[Kabar-Irian] News: Jul 6-9 2007
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KABAR IRIAN NEWS
July 5-9
TOPICS
* HRW Report Papua 07/07/07
* Indonesia: Police Abuse Endemic in Closed Area of Papua
* Report Finds Police Kill Civilians with Impunity in Papua, Indonesia
* U.S. congressman says progress in Indonesia's Papua
* Indonesian police say they will investigate claims
* Report pans Indonesia over Papua
* West Papua: Eight arrested at Tribal Congress as Report castigates
Indonesian Authorities
* Papuan Tribal Council head promises to pursue independence
* Police vow to look into reported Papua abuses
* Police unit accused of Papua abuses
* Papuan movement 'part of democracy'
* Yogya police break up rally by Papuans
* Forgotten Papua
* U.S. rep supports Indonesia on Papua
* Australia Upgrades Indonesian Travel Warning
* American congressman meets with Papuan figures in Jakarta
* Papua students demonstrate at US embassy
* Papuan students in Yogyakarta reject OTSUS
* Papuan students in Yogyakarta blockade road
* Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian stated...
* Eight West Papuans arrested after tribal council meeting
* Media Release:
* Howard should insist Jakarta halt Papuan rape and murder
* West Papua abuses highlight dangers of 'Lombok' treaty
---
http://hrw.org/reports/2007/papua0707/
July 2007 Volume 19, No. 10(C)
Out of Sight
Endemic Abuse and Impunity in Papua’s Central Highlands
Map of Papua and West Irian Jaya
............................................................................
1
I.
Summary...............................................................................................................2
Methodology......................................................................................................
6
II. Key
Recommendations........................................................................................
8
Human Rights Watch urges the Indonesian government to:
................................ 8
III.
Background.........................................................................................................9
Roots of the Papuan
conflict...............................................................................
9
Post-Reformasi: A Bumpy and Uncertain Transition to Special
Autonomy........... 14
IV. Restrictions on Access to
Papua........................................................................
21
V. Human Rights Violations in the Central Highlands
.............................................24
Extra judicial executions and other abuses during sweeping
operations............24
Brimob operations in
Tolikara......................................................................26
Brimob operations in Puncak
Jaya................................................................29
Serious human rights violations by the police
...................................................34
2005 flag
raising..........................................................................................34
The arrest of David Hubi
..............................................................................38
Mulia DPRD
Demonstration..........................................................................44
Shootings in
Waghete..................................................................................46
Police Killing of Man in Wamena
..................................................................49
Police Beating of Man in
Apalapsili..............................................................
51
TNI
Abuses........................................................................................................52
TNI Beating of Two Men
...............................................................................52
TNI beating of uncle of rape victim
...............................................................53
TNI Assault in Jayawijaya
.............................................................................
55
TNI Beating of Youths in Piramid
..................................................................56
Violence Against Women and Girls and Other Violations of Women’s Rights
......58
TNI Rape of 16-year-old girl
..........................................................................61
Rape as retaliation for alleged links to the OPM
...........................................62
VI. Impunity and Lack of Accountability for Abuses
................................................64
Impunity for security forces in Papua: Prominent cases
.....................................65
Mechanisms for Accountability
........................................................................
69
Prosecuting members of the police
...................................................................70
Impact of the Human Rights Courts
................................................................... 71
Conclusion: Impunity Persists
...........................................................................73
VII. Recommendations
...........................................................................................74
To the Government of the Indonesian Republic:
................................................74
To the Government and the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia
(POLRI):
.........................................................................................................................
75
To Papuan community leaders:
.........................................................................76
Appendix I: Glossary of Indonesian
Terms.............................................................. 77
Acknowledgements................................................................................................79
1 Human Rights Watch July 2007
Map of Papua and West Irian Jaya1
© 2006 International Crisis Group
1 On April 18, 2007, the name West Irian Jaya was changed to West Papua.
Out of Sight 2
I. Summary
The performance of security forces in the Central Highlands region of
Indonesia’s
Papua province2 is an important barometer of the success of security
sector reform
efforts in the country more generally. Outside scrutiny is minimal and the
security
challenges are pronounced—pro-independence guerrillas have long been based in
the region and public resentment of Indonesian authorities and institutions
continues to simmer. The Central Highlands show how security forces act when
hidden from public view.
For this report, Human Rights Watch investigated 14 cases of alleged human
rights
violations in the region, interviewing more than 50 victims, witnesses,
and family
members of victims. Government limits on access and the rugged terrain of the
region posed unique obstacles to research and follow-up as needed what we
found
gives serious cause for concern.
Among our key findings are that while civilian complaints of brutal
treatment by
soldiers continue to emerge, police officers rather than soldiers are
responsible for
most serious rights violations in the region today. We found that both
army troops
and police units, particularly mobile paramilitary police units (Brigade
Mobil or
Brimob), continue to engage in largely indiscriminate village “sweeping”
operations
in pursuit of suspected militants, using excessive, often brutal, and at
times lethal
force against civilians. Another finding is that even in routine policing,
officers
sometimes use excessive force.
2 The Indonesian territory of Papua occupies the western half of the
island of New Guinea. Originally one
province in the
republic, in 2003 it was controversially divided into two new provinces.
The new province of West Irian
Jaya now occupies the
western part of the region with a new provincial capital of Manokwari. The
new province in the eastern
half is still called
Papua, with Jayapura still serving as the provincial capital. Plans for a
proposed third province named
Central Irian Jaya, have
been postponed. On April 18, 2007, the name West Irian Jaya was changed to
West Papua. As used
here, Central Highlands
refers to the districts along the mountainous “spine” of the eastern
province of Papua: the districts of
Jayawijaya, Puncak Jaya,
Mimika, Tolikara, Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang, and Paniai.
3 Human Rights Watch July 2007
Underlying these mostly violent abuses is a culture of impunity. Members
of the
security forces continue to act as if they are above the law because, in
fact, they
rarely are prosecuted even when they commit the most serious of crimes.
In the 14 incidents documented in this report—which include eight alleged
killings,
two rapes, and many cases of ill treatment and torture—at writing, only
one member
of the security forces had faced prosecution, and that was before a
military court; a
low ranking officer was sentenced to eight months in prison for killing a
16-year-old
Papuan high school student. To our knowledge, no Brimob or regular police
officers
have been investigated or prosecuted for their role in the remaining seven
killings.
No officers have been charged in either of the two rape cases in which
police were
implicated. No officers have been charged in connection with the cases of
alleged
police ill-treatment we documented. This report thus documents what
appears to be
the near total absence of accountability for members of the security
forces who
commit abuses in the Central Highlands.
* * *
The Central Highlands region for years has been the site of tense
confrontations
between Indonesian police and military units and small cells of Organisasi
Papua
Merdeka (OPM, known in English as the Free Papua Movement) guerrillas. The
proindependence
guerrillas have conducted repeated low-level armed attacks against
Indonesian security forces, while Indonesian security forces, fearful of a
repeat of the
successful movement for independence in East Timor, have conducted regular
sweeping operations to search for OPM guerillas or their supporters. These
operations have typically involved looting, destruction of property, and
in some
cases harm to civilians and displacement. Public support for the
guerrillas is
perhaps stronger in the Central Highlands than anywhere else in Papua.
Some proponents of Papuan independence have alleged that Indonesia is
carrying
out genocide in the Central Highlands, while others claim that serious
human rights
violations are a thing of the past. The reality is that surprisingly
little is known about
what is happening in many parts of the region. One reason is that this
region is a
Out of Sight 4
large, mountainous, inaccessible, and sparsely populated area with little
modern
infrastructure. News can take days to reach towns if it reaches them at all.
A more important reason is that journalists, human rights workers, and even
diplomats are barred from entry to the area without permits, which are
hard, at times
impossible, to obtain. Outsiders who do visit are able to do so only very
irregularly
and under tight surveillance by authorities. This means that little solid
information
comes out, creating fertile ground for rumors and unfounded speculation.
The lack of
reliable factual accounts means that unfounded rumors circulate with much the
same potency as accurate accounts. The prominence of misinformation has
served
only to magnify the Central Highlands’ reputation as a hotbed of dissent
and abuse.
While Indonesian security forces have improved their practices in some
important
respects in the provinces of Papua and West Papua, the situation remains
of serious
concern, particularly in the highlands. Security forces often presume
civilians to be
linked to, or vicariously responsible for, acts by the OPM.
During the course of this research Human Rights Watch documented eight
confirmed
and five other possible extrajudicial killings since 2005, all involving
members of the
police, and one for which members of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI),
the
Indonesian military, appear to be primarily responsible. We documented two
rapes,
one by a TNI soldier of a child, and another by Brimob officers.
In 10 of the 14 cases documented in this report, members of the police
force were the
perpetrators. Several victims told Human Rights Watch about their forced
displacement due to sweeping operations by Brimob and army units, and were
eyewitnesses to the deaths of nine civilians (two children and seven
adults), most
likely caused by exposure to diseases such as malaria and lack of access
to medical
treatment during displacement.
As noted above, many of the most serious violations we documented occurred
as the
police conducted sweeping raids through the communities believed to have
hosted
OPM leaders, or in areas where the OPM had allegedly led attacks upon
security
forces. In 2005 the operations caused the dislocation of thousands of
villagers
5 Human Rights Watch July 2007
fleeing in fear to the mountains. This displacement restricted peoples’
access to
food, medical treatment, and other basic services such as education and
access to
livelihoods.
Extrajudicial killings and ill-treatment also occurred when regular police
and Brimob
units used disproportionate or excessive force to break up or control
gatherings of
people. In one of the cases, victims were individuals trying to fly the
“Morning Star,”
the Papuan independence flag. The Indonesian government remains highly
intolerant of even peacefully expressed pro-independence sentiment. Those
involved in Morning Star flag-raisings or other peaceful expressions of
aspirations for
independence are dealt with harshly.
Police officers appear to regularly commit abuses while carrying out
ordinary police
tasks, including arrest and detention of suspects for non-political
crimes. This kind
of daily abuse appears to be a reflection of the heavy security presence,
the lack of
meaningful consequences for offenders, and the general state of
lawlessness in the
area. Many of these violations took place when officers were not on
official duty but
in pursuit of private business or other ventures.
Human Rights Watch found that rape and other sexual violence against women
and
girls by security forces is a continuing problem. Such attacks, as well as
the broader
fear such attacks generate, shape the daily lives of women and girls in
the Central
Highlands region.
Many of the ordinary yet disturbing abuses we have documented arise
primarily due
to the impunity extended by the state to human rights violations by
security forces in
Papua and Indonesia more generally. Confidence of impunity is enjoyed by
members
of the security forces when they can abuse basic rights knowing that the
risk of being
held to account is negligible.
The vast majority of suspected perpetrators identified in this report are
police
officers (the majority are non-Papuan). This is a perceptible change from
previous
eras when members of the military committed the vast majority of serious
human
rights violations in Papua.
