No subject
Tue May 1 19:37:24 MDT 2007
organizational chart of Jemaah Islamiyah showing Abu Bakar Basher the Imam
(spiritual leader) and Usama bin Laden as a respected figure. General Pastika
pointedly noted that several of the suspects had been trained in Afghanistan,
but he made no further claim to al Qaeda connections.
His conclusions: The bombings were carried out by a network of Indonesians
connected to the Jemaah Islamiah. The attacks were carefully planned over a
period of months. They were in accordance with the objectives of the Jemaah
Islamiyah, which are to create an Islamic state in Southeast Asia comprising
areas of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Indonesia must acknowledge its unreadiness, including awareness of the
institutions and societies that carry out terrorism. We are now in a capacity-
building mode....Now we need the support of our friends, he said.
General Pastika spoke without a text and proved adept at questions which probed
some of the political implications in Indonesia. He stoutly defended the public
interview of Ali Imron, the alleged bomb builder, whose claims have been
contradicted by other suspects.
Q: Before the bombings the government was in denial about terrorists, and there
was no political cohesiveness. Do you see now that the government is more
united?
A: In the first weeks of the investigation there were many doubts. But because
the investigation was successful, we hope for a trickle up as well as
a trickle down effect. Now the political conditions are conducive for further
investigation. Now no one can say there is no terrorism. Now there is support
for the police and also for other institutions. There is a desk for anti-
terrorism in the office of the coordinating minister for political affairs,
comprised of senior officers from various services. Thats trickle up. Trickle
down means that within the police force, and also among prosecutors and judges,
there is an eagerness to learn and to improve.
Q: Referring to Ali Imrons public re-enactment of constructing the bomb, was
it good for your public relations but bad for due process? Will it be more
difficult to convict him in court?
A: Of course there are negatives as well as positives in this action. But we
were determined to show people there is no doubt. These people are always
blaming some other people when things go wrong. I wanted to show that
Indonesians are capable of building the bomb. If there is no response to
incidents like these I worry there will be other incidents. We got a positive
response from the public. We have to re-educate those who have been brainwashed
by the misuse of Islamic teaching. People in the villages dont understand the
outside world. They are simple. They have a strong but a wrong mind. But dont
underestimate their common sense. They need re-education. Our leaders should
take action. This is a message to our leaders.
Q: Why do you think the Balinese reaction to the bombing has not been one of
revenge and retaliation against Muslims in Bali?
A: I am Balinese and I understand their reaction. Of course they are angry. But
when they are angry they pray, they have a ceremony or gamelan performance.
Perhaps they blame themselves. But I can tell you there will be no horizontal
conflict in Bali.
Q: The U.S. Senate is considering $50 million in assistance for the war on
terrorism. What would be your priorities for help?
A: There are three areas of possible assistance to the police: intelligence,
striking force, and investigation. We have special needs for Brimob [mobile
brigade] that is the striking force of the police. Unfortunately, help to
Brimob is an issue in the United States because of its human rights violations.
Brimob has a long history of being the elite unit of the police. But in Aceh,
many young men were quickly recruited without proper qualifications or
training. This unit violated human rights because of their lack of training and
experience. I was myself in Brimob at one time. Now we are having a re-
selection process.
Q: Will there be more terrorist acts in Indonesia if there is war in Iraq?
A: There has been a lot of reaction in Indonesia about U.S. plans to attack
Iraq. There have been demonstrations by students, organized by political
parties. But I dont see a direct connection to possible terrorism because
these demonstrators are not connected to a terrorist network or radical
elements of society, in my observation.
Q: Ali Imrons interview was contradicted by some other evidence, some of which
suggested that Dr. Azhari [a Malaysian] constructed the bomb. Do you believe
Imrons account and can your evidence stand up in court?
A: Ali Imron did not say Dr. Azhari was his student but that Azhari
was junior to him. Do we believe Ali Imron? Not 100 percent; but we never
taught him how to talk. He is a teacher in his madrassah. Sometimes he bluffs,
but he [convincingly] explained how to build a bomb.
