bali attack files handed to prosecutor's office 

Denpasar, Bali (JP): Bali police on Monday handed over the dossiers of eight 
more Bali bombing suspects to the local public prosecutor's office.

The dossiers refer to Bali bombing suspects Hernianto, Wibowo, Saiful, Makmur, 
Nadjib, Herlambang, Masykur and Abdul Hamid.

The suspects are to be prosecuted based on Government Regulation in lieu of Law 
on Terrorism and, if found guilty, could be sentenced to death.

Antara said police had now submitted a total of 15 completed case files to 
prosecutors.

Police are holding 24 people as suspects in the October 12, 2002 tragedy, which 
killed almost 200 people and wounded 300 others, mostly foreign tourists. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Straits Times
Feb 24, 2003 Mon
Militias 'out to subvert Timor Leste government' 
-- Killing of former pro-independence activists points to a new militia threat 
from West Timor, says UN official 

DILI - Anti-independence militias have launched a 'terrorist strategy' to 
undermine Timor Leste's government before the planned United Nations withdrawal 
from the country next year, a top UN peacekeeper said.

Brigadier-General Justin Kelly, deputy commander of the UN peacekeeping force 
in the world's newest nation, said the killing of five former pro-independence 
campaigners in a mountain region last month pointed to a new militia threat 
from Indonesian West Timor. 

He said a group of men recently arrested in the town of Liquica claimed that 
they and another group which carried out those killings were sent into Timor 
Leste in December from West Timor, along with five other groups. 

They named their sponsor as Master Sergeant Tome Diogo, a Timor Leste national 
working for the Indonesian military in the border town of Atambua. 

The men said they were among some 300 trained for a guerilla campaign against 
former pro-independence activists and Suco chiefs, the influential local 
chieftains. 

Brig-Gen Kelly called this a 'classical terrorist strategy of trying to 
separate the people from the government', comparing it to the past campaigns of 
the Vietcong in Vietnam or the communists in Malaya in the 1950s. 

'We more or less expected this would happen but it has happened earlier than we 
thought,' he said. 

However, he said he thought it was more likely Diogo was working for other 
Timor Leste nationals in this matter rather than the Indonesian army.

Timor Leste leaders have also said they do not believe Jakarta had any hand in 
the incursions. 

Pro-Jakarta militias organised by elements of the Indonesian army organised a 
brutal intimidation campaign before Timor Leste's August 1999 vote to break 
away from Jakarta and a revenge campaign afterwards.

The militias fled across the border to West Timor before peacekeeping troops 
arrived. An estimated 3,000 former militiamen are still there. 

Many of the militia leaders come from influential Timor Leste families and some 
are wealthy. But they face legal action for crimes committed in 1999 if they 
return home. 

The infiltration, coming on top of riots late last year linked to internal 
dissent, could herald a dangerously enlarged role for Timor Leste's military, 
some analysts say. 
--AFP 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
International Herald Tribune
UN haste puts East Timor at risk  
Shepard Forman – IHT
Monday, February 24, 2003 
-- Too early to quit

New York - Even as the United Nations focuses like a laser on Iraq, it must not 
lose sight of its other commitments. The UN Security Council laid the framework 
for East Timor's independence nine months ago, but now the nascent state is at 
risk from a UN plan to withdraw support before the East Timorese have had time 
to lay the foundations of lasting security and stability.

The United Nations, the World Bank and numerous nongovernmental organizations 
have done their best to shepherd East Timor to independence. But threats to 
security remain, both from civil unrest - as evidenced in a rampage Dec. 4 in 
Dili, the capital - and from renegades waiting patiently across the border for 
the international force to leave. Thousands of refugees, lacking the means to 
continue the agriculture that has long provided their livelihood, have 
resettled in Dili, swelling its population from 60,000 to 200,000 people and 
creating an urban concentration of underemployed, dispossessed and disaffected 
youth.

Too little has been invested in training programs for the civil administration 
and for an incipient defense and police force capable of maintaining internal 
order and securing its borders. Public works, schools and housing - totally 
destroyed by roving militia bands after the East Timorese voted for 
independence over integration in Indonesia - have been only partially rebuilt.

To make matters worse, there has been little of the foreign investment that 
East Timor desperately needs to jump-start and sustain the economy and produce 
tax revenues for the state.

The United Nations, and especially the Security Council, has much to be proud 
of in East Timor. The council and the UN's senior leadership showed their 
resolve when devastating militia attacks plunged East Timor into crisis in 
September 1999. By insisting that Indonesia yield on its staunch resistance to 
an international peacekeeping force, and by setting up the transitional 
authority that governed the island until the East Timorese flag was raised in 
May 2002, the council contained a violent conflict and prepared the way for 
East Timor's independence.

Rather than declaring its mission a success, however, and insisting on a strict 
timetable for withdrawal, the Security Council needs to carefully measure the 
distance East Timor still needs to travel before it can stand entirely on its 
own.

In June 2002 the United Nations, with Security Council authorization, put into 
effect a "successor mission plan" for a downsized and temporary support system 
for the new East Timor government. It calls, largely on French insistence, for 
a rapid reduction of UN technical assistance and security personnel to zero 
over a two-year period. Unfortunately, in its haste to exit, the Security 
Council does not seem to be heeding its own admonition to ensure the security 
and stability of the nascent state.

The positive beginning the United Nations achieved in East Timor could easily 
be squandered if the Security Council does not complete the job it started. 
Despite having spent more than $1 billion over the last three years, the 
international community has insufficiently prepared East Timor to fully 
exercise its sovereign authority or provide for the welfare of its traumatized 
citizens.