Out of Sight 6
It appears that police and military members commonly abuse their power
because
they can do so, confident that no sanction or penalty will follow. They
are, for all
intents and purposes, above the law. When agents of the state, responsible
for
human rights protection, become its violators, there is a serious breach
of public
trust. Failure to rein-in abusive police and soldiers undermines the rule
of law and
the legitimacy of the state itself––in this case a state that still has
much work to do
to persuade Papuans of the benefits of citizenship. Much more attention
needs to be
paid to ensure that police re-direct their resources and energies to
effective
community protection and service.
Methodology
Conducting research for this report posed unique challenges. Researchers
endured
difficult conditions and visited many communities accessible only by foot
and via
rugged terrain. In all, we were able to conduct in-depth interviews with 56
eyewitnesses, victims, and family members of victims, focusing on cases
from 2005
and 2006. We also met with many other villagers, local community
officials, and civil
society leaders.
In our research, we prioritized allegations of particularly serious
violations such as
killings of unarmed people, rapes, and violent beatings. We examined a
number of
original documents relating to legal proceedings and autopsy reports where
available. We also used secondary sources such as newspaper articles,
reports by
human rights and advocacy organizations, and other human rights archival
sources
to corroborate information provided through primary sources.
We found that witnesses were generally eager to tell their stories.
However, as all of
the alleged perpetrators are serving members of the police or military,
witnesses
remain understandably fearful of reprisal for participating in the
research. Due to the
high risk of reprisal we have omitted the names of sources, as well as the
specific
dates and locations of the interviews.
In advance of and during the course of the research, Human Rights Watch made
several written and verbal requests to Indonesian authorities for formal
access to the
province. A request from Human Rights Watch was made in person to President
7 Human Rights Watch July 2007
Yudhoyono in September 2005 for official access. A letter was sent to
President
Yudhoyono in February 2006 raising concern at the lack of access to the
province for
the media and international human rights organizations. In March 2006 Human
Rights Watch issued a press release calling for access to the province to
investigate
rising tensions in the area. In January 2007 Human Rights Watch wrote to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting access to Papua. Human Rights Watch
has also
requested permission for access to Papua during several meetings held with
Indonesian government officials over the course of 2006 and 2007 in Jakarta,
Washington D.C., and London. At this writing, such permission had not been
granted
despite official indications that it would be forthcoming.
Because our queries and requests for official access were denied, we have
not been
able to include here the perspectives of local police, military, and
government
officials. In May 2007 Human Rights Watch wrote to both the police and TNI
commanders in Papua asking for clarification and responses to specific
cases raised
in this report. To date we have received no reply
Such denial of access is shortsighted. We believe that the production of
factually
based and balanced reporting on the human rights situation will only improve
governance in Papua and West Papua. It would also contribute to
strengthening both
the will and capacity of the Indonesian government to properly hold its
security
forces accountable where allegations are substantiated.
Out of Sight 8
II. Key Recommendations
Human Rights Watch urges the Indonesian government to:
• Allow unfettered access for diplomats, journalists, and human rights
organizations to all parts of the two Papuan provinces. Increased access
to information will ensure more balanced and accurate reporting and
allow problems such as police abuse to be identified and tackled rather
than fester and contribute to continuing tensions in Papua;
• Investigate all cases, including those presented here, involving
allegations of abuses by the police or soldiers. Where the information
justifies prosecution, the cases should be brought before civilian courts
under the criminal law and not be dealt with solely as disciplinary
offences to be resolved by internal police or TNI mechanisms;
• Suspend from active service all police officers being investigated for
human rights violations, pending the final determination of any legal
proceeding. Authorities should dismiss officers found responsible for
human rights violations;
• Provide victims of sexual violence with appropriate and timely health
services. These services should include counseling, emergency
contraception, and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) to prevent
HIVtransmission,
voluntary testing, and treatment for those affected with
HIV/AIDS.
9 Human Rights Watch July 2007
III. Background
The tensions and complexities that characterize policing in Papua are
difficult to
appreciate without understanding the context of the conflict in the
province. For this
reason, the next section of the report will go into some detail on the
roots of security
force operations in the area, and the history behind the ongoing tensions.
Roots of the Papuan conflict
The provinces of Papua and West Papua are in the most eastern part of
Indonesia.
The indigenous population in this region is ethnically quite different
from any other
in Indonesia, and boasts over 300 distinct ethno-linguistic groups. Recent
years
have seen a growing sense of “pan-Papuan” identity in response to the
process of
decolonization, Indonesia’s military presence, and the recent history of
transmigration of non-Papuans from other Indonesian territories. The
arrival of
overseas missionaries has engendered a large part of the indigenous
population
turning away from traditional animist practice and converting to
Christianity.
Churches and church communities have become important focal points in modern
Papuan life.3
Some Papuan peoples in Indonesia claim they are victims of an historical
injustice,
robbed of the independence promised to them by their former Dutch colonizers.
While the rest of Indonesia gained independence in 1949 following a war of
independence, the Dutch retained control in Papua into the 1960s. In the
later years
of Dutch rule, colonial officials in the region had been preparing Papua for
independence by encouraging Papuan nationalism and by allowing the
establishment of political parties and nascent institutions of state.4
3 R. Chauvel “Constructing Papuan Nationalism; History, Ethnicity and
Adaptation,” Policy Studies 14,
East-West Centre,
Washington,
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/March/papua-nationalism.pdf
(accessed June 25,
2007).
4 Kees Lagerberg, “West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism,” (London, Palgrave
Macmillon, 1979), pp. 58-72;
Nonie Sharp “The
Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian,” (Victoria, Kilford Books,
1977); J. Saltford “The United
Nations and the Indonesian
Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1989: The Anatomy of Betrayal,“ (London,
Routledge, 2003), pp. 9-10.
Out of Sight 10
However, rather than handing over control of the territory to Papuans, the
Dutch
instead agreed in 1962 to transfer authority over the territory to a
United Nations
Temporary Executive Authority, and then to Indonesia within a year,5 on
condition
that by end of 19696 an “Act of Free Choice” would be conducted to determine
Papua’s future status. Every adult Papuan would be eligible to participate
in this act
of self-determination.7
Instead of creating a process of universal suffrage, the Indonesian
authorities
decided to conduct the referendum through “representative” assemblies.
With the
agreement of the Dutch and the United Nations, the Act of Free Choice was
conducted by Indonesia in April 1969, with United Nations assistance.8 The
assemblies chose just 1,026 Papuans to participate.9 The majority of the
1,022 who
actually did participate were nominated by the Indonesian authorities and
then
voted on behalf of the rest of the population through eight regional
councils.10
According to one historian’s account, the Indonesian military used
intimidation and
coercion against the delegates.11 The result was a unanimous vote for
continued
integration with Indonesia.
Indonesia has always maintained that, as a former part of the Netherlands
East
Indies, West New Guinea (as it was then named) was a legitimate part of
Indonesia.
5 Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands concerning
Western New Guinea (West
Irian), signed at UN Headquarters, New York, August 15, 1962 (New York
Agreement), Article XII,
http://www.freewestpapua.org/docs/nya.htm.
6 Ibid, art. XX.
7 Ibid, art XVIII (d).
8 The UN team only witnessed 195 out of 1000 of the “elections,” due to
obfuscation by the Indonesian
Government; See also J.
Saltford “The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua,
1962-1989: The Anatomy of
Betrayal,“ (London,
Routledge, 2003), pp. 143-148; S. Blay “Why West Papua Deserves Another
Chance,” Inside Indonesia,
Issue 61, Jan-Mar 2000.
9 1,026 were selected but four were unable to participate due to illness
or other reason on the day; See
J. Saltford “The United
Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1989: The Anatomy
of Betrayal,“ (London,
Routledge, 2003).
10 J. Saltford “The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West
Papua, 1962-1989: The
Anatomy of Betrayal “(London,
Routledge, 2003), pp. 129-140; See also S. Blay “Why West Papua Deserves
Another Chance,” Inside
Indonesia, Issue 61,
January-March 2000.
11 Some diplomats reported open threats were made against delegates “a
council member asked what
would happen to him if
he opted for Independence; the reply was that he would be shot.” On May
24, the Tjenderawasih
newspaper reported that
Major Soewondo addressing 200 village chiefs stated that “I am drawing the
line frankly and clearly. I say
I will protect and
guarantee the safety of everyone who is for Indonesia. I will shoot dead
anyone who is against us-and all
his followers.” See J.
Saltford “The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua,
1962-1989: The Anatomy of
Betrayal” (London,
Routledge, 2003), p. 147.
11 Human Rights Watch July 2007
Indonesia further argued that the level of education was so low in the
territory that
the “one man, one vote” principle could not be applied.
The Act of Free Choice is widely considered by Papuans to be a fraudulent
basis for
Indonesian annexation of the territory, and fuels the continuing demand for
“historical rectification,” and a new act of self determination. The OPM
(the Free
Papua Movement), established in 1965,12 has since maintained a low–level,
armed
guerrilla war targeting mainly members of the Indonesian security forces,
but has
also on occasion targeted Indonesian transmigrants,13 foreign workers, and
journalists.14 Despite the dubious bona fides of the Act of Free Choice,
the OPM has
never succeeded in garnering much international support15 with only a
handful of
small Pacific states16 officially supporting the OPM’s key demand for a
new vote of
self-determination.
In the Soeharto period, Indonesia’s strategy to deal with the OPM was
typically
through military operations which sought, often brutally, to repress the
OPM and its
supporters. During the 1970s and 1980s a series of military campaigns
against the
OPM resulted in large-scale civilian deaths through execution-style
killings in village
sweeping operations, aerial bombardments, and malnutrition caused by forced
displacement.17 Campaigns targeted communities and relatives of OPM members
12 R. Osborne “Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian
Jaya,” (Sydney, Allen and Unwin,
1985), p. XIV.
13 Transmigration was an Indonesian government policy to alleviate
overpopulation in some parts of the
country, by moving
large communities to other areas of the archipelago. Most transmigrants
originated in Java and Bali and
were moved to places
like Papua, East Timor, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.
14 For example, the kidnapping and killing of 8 Javanese students in 1986,
and the kidnapping of an
international research
team of 12, including the killing of two of them during a military rescue
operation in 1996; See U.S. State
Department “Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia 2001,” Washington DC, U.S.
State Department, March
2002; See also the
kidnapping of two Belgian journalists for two months in 2001; See U.S.
State Department, “Country
Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Indonesia 2001,” Washington DC, U.S State Department, March 2002.
15 R. Osborne “Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian
Jaya,” (Sydney, Allen and Unwin),
1985, p. XIV.
16 Tuvalu, Nauru and Vanuatu called for Papuan independence in September
2000 at the United Nations
Millennium Summit in
New York; See Nic Maclellen, “Self determination or territorial
integrity?” Inside Indonesia, Issue 67,
July-September 2001;
Australia and Papua New Guinea have prioritized strengthening relations
with Jakarta, as has the newly
independent Timor-
Leste; See interview with then Timor-Leste Foreign Minister Jose Ramos
Horta in which he urges
Papuans to relinquish their
struggle for independence, “Timor-Leste Foreign Minister & 1996 Nobel
Peace Prize Winner Jose
Ramos-Horta Talks West
Papua,” Scoop independent News, October 31, 2005,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0510/S00344.htm.