Q: Is there evidence of a connection between the Laskar Jihad and the Bali
bombers network?
A: After the Bali bombing the Laskar Jihad announced they were disbanding. Up
to now there is no evidence of cooperation between the groups, but we are still
investigating.
Key Points Of I Made Pastikas Remarks
Indonesia has been a victim of terrorism. The Bali bomb of October 12, 2002
shocked Indonesia and the world, but Indonesia had been victimized by acts of
terrorism before, as evidenced in the series of bombings throughout Indonesia
in 2000 and 2001. Now we have a better understanding of how these seemingly
isolated events may be inter-connected.
-- Terrorism is a borderless crime: it can happen to anyone, anywhere, and can
strike us whenever. As a practical matter, it is impossible to fight terrorism
without engaging into international cooperation. By necessity, law enforcement
institutions of different countries have to learn and get used to working
together. Indonesias capacity-building efforts to fight terrorism can only be
attained through interaction and assistance from others. As the threat of
international terrorism rise, police cooperation will be a key feature of
international security trend in this decade.
-- The Bali bombing is one of the worst terrorist attacks in Indonesia. It
caused at least 202 dead and 300 injured. It led to immense social, economic,
and political setback for Indonesia. Tourism in Bali dropped from 50,000 to
3,500. Massive lay-offs occurred and Indonesias international image was
harmed.
-- In the course of our investigation of the Bali bombing, the Indonesian
police received full support from the international community, especially from
the home-government of the victims (FBI, Scotland Yard, Australia Federal
Police, etc). The police investigation involved 350 police personnel, and 200
foreign police. We were able to apprehend 31 suspected terrorists, and in the
process we also unraveled the terrorist networks which committed a series of
attacks in Indonesia in 2001 and 2000.
-- Our investigation has also the networks of the Jamaah Islamiyah in Indonesia
and neighboring states including Malaysia, The Philippines and Singapore. We
have captured the leader of Jamaah Islamiyah from Singapore who ran into hiding
in Indonesia. We have also detained Abubakar Basyir who is regarded as the head
of Jamaah Islamiyah and is suspected to being the leader of the radical Islamic
movement in Southeast Asia.
-- The terrorist groups can be categorized into 3 levels. First, those who wish
to commit terrorist acts in order to take a short cut to heaven
by sacrificing themselves in the cause of jihad. Secondly, those who want to
do violence in others as a measure of revenge and retribution against the
United States and its allies, who are held responsible for the suffering of
Muslims in Palestine and Iraq. Third and the highest level, those who are
motivated by ideological and political ambitions, and who wish to create an
Islamic state, negara Daulah Islamiyah consisting of Malaysia, Singapore, The
Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia and Southern Thailand. Historically, this
group originates from the rebellious Darul Islam movement who have existed in
Indonesia for a long time. This radical group has planted their influence in a
small yet hardline segment of society in Indonesia and Malaysia, mainly nesting
in and self-contained exclusive madrasah and pesantrens. After studying the
economic, social, and educational profile of these terrorists, I have come to
believe strongly in the role of education as one of the essential long-term
tools to fight terrorism. These men became terrorists because their minds were
twisted and brainwashed in a milieu where they were deprived of the kinds of
knowledge that are available to many of us in this room today.
-- Among those terrorists who were captured, some had committed jihad in
Afghanistan, The Philippines and Ambon.
-- These terrorists have the capability to strike terror with minimal support.
Remember: the Bali bomb operations cost merely Rp100 million, which is equal to
about US$10,000. They are also very militant, highly disciplined and dedicated
to their cause. Nationalism and nationhood mean little to them, if at all. Some
of their ranks have command technological sophistication. Many have little
knowledge of the international world.
-- The modus operandi is to regard Singapore and Malaysia as an economic zone
to make money and accumulate funds, to use the Philippines as a training ground
and Indonesia as an area of operation.