East Timor serves as an important test case of the Security Council's 
willingness to see its resolutions through to their intended conclusion. If the 
Security Council does not reconsider its scheduled formula for downsizing the 
UN's civilian, military and police support group, the long-term objective of 
creating the first new democratic state of the 21st century could be at serious 
risk.

The East Timorese are among the world's most resilient and self-reliant people. 
With the UN and the Security Council at their side, they won their 27-year 
struggle for independence and have taken the first steps toward recovery. The 
UN should extend its stay, to give them the extra time and assistance they need 
to build the political, economic and security institutions on which their 
fledgling democracy must be founded.
-- The writer directs the Center on International Cooperation at New York 
University and is co-editor of "Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy." 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ABC Radio Australia News 
24/02/2003 22:47:43
Bus attack prompts East Timor crisis meeting 

The East Timor Government is holding an emergency meeting after an armed group 
attacked a bus in a rural area southeast of the capital Dili causing at least 
one death. 

The Lusa news agency reported three people were injured in the attack near the 
town of Ribeira de Loes. 

The incident comes just one day after a top UN peacekeeper in the territory 
warned anti-independence militia had launched a "terrorist strategy" to 
undermine East Timor's Government before the planned withdrawal of the United 
Nations from the country next year. 

Brigadier General Justin Kelly, deputy commander of the UN peacekeeping force, 
said the killing of five former pro-independence campaigners in a mountain 
region last month pointed to a new militia threat from Indonesian West Timor.

Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri is expected to host the emergency meeting which 
will be attended by Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato and the Secretary of State 
for Defence Roque Rodrigues as well as UN officials.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Sydney Morning Herald
Civilian killed as gunmen attack minibus in East Timor
February 25 2003

Officials say unidentified gunmen have killed one person and seriously injured 
two pregnant women in an attack on a minibus in East Timor. 

Deputy Defence and Security Minister Roque Rodrigues says the group fled after 
the attack at 12.45pm (local time) yesterday near the village of Aidabaleten in 
Maliana district. 

Maliana is on the border with Indonesian West Timor, where many pro-Jakarta 
militiamen have sheltered since fleeing East Timor in September 1999. 

A security source says the 10-strong group first fired on a truck but the 
driver escaped. 

The attackers then stopped a minibus, boarded and started firing, killing one 
and injuring several others, at least three severely. 

United Nations peacekeeping troops deployed a quick reaction force to search 
for the attackers. 

Checkpoints have been set up and a helicopter called in. 

UN police and East Timorese police also rushed to the scene. 
-- AAP 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Jakarta Post.com
National News
February 25, 2003
TNI promises tighter border security after militia attack 
Yemris Fointuna and Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, The Jakarta Post Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur

The military commander overseeing the West Timor province promised tighter 
security along its border with East Timor where one person died on Monday in an 
attack allegedly staged by pro Jakarta militia who crossed the border to West 
Timor.

East Nusa Tenggara military chief Col. Moeswarno Moesanip said the Indonesian 
military (TNI) would not allow West Timor to become a base for militia 
activities. 

"We don't want them here and surely don't want to facilitate their activities," 
Moeswarno said, adding "we will tighten security." 

He said he had at his disposal two battalions, which would amount to 2,000 
soldiers. 

The East Timor government planned to hold an emergency meeting after an armed 
group attacked a bus in a rural area southeast of the capital Dili on Monday, 
AFP reported quoting the Lusa news agency. 

At least one died and three people sustained injuries. The bus, carrying at 
least 10 passengers, was ambushed near the town of Ribeira de Loes. 

The attack came just a day after deputy commander of the United Nations peace 
keeping force, Brig. Gen. Justin Kelly said pro-Indonesia militias had launched 
a "terrorist strategy" to destabilize East Timor. 

Last month five civilians were killed in an attack in East Timor, which 
eyewitnesses said was carried out by pro-Indonesia militias. 

The militias, backed by members of the Indonesian military, burnt destroyed the 
country and killed hundreds of East Timorese when the population overwhelmingly 
voted for independence in a UN sponsored poll in 1999. 

Thousands were forced to flee to West Timor, most of whom returned, but many 
militia members remain in West Timor, as some fear prosecution if they return. 
Indonesia has made no effort to bring to justice the thousands of militia 
fighters, even though some of the leaders have been tried in a human rights 
trial. 

Kelly is now warning of infiltration from a group of militia members, launching 
attacks from across the border in Indonesia. 

But East Timor stopped short of accusing the Indonesian government of backing 
the militias. The Australian government, which has UN peacekeepers in East 
Timor, dismissed suspicion that TNI was supporting the militias. 

Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirayuda responded with 
frustration to the latest attack and accusations. "I am tired of dealing with 
similar accusations over and over again," Hassan said in Kuala Lumpur. 

He said he recently met his East Timor counterpart Jose Ramos Horta who said 
nothing about the militia problems. 

Hassan said the attacks were simply riots among the East Timorese suffering 
from years of economic problems. 

Unemployment remains widespread and the country continues to rely on foreign 
aid three and a half years since it won the independence vote. 

"Without evidence and facts, accusations of militias operating in West Timor 
are simply false," he said. 

He said that among the around 220,000 refugees who returned to East Timor, 
8,000 were former militia members. 

"If these people now stir problems in East Timor, that's their problem," he 
said. 





More information about the Kabar-Indonesia mailing list