17 Allegations have been made of the use of napalm and other chemical
weapons; See “Indonesian
Human Rights Abuses in
West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of
Indonesian Control,” Indonesia Human
Rights Network,
Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School,
April 2004, pp. 19-26; R.
Osborne “Indonesia’s
Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya,” (Sydney, Allen and
Unwin), 1985.
Out of Sight 12
and many were arbitrarily detained, tortured, raped, and, in some cases,
killed. Most
detained Papuans were not formally charged and tried, but those who were
brought
to courts did not receive fair trials. Small scale attacks on military and
police posts
by the OPM were met with disproportionate retaliatory operations which often
arbitrarily targeted civilians.18
In the mid-1980s Indonesian government policy supported “transmigration,” the
transfer of typically poor families from other islands to Papua in large
numbers. This
program, together with increasing spontaneous migration by people seeking
economic opportunities in resource-rich Papua, drastically altered the
demographic
composition of Papua. The Government appropriated, usually without
compensation,
large tracts of land from traditional owners to support the new arrivals.
For example
“Operation Clean Sweep” in June 1981 was reportedly used to force Papuans
off their
lands in the border regions to vacate land for incoming transmigrants.
This resulted
in entire Papuan communities being displaced and increased feelings of
marginalization by the indigenous population, especially in the mining
towns where
non-Papuans sometimes vastly outnumbered Papuans. Non-Papuans also
dominated government bureaucracies and had better access to higher education
and employment. By 2000 when government-supported transmigration programs
ended, non-ethnic Papuans made up around 35 percent of the population.19
The struggle for control of Papua’s abundant natural resources has
contributed
significantly to the conflict. Concessions given to mining companies without
consideration for the rights of local people, and the involvement of state
security
forces in guarding mining sites, has provided fertile ground for conflict.
The direct
involvement of senior members of the police and army in resource
extraction, such
as where members of the military hold logging concessions themselves or
receive
payment from mining companies for security services, combined with the
lucrative
18 For example in April 2003 rebels broke into a military armory and stole
a number of rifles. In an army
campaign responding
to this attack Komnas HAM found that at least seven Papuans were killed,
48 tortured and some 7,000
others forced to flee.
See “Papuan Leaders want rights findings revealed,” The Jakarta Post, July
17, 2004.
19 According to UN figures around 35 percent of the Papuan population are
non-Papuan migrants, S.
Jones “Papua Shrouded
by Misperception,” The Australian Financial Review, August 29, 2006. For
the year 2000 census figures
indicated for the
province of West Papua a population of 1,460,846 indigenous people and
772,684 non-indigenous
people; See Statement to
UN Working Group on Minorities, Commission on Human Rights, 12-16 May 2003,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/docs/westpapua.doc; “Papua:
Answers to Frequently
Asked Questions,”
Asia Briefing no. 53, International Crisis Group, September 5, 2006.
13 Human Rights Watch July 2007
taxes which flow to the Indonesian state, provide powerful motives for the
state to
retain tight control.20
Civilians who protest against the impact of these activities upon their
environment,
livelihoods, and communities are often repressed by security force members
who
have frequently responded to community protest with disproportionate and
fatal
force.21 The US owned Freeport copper and gold mine has a particularly
long history
of troubled relations with local communities who, despite the mine’s
development
programs, feel excluded from the economic benefits of the mine yet bear
the brunt of
its environmental impact.
Mining towns have been centers of HIV/AIDS transmission in Papua. A survey of
more than 600 sex workers in Timika (location of the Freeport mine) showed
that
Timika has the second highest rate of HIV/AIDS infection in Papua,22 which
again is
the highest throughout Indonesia.23 High rates of migration among mining
workers,
poor literacy, and inadequate education campaigns and HIV/AIDS-specific
services
all contribute to the spread of the disease.
Women in the region are particularly vulnerable, having higher illiteracy
rates, lower
knowledge of sexual health, and a low status in Papuan culture vis-à-vis
men, which
restricts their ability to negotiate safe sex with their partners.24
Papuan women suffer
from the poorest health in Indonesia. For maternal mortality in Indonesia per
20 “Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua,” International Crisis
Group, Brussels, September 2002;
Human Rights Watch,
Indonesia-Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian
Military’s Economic Activities, vol.
18, no. 5(C), June 21,
2006.
21 “Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua,” International Crisis
Group, Brussels, September 2002.
22 N. Silitonga, A. Roddick, and FS. Wignall “Mining, HIV/AIDS and Women
Timika, Papua Province,
Indonesia” McDonald I,
Rowland C (eds); ‘Tunnel Vision: Women, Mining and Communities,’ Oxfam
Community Aid Abroad,
(Melbourne, Oxfam,
November 2002).
23 In 2002, 20.4 people per 100,000 were infected by HIV in Papua,
compared to only 0.42 cases per
100,000 in the rest of
Indonesia. Approximately 40 percent of HIV/AIDS cases in Indonesia have
been reported in Papua
which has approximately 1
percent of the population; Leslie Butt et al., “The Smokescreen of
Culture: AIDS and the Indigenous in
Papua, Indonesia,”
Pacific Health Dialog, September 2002.
24 Leslie Butt et al., “The Smokescreen of Culture: AIDS and the
Indigenous in Papua, Indonesia,” 1,
Pacific Health Dialog,
September 2002.
Out of Sight 14
100,000 live births the rate was 450 in 1,986, falling to 334 in 1995 and
307 in 2000.
However, in Papua in 1995 the rate was 1,025 per 100,000 live births.25
Post-Reformasi: A Bumpy and Uncertain Transition to Special Autonomy
Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, the Indonesian government has engaged
in an
uneven set of reforms to address the political situation in Papua. One
reform was to
rename the province. Previously known as “Irian Jaya,” on January 1, 2000
President
Wahid announced a name change for the province to “Papua.” The change was
formalized in September 2002.26 In 2003 the government of Megawati
Sukarnoputri
announced far more controversial plans to split Papua into three
provinces: Papua,
West Irian Jaya, and Central Irian Jaya.27 The creation of Central Irian
Jaya was
shelved in August 2003 after violent clashes in Timika over the partition
resulted in
five deaths. Central Irian Jaya remained part of Papua. West Irian Jaya
was created in
November 200328 and on April 18, 2007, this name was changed to West Papua.
Many Papuans opposed the splitting of Papua, and in particular the
creation of West
Irian Jaya, as it was seen as a divide and rule tactic of Jakarta. The
division of the
province was deemed to be aimed at undermining Papuan efforts to unite
behind a
common goal of self-determination. Others feared new provinces would
herald new
provincial military command posts, with attendant increased troop levels
in the area.
There were also fears that the split would exclude West Irian Jaya from
Special
Autonomy status (a question that remains unresolved). Among others, local
Papuan
officials favored the split, believing that it would improve local
services and
25 “National human Development Report 2004 - The Economics of Democracy:
Financing Human
Development in Indonesia,”
BPS-Statistics Indonesia, Bappenas and the United Nations Development
Program, Indonesia, 2004.
26 See “President Changes Irian Jaya’s Name to Papua,” The Jakarta Post,
January 4, 2000;
“Indonesia’s Irian Jaya Province
Officially Renamed Papua,” Agence France-Presse, October 1, 2002.
27 Formation of Central Irian Jaya Province, Western Irian Jaya Province,
Paniai kabupaten, Mimika
kabupaten, Puncak Jaya
kabupaten, and Sorong City, President of the Republic of Indonesia, Law
45, 1999; In January 2003
President Megawati issued
a Presidential Instruction on the Acceleration of the Implementation of
Law 45/1999; P. Stockman
“Constitutional Court’s
Ruling on the Partition of Papua” Watch Indonesia, Information and
Analyses, November 24, 2004,
http://home.snafu.de/watchin/papuapartition_24.11.04.htm.
28 P. Stockman “Constitutional Court’s Ruling on the Partition of Papua”
Watch Indonesia, Information
and Analyses,
November 24, 2004,
http://home.snafu.de/watchin/papuapartition_24.11.04.htm; “Pemekaran yang
Menyulut Perang,”
Tempo Magazine, September 1-7, 2003, p. 35; On April 18, 2007, the name of
West Irian Jaya was
officially changed to West
Papua.
15 Human Rights Watch July 2007
governance. The division would make administering the vast region easier,
through
two or three provincial offices, rather than just one.29
But the centerpiece of the Indonesian government’s strategy for reaching an
accommodation with Papuans has been the offer of Special Autonomy which,
as the
name implies, involves the devolution of many political and fiscal powers
to the
province. The strategy is aimed at encouraging pro-independence supporters
to work
within the state and to build robust Papuan institutions.30
Fears of Papua becoming the next “East Timor” and the then-failing peace
process in
Aceh provided the context for the November 2001 law on Special Autonomy
(otonomi
khusus or otsus). 31 However lack of consensus within the Indonesian
government,
with nervousness that any concession would fan and strengthen demands for
independence,32 has resulted in the protracted and half-hearted
implementation of
the law.
At the core of this governance model is the MRP, the Papuan People’s
Council, made
up of religious leaders, women, and customary representatives.33 It was to be
established within two years of enactment of the Special Autonomy law34
and was
mandated to protect and defend the rights of indigenous Papuans,
especially in the
areas of customary law, religion, and women’s rights. The negotiation process
dragged on and it became increasingly clear that President Megawati
Sukarnoputri
was not supportive of giving Special Autonomy any real substance.
Not long after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took office in October
2004, the
regulation enacting the MRP was finally issued and the body was established.
29 Indonesia – “Dividing Papua: How Not to Do it,” International Crisis
Group, Brussels, April 9, 2003.
30 R. McGibbon “Secessionist challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special
Autonomy the Solution?” East
-West Centre, Policy
Studies No 10,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/res-rp-publicationdetails.asp?pub_ID=1523.
31 Special Autonomy for Papua Province, Peoples Representative Assembly
and the President of the
Republic of Indonesia,
Law no. 21, 2001, art. 19,
http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-id.html.
32 J. Timmer ”Papua,” The Contemporary Pacific, 17.2 (2005), pp. 448-456,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/contemporary_pacific/v017/17.2timmer.html.
33 Special Autonomy for Papua Province, Peoples Representative Assembly
and the President of the
Republic of Indonesia,
Law no. 21, 2001, art. 19,
http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-id.html.
34 Ibid, art. 75, chapter XXIII.
Out of Sight 16
Controversy then commenced about the composition and voting procedure for the
new body with the powerful Papuan Dewan Adat (Customary Council), already
disillusioned by the faltering process, refusing to support and
participate in the new
body.35 Key religious bodies also boycotted the selection process until
the last
minute. Nonetheless, representatives for the MRP were selected, albeit not
through
direct elections. Irregularities in the selection process occurred in
patches but
monitors concluded that they were not sufficiently widespread to impugn
the overall
results.36 MRP members were inaugurated on October 31, 2005.
One of the first blows dealt to the MRP was the government’s refusal to
consult with
it on the creation of West Irian Jaya, as is required under the Special
Autonomy law.