-- In developing their jihad operations, they followed two methods. First, to
seek and gain entry into conflict areas (Poso and Ambon for example), and if
possible to aggravate the conflict itself. Conflict areas make for easy entry
point and give more room for their operations due to weak law enforcement, they
can roam around freely and undetected, and they can get logistical support with
ease. Secondly, through bomb making, which serves as a tool to create a massive
sense of insecurity, mistrust and in-fighting which in the end is hoped to
weaken the Government and the political order in general.
-- General Pastika is a career police officer who has headed several high
profile investigations in recent years. In East Timor he was the liaison
between UNAMET, the UN administration, and the Indonesian government. He headed
the investigation of the murder of 3 UN workers in Atambua, West Timor. After
three months he was assigned to Papua where the OPM (independence movement)
held hostages in Merauke. Subsequently he headed the investigation of the
murder of Theys Eluay, a Papuan political leader, and the assassination of two
American and one Indonesian teachers near Timika. He said the latter
investigation was about 75 percent finished when the 10/12 bombing occurred,
and he was transferred to head the Bali investigation.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Jakarta Post.com
Latest News
2/24/2003 7:44:21 PM
Eight more Bali attack files handed to prosecutor's office
Denpasar, Bali (JP): Bali police on Monday handed over the dossiers of eight
more Bali bombing suspects to the local public prosecutor's office.
The dossiers refer to Bali bombing suspects Hernianto, Wibowo, Saiful, Makmur,
Nadjib, Herlambang, Masykur and Abdul Hamid.
The suspects are to be prosecuted based on Government Regulation in lieu of Law
on Terrorism and, if found guilty, could be sentenced to death.
Antara said police had now submitted a total of 15 completed case files to
prosecutors.
Police are holding 24 people as suspects in the October 12, 2002 tragedy, which
killed almost 200 people and wounded 300 others, mostly foreign tourists.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Straits Times
Feb 24, 2003 Mon
Militias 'out to subvert Timor Leste government'
-- Killing of former pro-independence activists points to a new militia threat
from West Timor, says UN official
DILI - Anti-independence militias have launched a 'terrorist strategy' to
undermine Timor Leste's government before the planned United Nations withdrawal
from the country next year, a top UN peacekeeper said.
Brigadier-General Justin Kelly, deputy commander of the UN peacekeeping force
in the world's newest nation, said the killing of five former pro-independence
campaigners in a mountain region last month pointed to a new militia threat
from Indonesian West Timor.
He said a group of men recently arrested in the town of Liquica claimed that
they and another group which carried out those killings were sent into Timor
Leste in December from West Timor, along with five other groups.
They named their sponsor as Master Sergeant Tome Diogo, a Timor Leste national
working for the Indonesian military in the border town of Atambua.
The men said they were among some 300 trained for a guerilla campaign against
former pro-independence activists and Suco chiefs, the influential local
chieftains.
Brig-Gen Kelly called this a 'classical terrorist strategy of trying to
separate the people from the government', comparing it to the past campaigns of
the Vietcong in Vietnam or the communists in Malaya in the 1950s.
'We more or less expected this would happen but it has happened earlier than we
thought,' he said.
However, he said he thought it was more likely Diogo was working for other
Timor Leste nationals in this matter rather than the Indonesian army.
Timor Leste leaders have also said they do not believe Jakarta had any hand in
the incursions.
Pro-Jakarta militias organised by elements of the Indonesian army organised a
brutal intimidation campaign before Timor Leste's August 1999 vote to break
away from Jakarta and a revenge campaign afterwards.
The militias fled across the border to West Timor before peacekeeping troops
arrived. An estimated 3,000 former militiamen are still there.
Many of the militia leaders come from influential Timor Leste families and some
are wealthy. But they face legal action for crimes committed in 1999 if they
return home.
The infiltration, coming on top of riots late last year linked to internal
dissent, could herald a dangerously enlarged role for Timor Leste's military,
some analysts say.
--AFP
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
International Herald Tribune
UN haste puts East Timor at risk
Shepard Forman IHT
Monday, February 24, 2003
-- Too early to quit
New York - Even as the United Nations focuses like a laser on Iraq, it must not
lose sight of its other commitments. The UN Security Council laid the framework
for East Timor's independence nine months ago, but now the nascent state is at
risk from a UN plan to withdraw support before the East Timorese have had time
to lay the foundations of lasting security and stability.
The United Nations, the World Bank and numerous nongovernmental organizations
have done their best to shepherd East Timor to independence. But threats to
security remain, both from civil unrest - as evidenced in a rampage Dec. 4 in
Dili, the capital - and from renegades waiting patiently across the border for
the international force to leave. Thousands of refugees, lacking the means to
continue the agriculture that has long provided their livelihood, have
resettled in Dili, swelling its population from 60,000 to 200,000 people and
creating an urban concentration of underemployed, dispossessed and disaffected
youth.
Too little has been invested in training programs for the civil administration
and for an incipient defense and police force capable of maintaining internal
order and securing its borders. Public works, schools and housing - totally
destroyed by roving militia bands after the East Timorese voted for
independence over integration in Indonesia - have been only partially rebuilt.
To make matters worse, there has been little of the foreign investment that
East Timor desperately needs to jump-start and sustain the economy and produce
tax revenues for the state.
The United Nations, and especially the Security Council, has much to be proud
of in East Timor. The council and the UN's senior leadership showed their
resolve when devastating militia attacks plunged East Timor into crisis in
September 1999. By insisting that Indonesia yield on its staunch resistance to
an international peacekeeping force, and by setting up the transitional
authority that governed the island until the East Timorese flag was raised in
May 2002, the council contained a violent conflict and prepared the way for
East Timor's independence.
Rather than declaring its mission a success, however, and insisting on a strict
timetable for withdrawal, the Security Council needs to carefully measure the
distance East Timor still needs to travel before it can stand entirely on its
own.
In June 2002 the United Nations, with Security Council authorization, put into
effect a "successor mission plan" for a downsized and temporary support system
for the new East Timor government. It calls, largely on French insistence, for
a rapid reduction of UN technical assistance and security personnel to zero
over a two-year period. Unfortunately, in its haste to exit, the Security
Council does not seem to be heeding its own admonition to ensure the security
and stability of the nascent state.
The positive beginning the United Nations achieved in East Timor could easily
be squandered if the Security Council does not complete the job it started.
Despite having spent more than $1 billion over the last three years, the
international community has insufficiently prepared East Timor to fully
exercise its sovereign authority or provide for the welfare of its traumatized
citizens.
East Timor serves as an important test case of the Security Council's
willingness to see its resolutions through to their intended conclusion. If the
Security Council does not reconsider its scheduled formula for downsizing the
UN's civilian, military and police support group, the long-term objective of
creating the first new democratic state of the 21st century could be at serious
risk.
The East Timorese are among the world's most resilient and self-reliant people.
With the UN and the Security Council at their side, they won their 27-year
struggle for independence and have taken the first steps toward recovery. The
UN should extend its stay, to give them the extra time and assistance they need
to build the political, economic and security institutions on which their
fledgling democracy must be founded.
-- The writer directs the Center on International Cooperation at New York
University and is co-editor of "Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ABC Radio Australia News
24/02/2003 22:47:43
Bus attack prompts East Timor crisis meeting
The East Timor Government is holding an emergency meeting after an armed group
attacked a bus in a rural area southeast of the capital Dili causing at least
one death.
The Lusa news agency reported three people were injured in the attack near the
town of Ribeira de Loes.
The incident comes just one day after a top UN peacekeeper in the territory
warned anti-independence militia had launched a "terrorist strategy" to
undermine East Timor's Government before the planned withdrawal of the United
Nations from the country next year.