This was exacerbated by the decision of the Indonesian government to push
ahead
with provincial elections in the new West Irian Jaya Province before its
legal status in
relation to Special Autonomy was finally resolved.37 A decision of
Indonesia’s
Constitutional Court in November 200438 further confused the new
province’s status.
The court ruled that while the Special Autonomy law superceded the 1999 law
creating the new province of West Irian Jaya, the new province should be
recognized
nonetheless as its existence was already a political fait accompli, the
authorities
having, for example, already conducted elections for a regional
parliament.39 No new
regulations reconciling the status of West Irian Jaya with Special
Autonomy have
followed and uncertainty remains.40 However, the two governors of the
provinces in
Papua, as well as local parliamentary and MRP leaders, signed an agreement
on April
35 Dewan Adat Papua, (Papuan Customary Council) “Communique by the Papua
Indigenous Peoples,”
August 12, 2005,
http://www.nieuwsbank.nl/papua-lobby/DAP12Aug05.pdf.
36 “Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue,” International Crisis
Group Briefing No 47, March
23, 2006, p.5; “The
West Papua Report September 2005,” Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for
Human Rights (CHR)-
West Papua Advocacy Team,
http://www.rfkmemorial.org/human_rights/1993_Bambang/WPReport_Oct_05.pdf;
“Papuan Protest
Puppet Government,”
The Jakarta Post, October 29, 2005.
37 “Irate Papuans Threaten to Boycott Election,” The Jakarta Post, October
10, 2003; “West Irian Jaya
Governor Sworn in
Despite Dispute,” The Jakarta Post, November 15, 2003.
38 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Putusan Perkara
Nomor, 018/PUU-I/2003,
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id.
39 With 70 percent of eligible voters turning out, adding substantially to
its legitimacy; See “Papua: The
Dangers of Shutting
Down Dialogue,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No 47, March 23,
2006.
40 Despite around 25 percent of MPR members being from West Irian Jaya,
and the province being in
receipt of Special
Autonomy funds, the Provincial elections were governed under the general
Law on Regional Governance
suggesting the
jurisdiction of Special Autonomy does not extend to West Irian Jaya.
17 Human Rights Watch July 2007
18, 2007, that West Papua will come under Special Autonomy, and the two
provinces
will share the funds provided for it.41
Despite the difficulties experienced in establishing the MRP and implementing
Special Autonomy, substantial decentralization of power has occurred. The
central
government in Jakarta has effectively devolved itself of control over most
policy
areas, though it retains control over foreign affairs, defense and
security, fiscal and
monetary policy, religious affairs, and justice.42 Given that the
governors of both
Papuan provinces, all district heads, and all members of the MRP are
indigenous
Papuans, and that Special Autonomy has brought substantial financial
resources to
local coffers,43 there is a new opportunity to address some of the Papuan
people’s
longstanding grievances.
Unfortunately, despite the reforms, poor governance remains the norm in
Papua with
corruption and neglect of duty by indigenous Papuans on par with what had
existed
prior to the influx of Papuans into civil service leadership positions.44
A lack of
skilled civil servants and the overall limited human resource capacity
restrict efforts
to effectively implement and monitor development programs. The new
post-Special
Autonomy political elite in Papua commonly use their positions and
influence to play
out regional, ethnic, and tribal tensions.45 Lack of attention to the poor
performance
of some local leaders by the central government has left many ordinary
Papuans
increasingly disillusioned with Special Autonomy, having seen no
improvements to
41 Email correspondence with an International Crisis Group Indonesia
analyst, May 29, 2007.
42 Special Autonomy for Papua Province, Peoples Representative Assembly
and the President of the
Republic of Indonesia,
Law No 21, 2001, http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-id.html,
chapter IV Regional Authority,
Article 4(1).
43 The annual budget for Papua in 2006 was 4 trillion rupiah, making it
one of the wealthiest provinces
per capita in Indonesia.
S. Jones “Papua Shrouded by Misperception,” Australian Financial Review,
August 26, 2006; A. Sumule
“Social and Economic
Changes in Papua since the Law on Special Autonomy Came into Effect,”
paper presented at
conference: “Autonomy for Papua
– Opportunity or Illusion,” June 4, 2003, Berlin, Germany,
http://home.snafu.de/watchin/AfP2003sumule.htm.
44 See, for example the case of former Jayawijaya Bupati, David Hubi, the
first Papuan administration to
be tried for corruption.
On August 29, 2006, Hubi was found guilty and sentenced to five years
imprisonment for embezzling
13,6,01,780,000 (approx
US$1.5million) from the State; “Hubi Dihukum 5 Tahun Penjara,”
Cenderawasih Pos, August 30, 2006;
“Bupati Mimika Sudah
Tiga Bulan Tak Masuk Kantor,” Kompas, August 8, 2006.
45 R. Chauvel “Constructing Papuan Nationalism; History, Ethnicity and
Adaptation,” Policy Studies 14,
East-West Centre,
Washington,
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/March/papua-nationalism.pdf; J.
Timmer
“Decentralization and Elite
Politics in Papua,” Discussion Paper 2005/6, State, Society and Governance
in Melanesia,” Research
School of Pacific and
Asian Studies, Australian National University,
http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/lap/ssgm/2005-d6-timmer.pdf,
p.8; “Regional
Autonomy ‘fuelling tribalism,” The Jakarta Post, August 31, 2006.
Out of Sight 18
their standard of living, despite much greater local management of the
wealth of the
Papuan provinces.46 The 2004 Human Development Report for Indonesia noted
that
Papua was “ranked 26 places lower in the Human Development Index than in
Gross
Domestic Product, a clear indication that the income from Papua’s natural
resources
has not been invested sufficiently in services for the people.”47
While the Special Autonomy process has been marred by long delays and
wavering
commitment on the part of the Indonesian government, the latter cannot be
blamed
for all of Papua’s continuing problems, and an increasing proportion of
responsibility
must rest with Papuan maladministration.
In late July 2006 the media reported that OPM leaders, meeting in Papua
New Guinea,
had decided to end their armed struggle and to continue their demands for
independence using peaceful means. They did, however, maintain their right to
defend themselves if attacked.48 In response, TNI Commander in Chief
Marshal Djoko
Suyanto stated that the military would remain “vigilant” but that they
would no
longer conduct offensive operations to pursue OPM separatists.49 It
remains to be
seen whether these developments will usher in a new commitment to peace and
restraint on both sides. A series of attacks on security officers in
Punjak Jaya in
December 2006 allegedly by the OPM cell led by Goliat Tabuni (the attacks
included
two fatal shootings of TNI soldiers (one retired) on December 8 in the Yamok
mountain area, 2 kilometers from the old city Mulia; one non-fatal
shooting of a
Brimob officer on December 13; and the brief kidnapping of a TNI officer on
December 24) was a major setback.
46 J. Timmer “Decentralization and Elite Politics in Papua,” Discussion
Paper, State, Society and
Governance in Melanesia,
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National
University, June 2006,
http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/lap/ssgm/2005-d6-timmer.pdf; J. Timmer
“Papua,” The Contemporary
Pacific, February 17,
2005, pp. 448-456,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/contemporary_pacific/v017/17.2timmer.html.
47 “National human Development Report 2004 - The Economics of Democracy:
Financing Human
Development in Indonesia,”
BPS-Statistics Indonesia, Bappenas and the United Nations Development
Program Indonesia, 2004.
48 “Papua Fighters Promise Non-Violent Future,” ABC, Lateline, July 27, 2006.
49 “Suyanto: TNI still keeping on guard against OPM,” Tempo Interactive,
August 1, 2006.
19 Human Rights Watch July 2007
The Indonesian government remains intolerant of even peaceful expressions
of proindependence
sentiment. Those involved in Morning Star flag-raisings or other
peaceful expressions of pro-independence sentiment are dealt with harshly.50
The most recent example concerns two men, Filep Karma and Yusak Pakage, who
were found guilty on charges of rebellion51 and expressing hostility
towards the
government52 by the Jayapura District Court. They were sentenced on May
27, 2005,
to 15 and 10 years of jail, respectively. The men had participated in a
peaceful
gathering on December 1, 2004, in Abepura to commemorate Papuan
“Independence Day” at which the Morning Star flag was unfurled. Police
violently
broke up the gathering and arrested several, later releasing all but the
two men. The
sentence far exceeded the five years sought by the prosecution. In
February 2007
Human Rights Watch published the report, “Protest and Punishment: Political
Prisoners in Papua,” detailing arrests and convictions for those peacefully
campaigning for independence in the region.53
In 2006 Indonesia took some steps towards protecting human rights but has
yet to
take decisive measures to end impunity by its security forces. In May 2006
Indonesia
acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). In the
same month, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
(ICESCR) took legal effect in Indonesia.54 Indonesia had earlier ratified the
Convention Against Torture, (CAT, 1998), the Convention on the Elimination
of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1984), the International
50 It has not always been this way. At the height of government tolerance
to pro-independence
aspirations, President Wahid
had permitted the raising of the Morning Star flag providing it was flown
below the Indonesia flag. See, for
example “Dividing
Papua: How not to do it,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing Paper,
April 9, 2003; Human Rights
Watch, Indonesia-
Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Papua, 1999-2000, vol. 12,
no. 2, May 2000,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/papua/Pap004.htm. With the demise of
President Wahid the Reformasi
political space in
Papua greatly contracted. Under the administration of President Megawati,
then Security Minister Susilo
Bambang
Yudhoyono warned that any commemoration of the independence declaration
would be regarded as an
“act of treason” and
tough measures would be taken against perpetrators. See “West Papuans to
ignore warnings,” Sydney
Morning Herald,
November 24, 2000.
51 Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP), Articles 110 and 106.
52 Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP), Articles 154 and 155.
53 For more information, see Human Rights Watch, Indonesia – Protest and
Punishment: Political
Prisoners in Papua, vol. 19,
no. 4 (C), February 21, 2007.
54 Indonesia is yet to ratify the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
the Optional Protocol to the
Convention Against Torture
(CAT) or the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, all which include mechanisms for
individual victims to make
complaints to treaty
oversight bodies.
Out of Sight 20
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1999), and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990).55 Indonesia is also in the
process of
implementing its second national human rights plan (2004-2009).
In May 2006 Indonesia was elected to the UN Human Rights Council, a step
which
was cynically received in many quarters, but which may create some
pressure on
Indonesian officials to ensure more consistent adherence to international
standards.
Indonesia is also currently a member of the UN Security Council.
The real test of the significance of these developments will be the
willingness and
ability of the Indonesian government to implement the newly ratified human
rights
standards both in law and in everyday practice. Indonesia has long paid
lip-service
to international institutions and treaties but, with only a few
exceptions, has failed to
create effective mechanisms for implementation. For example, despite
ratifying the
Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1998, Indonesia has failed to
incorporate the
term “torture” into its legislative vocabulary or create any mechanism for
systematically translating CAT principles into practice.56
55 Indonesia has also signed but not ratified the Optional Protocol to
CEDAW (2000), International
Convention on the
Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (2004),
and the First and Second
Optional Protocols to the
CRC (2001.)
56 Indonesia has within the past 6 years created in rapid succession a
Constitutional Court, Truth and
Reconciliation
Commission, National Law Commission, Judiciary Commission, Ombudsman
Commission, Prosecutorial
Commission, Police
Commission, Corruption Eradication Commission and the Special Court for
Corruption. The effectiveness
of these new bodies
is yet to be tested. The Constitutional Court has in numerous decisions
shown substantial independence
in decision making. A
promising recent decision was when the Constitutional Court found the
criminalization of insulting the
President and Vice
President unconstitutional; Charmain Mohamed (Human Rights Watch), “A
Court Ruling on Human Rights
that Deserves
Presidential Support,” commentary, The Jakarta Post, December 15, 2006,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/15/indone14876.htm; A commitment to
the rule of law was also shown
in the decision
to annul Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP) Law 15/2001, July 26, 2004,
making retrospective its
application to the Bali
bombing; “Indonesia’s Constitutional Court blocks Anti-Terrorism Law” Asia
News, July 26, 2004,
http://www.borrull.org/e/noticia.php?id=37322; On the other hand, in
August 2006 the Constitutional Court
emasculated
promising efforts by the Judiciary Commission to monitor judges, claiming
a conflict with the constitution
and limiting the
Commission to its role in screening applicants for Supreme Court
vacancies. Davidson, Soren, Juwono,
Vishnu and Timberman,
“Curbing Corruption in Indonesia,” 2004-06; A survey of National Policies
and Approaches,” The United
States-Indonesia
Society, Centre for Strategic and International Studies p. 40,
www.usindo.org/pdf/korupsi_web.pdf. While
the Prosecutorial
Commission, Police Commission and Judiciary Commission are all separate
from the bodies they are
intended to provide
oversight to, they are not independent bodies as they are still controlled
by the Government. “Building
Capacity from Within
and Advocating Pressures from Without, to Combat Systemic Corruptions in
Indonesia,” Piet Soeprijadi,
Partnership for
Governance Reform in Indonesia,
http://www.kemitraan.or.id/data/pdf/building-capacity-from-within_piet
-soeprijadi.pdf.
21 Human Rights Watch July 2007
IV. Restrictions on Access to Papua
Severe restrictions on access to Papua for human rights monitors mean that
reliable
information on conditions is hard to come by. Word of mouth is the most
common
means of transmitting news of alleged human rights abuses, and independent
corroboration can be difficult. National human rights monitors are frequently
harassed or intimidated.57 Human rights workers from Elsham, Legal Aid,
Kontras,
the Catholic Office for Justice and Peace, and other NGOs work under an
atmosphere
of intimidation.58 Members of international monitoring groups such as
Human Rights
Watch are routinely denied visas to conduct visits.59
While tourists can freely visit Papua and are not restricted to the
capital, visitors with
other purposes must apply and provide detailed itineraries and plans to
the police
for permission. Those granted permission to travel to Papua are likely to
be subject
to surveillance to ensure their true purpose is not political or related
to human rights.
In June 2006 two Americans working for an indigenous land rights group
traveling on
visas which permitted tourism, cultural, business, or government
activities, were
deported from Indonesia after attending a meeting of the Dewan Adat (Papuan
Customary Council) a body committed to peaceful advocacy for independence.60
While Indonesian journalists can somewhat openly report on developments in
Papua,
authorities have largely denied international journalists access to the
region since
2003, although some exceptions have been made for known Jakarta-based
international journalists working on themes deemed non-political. However,
even
57 Most recently, Paula Makabory, a staff member from ELSHAM Institute for
the Study and Advocacy
for Human Rights in
West Papua, has been accused by BIN (National Intelligence Agency) of
involvement in organizing the
flight of a group of 43
Papuans who were granted temporary asylum in Australia in March 2006. 1000
PeaceWomen Update,
October 20, 2000,
http://www.1000peacewomen.org/typo/index.php?id=74&L=1.
58 Aloysius Renawin from Elsham, October 20, 2006; 1000 PeaceWomen Update,
October 20, 2000,
http://www.1000peacewomen.org/typo/index.php?id=74&L=1.
59 As detailed in the ‘Methodology’ section above, Human Rights Watch has
made several written and
verbal requests to the
Indonesian government for official access to Papua. These requests have,
to date, not been answered.
See also TAPOL
Briefing on the Current Situation in West Papua, March 14, 2005, p.1.
60 “Two U.S citizens questioned over visa violations in Papua,” Associated
Press, June 27, 2006;
“Indonesian Government to
deport 2 U.S citizens for Papua action,” Associated Press, June 28, 2006.
Out of Sight 22
those granted permission assert that Papuan police continually harass them
and
interfere with their work.61 In February 2006 Indonesia’s Defense
Minister, Juwono
Sudarsono, defended restrictions on foreign media access to West Papua. He
was
quoted as saying “Indonesian unity and cohesion would be threatened by
foreign
“intrusion and concern,” and that reporters could be “used as a platform” by
Papuans to publicize the alleged abuses.62
Academic freedom also has its limits. In 2006 Australian National
University’s Chris
Ballard, an anthropologist whose main focus is Papua, said he had been
unable to
visit the province since 2001.63 May of 2006 the Indonesian government
boycotted
cooperation with two Australian universities (RMIT and Deakin Universities
in Victoria)
on the basis that they employ academic staffs who have been critical of the
Indonesian government’s policies in Papua.64
The work of international organizations, including the UN, is hampered by
restricted
access. In May 2006, UNHCR Regional Representative Neil Wright expressed
concern
that the organization had been denied access to Papua despite repeated
requests to
the Indonesian government.65 In his 2005 report to the Commission on Human
Rights,
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak expressed his “regret” that
the
longstanding request of his office to visit Indonesia, initially made in
1993, was still
being ignored.66 In response Indonesia finally extended him an invitation
and at this
writing he was due to visit Indonesia at the end of 2007, though it was
unclear
whether he would visit Papua. In January 2006, the UN Secretary-General’s
special
envoy on the prevention of genocide, Juan Mendez, expressed concern at the
61 “Journalists Face Difficulties in Papua, Even with Work Permits,” The
World Today, September 26,
2006, http://www.kabaririan.
com/news/msg03592.html (accessed June 25, 2006).
62 “Foreign media ban in Papua to be maintained: Juwono,” Agence France
Presse, February 6, 2006.
63 “Papua Travel Ban Halts Abuse Scrutiny: Envoy,” Sydney Morning Herald,
March 1, 2006.
64 “Indonesian Government Attempts to Silence Foreign Critics of its
Policies in West Papua,” The Age,
May 22, 2006.
65 Transcript of Inquiry into the provisions of the Migration Amendment
(Designated Unauthorised
Arrivals) Bill 2006, Senate
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, May 26, 2006, UNHCR Regional
Representative, p. 7; Neil
Wright, “I can confirm
that, despite repeated requests, UNHCR has not been given permission by
the government in Jakarta to
have access to West
Papua. So we do not have direct information from there. We do of course
have information coming from
those that cross into
Papua New Guinea and are interviewed by us.”
66 Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of
torture, UN Commission on
Human Rights, sixtysecond
session, E/CN.4/2006/6, December 23, 2005,
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4598847.html.
23 Human Rights Watch July 2007
government’s prevention of human rights monitors from observing the
situation in
Papua.67
67 ‘UN Expert Says Action Needed to Prevent Genocide in Several African
Countries’ Voice of America,
January 27, 2006.
Out of Sight 24
V. Human Rights Violations in the Central Highlands
This report consists almost entirely of first-hand testimony covering
cases of human
rights violations from across the Central Highlands in 2005 and 2006.
During the
course of this research Human Rights Watch documented eight confirmed and
five
other possible extrajudicial killings since 2005, all involving members of
the police,
and one of which members of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), the
Indonesian
military, appear to be primarily responsible. We documented two rapes, one
by a TNI
soldier of a child, and one by Brimob officers.
In 10 of the 14 cases documented in this report, members of the police
force were the
perpetrators. Several victims told Human Rights Watch about their forced
displacement due to sweeping operations by Brimob and army units, and were
eyewitnesses to the deaths of nine civilians (two children and seven
adults), most
likely caused by exposure to diseases such as malaria and lack of access
to medical
treatment during displacement.
Extra judicial executions and other abuses during sweeping operations
The passing of the Soeharto era and the transition to Special Autonomy has
brought
about some gradual easing of tensions between Papuans and the central
government in Jakarta, resulting in some decrease in military crackdowns and
sweeping operations of the Papuan population. The main reason for the recent
reduction in these types of sweeping operations in Papua appears to be
reduced
armed activity by the OPM.
While the number and scale of sweeping campaigns in Papua as a whole has
decreased since Soeharto stepped down, such operations still occur
periodically,
most often in the Central Highlands, where OPM activity and support remains
strongest. While such operations typically are triggered by alleged OPM
attacks, the
security forces continue to respond with disproportionate and often lethal
force, with
surrounding communities subject to harsh collective punishment. Greater
numbers
of civilian lives are lost when communities, forced from their homes to
set up
25 Human Rights Watch July 2007
makeshift shelter in the forests, succumb to illnesses caused by poor
nutrition,
inadequate housing, and lack of access to health services. Widespread
destruction
of private and community property—including crops, livestock, and
schools—looting,
and desecration of churches by security forces are common occurrences and
make it
very difficult for returning communities to rebuild and sustain themselves,
protracting the experience of displacement. Many of the testimonies we
gathered,
presented below, focus on the consequences of displacement that follows
abusive
behavior by security forces.
Known sweeping operations were undertaken by security forces in the
Kiyawage area
in 2003, in Puncak Jaya during 2004, and in the Tolikara regency from
January-March
2005;68 in August-October 2005 Puncak Jaya was targeted again in villages
throughout Tinginamput District.
The 2004 and 2005 operations in Puncak Jaya were triggered by authorities’
efforts
to find Goliat Tabuni, an OPM leader who heads one of the more active OPM
cells in
the Mulia region. In both operations, religious leaders were killed. In
September
2004 Rev. Elisa Tabuni was killed by members of the military after he denied
knowing the OPM leader’s whereabouts.69 His son, also a pastor, managed to
escape
with his hands cuffed.70 During the same operation, thousands were forcibly
displaced to the mountains. The London-based human rights organization TAPOL,
the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, received a list of 53 names of
civilians who
reportedly had died as a consequence of the displacement.71 Other groups
reported
that up to 15,000 people had been displaced and 20 people, mainly
children, had
died.72 In the 2005 Puncak Jaya operation, another pastor, Apreke Tabuni, was
68 “Indonesian military reacting brutally in Wunin,” Wurineri District,
West Papua News, January 24,
2005.
69 “Alleged murder to be probed,” The Jakarta Post, October 29, 2004.
70 TAPOL Briefing on the current situation in West Papua, TAPOL - The
Indonesia Human Rights
Campaign, March 14, 2005,
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/r050315wpbriefing.htm; John, King and
Peter Wing “Genocide in West
Papua? The role of the
Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan
people,” Report prepared for
the West Papua
Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of
Sydney; ELSHAM, Lembaga Study
dan Advokasi Hak Asasi
Manusia, Jayapura, Papua, August 2005, p.19.