Brigadier General Justin Kelly, deputy commander of the UN peacekeeping force,
said the killing of five former pro-independence campaigners in a mountain
region last month pointed to a new militia threat from Indonesian West Timor.
Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri is expected to host the emergency meeting which
will be attended by Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato and the Secretary of State
for Defence Roque Rodrigues as well as UN officials.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Sydney Morning Herald
Civilian killed as gunmen attack minibus in East Timor
February 25 2003
Officials say unidentified gunmen have killed one person and seriously injured
two pregnant women in an attack on a minibus in East Timor.
Deputy Defence and Security Minister Roque Rodrigues says the group fled after
the attack at 12.45pm (local time) yesterday near the village of Aidabaleten in
Maliana district.
Maliana is on the border with Indonesian West Timor, where many pro-Jakarta
militiamen have sheltered since fleeing East Timor in September 1999.
A security source says the 10-strong group first fired on a truck but the
driver escaped.
The attackers then stopped a minibus, boarded and started firing, killing one
and injuring several others, at least three severely.
United Nations peacekeeping troops deployed a quick reaction force to search
for the attackers.
Checkpoints have been set up and a helicopter called in.
UN police and East Timorese police also rushed to the scene.
-- AAP
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Jakarta Post.com
National News
February 25, 2003
TNI promises tighter border security after militia attack
Yemris Fointuna and Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, The Jakarta Post Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur
The military commander overseeing the West Timor province promised tighter
security along its border with East Timor where one person died on Monday in an
attack allegedly staged by pro Jakarta militia who crossed the border to West
Timor.
East Nusa Tenggara military chief Col. Moeswarno Moesanip said the Indonesian
military (TNI) would not allow West Timor to become a base for militia
activities.
"We don't want them here and surely don't want to facilitate their activities,"
Moeswarno said, adding "we will tighten security."
He said he had at his disposal two battalions, which would amount to 2,000
soldiers.
The East Timor government planned to hold an emergency meeting after an armed
group attacked a bus in a rural area southeast of the capital Dili on Monday,
AFP reported quoting the Lusa news agency.
At least one died and three people sustained injuries. The bus, carrying at
least 10 passengers, was ambushed near the town of Ribeira de Loes.
The attack came just a day after deputy commander of the United Nations peace
keeping force, Brig. Gen. Justin Kelly said pro-Indonesia militias had launched
a "terrorist strategy" to destabilize East Timor.
Last month five civilians were killed in an attack in East Timor, which
eyewitnesses said was carried out by pro-Indonesia militias.
The militias, backed by members of the Indonesian military, burnt destroyed the
country and killed hundreds of East Timorese when the population overwhelmingly
voted for independence in a UN sponsored poll in 1999.
Thousands were forced to flee to West Timor, most of whom returned, but many
militia members remain in West Timor, as some fear prosecution if they return.
Indonesia has made no effort to bring to justice the thousands of militia
fighters, even though some of the leaders have been tried in a human rights
trial.
Kelly is now warning of infiltration from a group of militia members, launching
attacks from across the border in Indonesia.
But East Timor stopped short of accusing the Indonesian government of backing
the militias. The Australian government, which has UN peacekeepers in East
Timor, dismissed suspicion that TNI was supporting the militias.
Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirayuda responded with
frustration to the latest attack and accusations. "I am tired of dealing with
similar accusations over and over again," Hassan said in Kuala Lumpur.
He said he recently met his East Timor counterpart Jose Ramos Horta who said
nothing about the militia problems.
Hassan said the attacks were simply riots among the East Timorese suffering
from years of economic problems.
Unemployment remains widespread and the country continues to rely on foreign
aid three and a half years since it won the independence vote.
"Without evidence and facts, accusations of militias operating in West Timor
are simply false," he said.
He said that among the around 220,000 refugees who returned to East Timor,
8,000 were former militia members.
"If these people now stir problems in East Timor, that's their problem," he
said.
More information about the Kabar-Indonesia
mailing list