71 TAPOL Briefing on the current situation in West Papua, TAPOL - The
Indonesian Human Rights
Campaign, March 14 2005,
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/r050315wpbriefing.htm.
72 “Thousands of Papuans Flee Troops,” Courier Mail, November 27, 2004;
Solidarity South Pacific,
http://www.ecoaction.
org/ssp/news/07120402.html (accessed June 25, 2007); “Papuan Protesters
Present Plea Calling for
Jakarta to End
Punjak Jaya Military Action,” Radio New Zealand International, December
17, 2004.
Out of Sight 26
executed by members of Brimob in circumstances similar to those under
which the
Rev. Elisa Tabuni had been killed the previous year.73
Brimob operations in Tolikara
In March 2005 a Brimob police unit was air-dropped from Jayapura into
Tolikara
Regency, marched the approximately 6o kilometers to Wunmi District, and
conducted an aggressive sweeping operation. This was in response to the
burning of
several schools in late February 2005, allegedly by the OPM. On March 13,
2005, en
route to Wunmi, a member of Brimob shot and killed a civilian named Lele
Jikwa.
Although we were unable to find any eyewitnesses to the killing, a man who
came
across Lele shortly after he had been shot reported that Lele was unarmed
at the
time.
As the witness told Human Rights Watch:
That morning I heard the sound of a gunshot but did not know that
Lele Jikwa had been shot. After Brimob had continued marching in the
direction of the District of Wunmi, I went to the area from where I had
heard shots. I saw blood spreading along the length of the road.
Because of all the blood I began looking for an injured person, and
then I heard him crying out from the side of the road to Ponim. I found
Lele Jikwa seriously injured by a gunshot wound and, because of his
condition, I offered him help standing up. As we went I felt very sad.
He said to me ‘I was shot by members of Brimob.’ I could see he was
shot to the right hand side of the back of his chest and I could see all
the bones were shattered. The road to Ponim became red. I helped him
to sit down and a number of friends came, bringing wood and rope,
and we carried him on our shoulders to the house of his family. There
were seven of us who carried the victim.74
73 Human Rights Watch Interviews (names and locations withheld), 2006.
74 Human Rights Watch interview (name and locations withheld), 2006.
27 Human Rights Watch July 2007
Another person recounts:
Around 8 a.m. I heard the sound of a single gunshot. I did not know
who was shooting; the TNI or police, and I did not know until later that
he [Lele Jikwa] had been shot by them
I prepared to go to the garden. I was outside of the house when a large
number of fully uniformed Brimob members marched past the yard. I
do not know how many people. I felt scared and I returned to the
house. They were wearing complete uniforms with guns and were
marching in the direction of Wunmi district. After they had passed, at
around 9 a.m. several community members brought Lele from the
place of the incident
I couldn’t think and didn’t know what had
happened
they had shot him on the right side of his back. I asked
[name withheld] ‘Who shot him?’ and in the words of [name withheld]
‘Those who shot him were members of Brimob from Jayapura.’ After
several hours, at 3 p.m., he died
after that incident, other community
members fled as refugees to the jungle.75
Members of Brimob continued on to Wunmi, where community members report that
officers burned 10 houses and shot and consumed dozens of chickens and
pigs as
well as large quantities of fruit from private houses in two villages,
Honai and
Inanagai, before returning to Tolikara on March 15. Following this
incident, frightened
villagers fled to the mountains where they remained until the end of April
2005.
Witnesses claimed that seven displaced persons within their group died from
malaria, diarrhea, or pneumonia they had contracted due to unhygienic
conditions.
One witness told Human Rights Watch:
After seeing this shooting incident and the burning of the houses we
feared the same treatment so we decided to run to the mountains. At
that time we wanted to take revenge on them but we felt we didn’t
have enough strength.
75 Human Rights Watch interview with (name and locations withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 28
The refugees lived together in one complex. We didn’t struggle with
food because the garden was close to the mountains. We had the
women gather food in the garden and we were always close by
accompanying them. After two months in the mountains, a number of
people became sick and died
Seven refugees died. There were three women, three men, and one
child. One woman who died was Karetina Wenda, aged 29 years. She
was sick with malaria
and had pneumonia. She was sick for five days
beginning on April 10, and on April 15 she died. One other woman by
the name of Tegina Wantik, aged 28, also died due to malaria. Her
illness lasted for one month, from May 12 until June 10 when she died.
Another woman, Memenauge Murub, also died due to malaria. She
was only sick for two days from May 1 and then on May 3 she died. She
was around 50 years old. The three men who died were Yununggen
Wandik, aged around 31 years. He was sick from diarrhoea. He was
sick for one week beginning May 7. Another man, Bimbin Weya, aged
around 45 years old, died from pneumonia. He was sick for two days
commencing on March 9. Yunus Wantik also died from diarrhea. He
was around 45 years and his illness began on June 7. The child who
died, Paiserah Relak, was only one-year-old, she was sick for only
three days.76
A health officer staying with the displaced community told Human Rights
Watch:
The community’s living conditions were very unhealthy and, as a
consequence, seven people died, six adults and one small child. I
tried to provide them with medical treatment but it didn’t help and I
feel great sorrow that they died. They suffered from malaria, diarrhea,
coughing up blood and pneumonia so I gave them medicines
that I
had brought from outside of the jungle.77
76 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
77 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
29 Human Rights Watch July 2007
Brimob operations in Puncak Jaya
The sweeping operation undertaken by Brimob in Puncak Jaya in August 2005
occurred after Brimob officers from Mulia responded to a report that OPM
leader
Goliat Tabuni was present in the village of Kuragi visiting his ailing
parents. Early in
the morning of August 17, 2005, a number of Brimob officers arrived in
Kuragi village
and questioned villagers. Villagers told Human Rights Watch that they
denied that
Tabuni was in the area and, to placate Brimob members, had offered them meat.
Later, however, the Brimob officers arrested three people in the local
church, after
which the situation deteriorated. At some point a Brimob member was shot
in the
right rib, although the circumstances of the shooting remain unclear. The
officer was
evacuated to Jayapura for medical treatment.
The remaining Brimob members redoubled their search for Goliat Tabuni and his
OPM followers. On August 18 and 19 more Brimob reinforcements were
air-dropped
from Jayapura by helicopter and commenced sweeping operations across at
least 13
villages in the district of Tinginamput. One witness told Human Rights Watch:
On August 17, at 9 p.m., a number of Brimob officers arrived by truck.
They stayed in several churches there and planned their fighting
strategy
on the 18th and 19th troops began dropping from Jayapura
by helicopter to Puncak Jaya and they spread through several districts
including Pigiragi, Brime, Ngalume, Erumugun, Limajari, Monia,
Wonaluka, Poruageneri, Pawagarau, Kekung, Erimuli, Kuragi, and the
city of Mulia. In all the places they shot their weapons but no
community members were shot because they had already fled.78
Villagers in the area told Human Rights Watch that they estimate as a
consequence
of these deployments 16,000 civilians fled to the mountains or to other
regions.
Local residents’ fears were stoked by reports that Brimob officers had
tortured an
OPM member they had caught. As one witness told us:
78 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 30
[The OPM member] was shot in the chest, with the bullet entering
through his back. At that time he was holding an M16 weapon which
was taken by Brimob. After he was shot [dead] his hair was drenched
with cooking oil and set alight.79
During the sweeping operation, Brimob troops reportedly destroyed houses and
buildings, and looted or burned gardens and fields. The widespread
destruction and
lack of assistance in re-building, many villagers did not return to their
houses for
several months.80 Describing the fear the sweeping operation induced, a
villager told
Human Rights Watch:
After the shooting [of the Brimob member] on August 17, many more
Brimob came from the city of Mulia to the village of ‘Five Fingers’
where the Brimob member had been shot. As soon as they arrived they
started shooting. I heard the shooting and began running in the
direction of the jungle. I did not even have the opportunity to collect
my belongings, which all remained at the house. Nor could I even
collect my young child who at that time was being cared for by
someone else, but was taken by them. Thereafter I, together with my
child, and a number of members of the community from the village
Monia began life as refugees close to Yamo. There we made a
shelter...we could not get good food.81
Brimob established roadblocks and patrols through the area, preventing
displaced
persons from returning to collect food from whatever gardens were not
destroyed.
Many displaced people remained in the jungle for four months until the end of
December 2005. It is not known how many died. All suffered acute
privations. One of
those displaced told Human Rights Watch:
79 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
80 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
81 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
31 Human Rights Watch July 2007
After the shooting [of the Brimob officer], many troops were
parachuted in by helicopter to the villages of Tingginamput and
Kuragi...After hearing the sound of the shots I immediately ran to the
jungle. The distance was approximately 10 kilometers. There I met with
a number of families who had also fled because they did not feel safe.
We were seven adults—four men, three women—and two children
aged around five to six years old. For four months we lived as refugees
in the jungle. There we stayed but did not feel safe as we often heard
the sound of gunfire and were very nervous and traumatized.
On August 18 at 8 a.m., a number of members of Brimob and TNI
began coming from Punjak Jaya in trucks to the villages of Tinginamput
and Kuragi. They opened fire in many directions including in the
direction of the jungle. After we heard the sound of shooting we ran
deeper into the jungle. After four days and nights of sleeping in the
jungle I fell ill with malaria. At that time there were no medical staff
and it was difficult to obtain medicine
all the roads were guarded by
members of Brimob and TNI who stopped members of the community
seeking access to the community clinic or hospital in Puncak Jaya. At
the time I was sick I took only traditional medicine collected from the
jungle. At the end of December 2005 I was able to get to the hospital in
Mulia and was provided with medical treatment until I had recovered.
During the time I spent in the jungle I wasn’t able to get good food. We
could only collect a little food from the farms but it was very difficult
because Brimob members guarded the roads to the gardens day and
night.82
Another internally displaced person shared a similar story with Human
Rights Watch:
For four months we lived in the jungle, from August until November
2005. During this time we were refugees. We could not get any good
food as we were in the middle of the jungle and it was difficult to go to
82 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 32
the gardens for food as all the pathways leading to and from the
villages were guarded by members of Brimob and TNI. So for four
months we ate only nettles and bananas. We were a group of eight
adults—three women, five men—and three children...Two of our
members died in the jungle as they could not be helped. Naniamban
Wenda, a 45-year-old man who was sick for four months, died in
December. The other was a two-month-old infant, Letera Tabuni, who
died in September. During the time they were sick there were no
health professionals to give them medicine and this caused their very
sad deaths. We all suffered immensely. We did not sleep well and we
ate little. Now and then we had food, but when there was none we just
had to endure
due to our situation we did not eat well and our bodies
became weak. If we found bananas in the jungle we gave them to the
young children. It was especially hard on the children and so we made
special efforts to look after them.83
Another man who was displaced from Kuragi and living with a different,
larger group
in the jungle similarly reported:
Amongst the refugees were many children who died because they did
not have good food and good sleeping conditions. Mosquito bites
made many people ill. The lack of medical treatment meant that many
community members who became ill then died.84
Due to continuing prohibitions on media and NGO access to Papua, no reliable
figures exist concerning the number of deaths caused by these operations
or the
total numbers of civilians displaced.
Forced displacement also prevents children from attending school and the
burning
and destruction of government buildings often includes schools,
guaranteeing that
83 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
84 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
33 Human Rights Watch July 2007
such interruptions in education have long-term consequences. One villager
told
Human Rights Watch:
At the time, schools were shut down. School children were also victims
and fled to the jungle with their parents
we have not yet returned to
our village of Tinginamput because we remain very traumatized by all
the things done by Brimob and TNI. We are still living in Mulia. A
number of villages are overgrown, and the conditions in villages are
now very poor.85
Many residents independently told Human Rights Watch that Brimob officers
used
churches for accommodation in their 2005 Puncak Jaya operation and sometimes
desecrated them upon their departure. This caused ongoing disruption to
religious
activities and dampened the morale and emotional recovery of local
communities.
Many churches remain badly damaged.86 As was the case during the Brimob
operation in Tolikara (detailed above), religious leaders were not spared
the direct
brunt of human rights violations. One community member reported:
At the time of the Brimob operation the troops stayed in the church of
Tanobaga. When they left all the sacred items in the church were burnt,
and even the pulpit was destroyed. During the military operation the
community could not enter the church for prayer and religious service.
After the shooting started on August 17, 2005, all the church worship
activities stopped until 2006. There are 10 church buildings that are
still empty. The congregation is scared because a church leader, Anton
Tabuni, was killed hiding in the church. During the four months we
were displaced in the jungle from August until the end of December,
the congregation worshipped in the jungle. After returning to the
village we could not resume our worship properly until 2006.87
85 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
86 Human Rights Watch interviews (names and locations withheld), 2006.
87 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 34
Similarly, another victim reported:
Brimob and TNI used various churches including at Wurigele and
Yogonik. They used them as places to sleep and eat, and when they
were ready to leave they destroyed them. Glass was smashed, the
sacred cloths and pulpit were burnt. Until this time, the churches
remain damaged and the activities of the church disrupted.88
The destruction and looting of houses, gardens, crops, and the theft of
livestock
during sweeping operations ensure ongoing suffering even once displaced
communities are able to return. Livelihoods are easily destroyed overnight
but can
take months and years to rebuild, especially when an entire community’s
financial
capital has been destroyed. Such widespread destruction limits the ability of
community members to help each other and further increases the hardships
suffered
by vulnerable groups, especially already marginalized people such as
femaleheaded
families with few or no resources to tide them over.
One man told Human Rights Watch:
After four months we returned to our village at the end of December
2005. Our village was badly damaged. The yards were totally
overgrown, houses in a number of villages had been burnt by Brimob,
all our gardens were destroyed... all the belongings we had left behind
such as machetes, spades, axes, frying pans were all gone. Our pigs,
more than three, were shot by Brimob and were used as their food for
their operations.89
Serious human rights violations by the police
2005 flag raising
Ceremonies at which the Morning Star flag is raised, symbolizing independence
aspirations, remain a common expression of Papuan nationalism and defiance.
88 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
89 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
35 Human Rights Watch July 2007
While such flag raisings are in themselves peaceful, they frequently are
met with
brutal repression by Indonesian authorities, who view them as a dangerous and
illegal form of separatist activity.
One early morning in 2005 [exact date withheld], 12 members of TPN
(Tentara Papua
Nasional, Papua National Army) and OPM conducted a peaceful flag-raising
ceremony in a field near a village in Bolakme [exact date and location
withheld]. In
response, Brimob arrived at the scene equipped with fire arms and in full
uniform.
They immediately opened fire aiming at the flag, into the air, and
violently accosted
those present. One witness told Human Rights Watch:
It was around 5 a.m. From out of the forest many people came. I also
went down there. And there we raised the Morning Star flag. We stayed
on the edge of the field until 7 a.m. and then we raised the flag.
Brimob came there that morning. They pointed their guns at us. There
were 12 members there. They asked ‘Who is in charge here?’ But we
were all silent. All our bows and arrows were collected together. They
ordered us to take off our shirts and they took away our bracelets and
chicken feathers [head decorations of the Dani people]. After that they
hit us using the end of their guns. They kicked us using their military
boots. My teeth fell out. Blood flowed out. I was hit. I was kicked twice
and then in the stomach twice again. I was kicked in the nose, the
mouth and the teeth. More kicks were ordered and this was repeated. I
could not count the number of times. I saw all my friends given the
same treatment. Blood was flowing from them and they were
forbidden from going to the toilet. They ordered us to swallow our
blood. My nose was bleeding. They ordered us to swallow the blood
again. I do not know the name of the officer in command. They all
punched us, taking turns. We were given one cigarette and all ordered
to suck it. One packet of noodles was given to us and we were ordered
to share this for all of us. They ridiculed us saying, ‘You’ve already
eaten Papuan bread.’
Out of Sight 36
The flag pole was yanked out. The flag was wrapped up. We were
ordered to carry on our shoulders the heavy wood. There were 12 of us
in total who had raised the flag.
Once we reached the Brimob post
[we] were still receiving blows.
Brimob questioned us again about who was in charge. We were all
silent and closed our mouths
a Brimob officer lit a lighter then placed
it in our mouths. But we were still silent. They lit the lighter and put it
on our tongues, then on our ears. They burnt my ear and my tongue.
This was very painful. They beat us with their gun butts
they ordered
us to eat blood. I didn’t want to. They punched and kicked me
continuously until I ate that blood. That morning they beat us with rifle
butts and barbed wire. Until 8 a.m. they were still beating us.
After that they threw us in a truck. The truck took us to the police
station. That morning was very cold. They turned on the water and
drenched us one by one with a bucket. My head was drenched. We
were quivering and shaking and still we did not answer. Then they
beat us with their boots, aiming for our hearts. Each of us, two times.
We were all dizzy. I was wanting to die. With their feet they kicked my
head again.90
Another victim told a similar story:
The police came and we were arrested immediately by 12 members of
Brimob. I was kicked by eight members of Brimob, to my back five
times and to my ribs 10 times, five times on the right and five on the
left. They beat me taking turns. They were all wearing complete
uniforms, but I did not see their names and ranks clearly. They were
Brimob, coming from Jayapura. Eight members of Brimob guarding me
kicked me five times on the left and right with their boots, cracking my
face until it was full of blood
the beating continued by them including
90 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
37 Human Rights Watch July 2007
with knives until my head was cut and face bloodied. One member of
Brimob threatened me with a knife held to my neck, ‘I will kill you, so
you can pray first’. He also said ‘You all will be taken by us to Wamena
where you will be killed.’ We were very scared by these threats and
thought we were going to be killed there.91
Another man recounted his experience:
Brimob came and started shooting. They were wearing complete
uniforms with guns, and they shot in the direction of the flag. The flag
tore down the middle. We were arrested, hit, and kicked. We were
ordered to squat and walk squatting to the Brimob post. We were tied
together and ordered to carry the flag pole on our shoulders. On the
road we were continually kicked. I was kicked twice by one member of
the police to my eyebrow which was bleeding. I was hit again with the
gun in the back three times, and then with the gun butt three times to
my face. A Brimob member hit me with truncheon on my head
twice
after that we were tied again into twos and thrown into a truck.
But a number of women boarded the truck and they cut the ties
binding us with a knife, and we escaped.92
A fourth man described how he was mistreated at the Brimob watch post:
On the long road we were continually kicked until we arrived at the
watch post. I was guarded by a member of the police armed with a
knife. My face was swollen by the assaults inflicted on me. I could not
count the number of strikes as there were too many. My lips and nose
were bleeding. My blood was mixed with chicken meat and I was
ordered to eat it. I didn’t want to and they forced me to. I was silent
and didn’t say anything. At their post they prepared cold water in a
bucket and we were drenched one by one. We were given one cigarette
91 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
92 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 38
stump and one packet of uncooked noodles and were ordered to eat,
one by one, taking turns.93
The arrest of David Hubi
On March 15, 2006, police appeared at the house of former district head
(Bupati)
David Hubi in Wamena, Jayawijaya. Hubi had been suspended from office on
corruption charges and had four times failed to appear in court to face
charges.94 In
preparation for his arrest, police had conducted surveillance of his house
on March
14, and then blocked roads leading to his residence on March 15. Supporters,
including family members, children, and women, along with some male
supporters,
armed with traditional weapons such as bows and arrows, spears, and machetes,
flocked to Hubi’s house to demonstrate their support, and to obstruct the
authorities’ access to the area.
>From 6 a.m.-11 a.m. a standoff took place between Hubi and his supporters
and the
Jayawijaya special reserve police, alongside prosecutors from Wamena. Hubi’s
supporters refused to open the door to his house and Hubi continued to
deny his
surrender. Negotiators for Hubi said that the arrest warrant was not
accompanied by
a final order from the District Court and that the arrest was therefore
unlawful.
Negotiations broke down.95
According to Indonesia’s national Human Rights Commission, KOMNAS HAM
members of the reserve police asserted that members of the crowd started
to attack
them, with one officer reportedly injured by an arrow to his leg. The
police then
opened fire on the crowd, killing two men, Sodeman Hubi, the younger
brother of
David Hubi, and Mokarineak Kossay. They also seriously injured a third
man, Hali
Matuan, who later died from his injuries. Newspapers reported that some
143 other
people were injured.96
93 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
94 ‘Terdakwa Drs, David A. Hubi Sudah Dipanggil 4 Kali’, Cenderawasih Pos,
May 16 2006.
95 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
96 “Komnas HAM Papua Laporkan Tindakan Kekerasan Polisi Jayawijaya,”
Republika, June 16, 2006.
39 Human Rights Watch July 2007
According to witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, police broke
down the
door to Hubi’s home and discharged tear gas into the house, beating those
in the
way and forcing them into the yard. Police armed with rifle butts and
rubber batons
assaulted unarmed civilians. All those present on the property, including
children as
young as nine years old, were herded into police vehicles and tear gas was
discharged nearby. Those detained were taken to Jayawijaya police station
where
victims say they were further mistreated and neglected by the police.
One eyewitness told Human Rights Watch:
On May 15 after 10 a.m., the prosecutor and police from Jayawijaya,
guided by detective Nur Bakti, together with the head of operations,
Naharudin, came to negotiate with us
the negotiations were not
successful and the detective, Nur Bakti said, ‘We will carry out the
order using force and we will count to 10 but if you don’t surrender to
us, we will then use force.’
The police then began to shoot tear gas. I wanted to take pictures of
them but the gas was affecting me
Police shot tear gas inside the hall
and other rooms. Because my eyes were feeling hot I immediately
went to the bathroom to wash my eyes. I was coming out of the
bathroom when the agents entered. I wanted to use my camera but
two police quickly grabbed me and arrested me. They took my camera
and pulled at my clothes. At the same time they punched me and
accused me of being a provocateur. I didn’t have the chance to see
who was punching me because my eyes were affected by the gas and
my face had filled with blood. I was beaten with the end of a gun on
my back, and with fists to my face. My mouth and eyes were smashed
and bleeding. I felt dizzy and fell. Straight away I was kicked by five
members of the police and Brimob. They were all wearing complete
official uniforms with guns...then, a member of the police, Daud
Matuan, ordered them to stop. I was barely conscious when five
members of the police took me into the car. As they were taking me,
Out of Sight 40
they punched me in the back three times with rifle butts and then in
the car I was beaten with a truncheon.97
Another witness told Human Rights Watch:
[When the violence began] I was sitting [in David Hubi’s house]
together with Sodeman Hubi who was later shot
glass began
breaking. I stopped some small children from entering the room.
Brimob troops began shooting left and right. Before they began
shooting they released tear gas. I couldn’t resist because I couldn’t
see much
the children and I were inside the house
at that time we
were treated as though we were terrorists. The door was shot down. I
was very scared. I looked for shelter under the table on the floor. Left
and right I could see troops with guns looking for me.“Mana Ibu [name
withheld]” [‘Where is name withheld’] were their words. I raised my
hand. Brimob punched me
my nose was puffy and swollen. My eyes
were injured
they hit using their hands; so many times I could not
count. One police detective defended me
my face was distorted and
full of blood. One Brimob member insulted me, calling me a ‘whore.’98
Young children present at the former district chief’s house were not
spared. One 9-
year-old boy told Human Rights Watch:
The day before the incident I hadn’t been playing there but others told
me that they wanted to arrest David and that we had to keep watch, so
I went along. I didn’t know there would be an incident
that morning
we had finished our cake and I was playing with my friends. I saw that
there were many police coming. I didn’t know what they were coming
for. I wanted to leave the area. But my older brother was angry. He said
‘Don’t go out or later police will beat you.’ So I stayed where I was. I
was always together with my brother. At around midday the police said
97 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
98 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
41 Human Rights Watch July 2007
that they wanted to arrest Mr. Hubi, I did not expect that they would
beat us. But they immediately fired tear gas. My eyes were burning
painfully and I could not see. I struggled for air but couldn’t get it. They
punched my brother. I felt very sorry for him. I cried and yelled ‘Don’t
hit my brother,’ but the police immediately hit me on my right cheek
then held onto me with his right hand and threw me into the garden
bed. I fell and was in a lot of pain. We young children gathered. The
police were shooting to the left and right. I wanted to run but I was
scared.
Not long after, three police came and beat the young children one by
one. I was held and beaten again. It was very painful. The police
ordered us to get into the police car. When I was close to the car,
police threw me onto the car. He held my neck and threw me above.
The car was full of tear gas. I was immediately dizzy and I couldn’t see.
They took us to the police station. We were thrown out of the car.
Some other children were beaten as they got down...Police ordered us
to line up in the sun. They ordered us to lie down. After that they didn’t
beat us but we didn’t have food. We were held there until night-time.
The small children were all told to leave at around midnight.99
A 13-year-old boy told a similar story:
Quickly the police entered into the yard of the [former] Bupati’s house.
They came complete with guns. There were many Brimob. I wanted to
run but I couldn’t. I did not expect them to attack and hit the children.
But immediately the police used their tear gas. My eyes were burning. I
couldn’t see anything. We were crying, not only me, but all the small
children. We were ordered to gather at the front. I wanted to run but
was chased by police. The police officer hit me on my head twice. I was
immediately dizzy. I cried. A Brimob officer kicked me and threw me to
the front. They kicked me once. I fell. Police pulled me by my arm.
99 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 42
When we were close to the police car, I was thrown on top with many
other small children. When we were in the car Brimob again used tear
gas. We could not see. Our eyes were burning.
After we arrived at the Polres Jayawijaya, police grabbed us and threw
us down from the car. After that we were ordered to line up in the sun.
While we were doing that, a policeman came and was angry with us.
He said ‘You small children should not be going along to
demonstrations.’ We stayed at Polres until 12 p.m. We didn’t eat.
Finally a number of women pleaded for us to be released, and we were
released. There were many small children there. I couldn’t count them
all. I was sick so I couldn’t count. After we left to go to my house, I felt
sick. Afterwards I was still sick so I didn’t go to school for five days.100
Similar brutality was shown to a woman who was six months pregnant:
At that time of the incident there were discussions continuing inside
among police, Ms. [name withheld] and [name withheld]. But I could
see that the atmosphere was already very serious. I stood close to the
fence at the back of the building where many women were standing.
Not long after that, we heard the sound of shooting and the main
section of the door opened. Brimob burst in, shooting into the air. I
thought they were only firing warning shots. I was startled to see them
begin to use tear gas. At first I was not affected but then they shot the
tear gas in our direction and it immediately affected my eyes. My eyes
were in pain. I saw the Bupati’s children being kicked. I became very
scared. I wanted to run to the back but Brimob had already surrounded
the place. They opened fire, shooting everywhere. We could not run
and we bent down in submission. At that time I was 6 months
pregnant. I was short of breath. My heart wanted to explode. I was
confused because of the tear gas and then quickly I was threatened
with a gun. Two members of Brimob did this. One member kicked me
100 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
43 Human Rights Watch July 2007
twice. I was stamped on and pulled up to stand. I was hit with a rifle
butt to my nose and it immediately began bleeding.
After that I was ordered to climb into a police vehicle
but the vehicle
was high, so they had to push me up. While they were holding me, a
policeman kicked me in the stomach. I thought my baby would die. I
could not get up. But I was kicked again in the back so I got in. After
that many others were put in and they closed the door.
At the police station, my baby was heavy so I wanted to get out slowly
but I was immediately pushed outside. Three police climbed on top of
the vehicle to push us out. While getting out I was hit again to my left
calf. This was very painful as the blow was with a truncheon.
After we arrived at the police station we were all ordered to line up in
the yard. We were told to lie out in the sun for around one hour. I felt
very sorry for the small children. They were also beaten and forced to
lie in the sun. There were also many women, approximately 20
although I do not know precisely how many. There were many children.
We were punished all afternoon in the yard. At 8 p.m. that night I
vomited twice. One police guard abused me saying, ‘Whore, Woman
working for the enemy.’ At midnight we were released.
When I got back to my house I was very sick and vomited three
times.101
In total around 200 people were detained in relation to this incident.102
Most were
released late on the night of March 15, 2006 or the following day. Eight
people,
including three women, were charged with offenses of threatening violence and
101 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
102 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 44
obstructing arrest.103 The three women who were detained were interrogated
by the
police for three days and then conditionally released.104
The five men were detained at Polres for 60 days and then transferred to
cells at the
Wamena prosecutor’s office and detained for a further month.105 After several
hearings, at which seven members of the police and the prosecutor gave
evidence
against the charged group, the court issued a final decision in November 2006
sentencing the five men to three months of imprisonment. As they had
already spent
three months in jail they were immediately released.106
Human Rights Watch has been unable to confirm whether any police officers
have
been investigated or charged for their roles in this incident. We wrote to
the head of
the police in Papua asking for information on this case but did not
receive any
response. The police have consistently defended their behavior, claiming
that the
force used was both reasonable and proportionate.107 Although some of the
people
surrounding Hubi’s house did have spears and bows and arrows, the majority
were
unarmed. The testimony above strongly suggests that police used excessive
force
with respect to persons present who were not offering any serious resistance,
including women and children.
Several victims from this incident have filed a complaint with Komnas HAM
Papua,
who then reported it to the Komnas HAM office in Jakarta. To our knowledge,
however, there have been no further developments in the case.
Mulia DPRD Demonstration
There is also some evidence suggesting that police may have used excessive
and
disproportionate force on September 29, 2006, in the city of Mulia, the
regional
capital of Puncak Jaya. In this case, the protesters were residents who
had been
103 “Tiga tersangka dan BAP Diserahkan ke Kejaksaan,” Cenderawasih Pos,
July 11, 2006.
104 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
105 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
106 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
107 “Terdakwa Drs, David A. Hubi Sudah Dipanggil 4 Kali,” Cenderawasih
Pos, May 16, 2006.
45 Human Rights Watch July 2007
denied a government fuel subsidy (compensating for fuel price hikes) on
grounds
that they were not originally from the Puncak Jaya region. The disgruntled
members
decided to conduct a peaceful protest at the office of the Provincial
Legislative
Assembly (the DPRD) in New Mulia City. At 12p.m. that day they gathered in
the old
city and began a 10 kilometer march towards the DPRD office.
Witnesses recount that, as the crowd moved forward, marchers began
throwing rocks
breaking the windows of houses lining the main road.108 Brimob was called
to back
up the police to prevent the protestors from entering the DPRD office
compound.
Under conditions that remain unclear and require additional public
investigation,
police opened fire upon the crowd, wounding three civilians, two men and a
woman.
One eyewitness described the events as follows:
[When the march arrived at the] DPRD office where the protesters
wanted to deliver their demands, the group was prevented by the
police from entering. The crowd then became emotional, threatening
to burn down the DPRD office. Iri Telenggen, a member of the DPRD,
and Henok Ibo, a caretaker, summoned the police. The police opened
fire. Three people were shot at that time: Lele, Iterina, and Mondin.
Brimob had approximately four members using guns. After Lele was
shot, Iterina Teleggen came forward wanting to assist, but Iterina was
then shot in her left leg. The two were taken by ambulance to the
Puncak Jaya hospital. At that same place, Mondin was shot by a
member of Kopassus. After the shooting the crowd started to
disperse.109
A second witness who assisted the victims at the scene told Human Rights
Watch:
Police blocked the demonstration. The crowd continued marching
towards their goal, the DPRD office, and finally Brimob opened fire
108 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
109 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 46
shooting three civilian community members in the yard of the office of
DPRD Puncak Jaya. Those shot were two men and one woman, Iterina
Telenggen, Mondin Teleggen and Lele Tabuni
Iterina was shot in the
left leg. Mondin Telenggen was shot twice in the back, twice in the
right flank and once on his right arm between his armpit and
elbow
members of Brimob were ordered to load the injured in an
ambulance. That day I also went straight to the public hospital in
Mulia. In Mondin’s body were five bullets so he was later evacuated to
Jayapura. On the same day Lele was also evacuated to Jayapura for an
operation to remove bullets but they were not removed. The reason
given by the doctor was that the injured men didn’t have enough
money for the costs of the treatment. It is not clear where the two
patients are located today
Later Iterina had an operation to repair damaged muscle tissue and
was given medical treatment at the public hospital in Mulia for one
month. During this time she was under tight police security day and
night. After she was released she was picked up at the hospital by a
member of the police and immediately taken to the police station for
the process of investigation...she was detained at Polres Puncak Jaya
for more than a month in late 2006. On December 8, she was taken to
Paniai for investigation and a court hearing.110
Shootings in Waghete
In Waghete, Paniai, on January 20, 2006, police shot and seriously injured
two young
men while undertaking a routine policing matter. The TNI also became
involved and
are believed responsible for the shooting death of a third victim, a
16-year-old child.
While key facts in the case remain unclear, a soldier subsequently was
convicted of
shooting the 16-year-old but received a sentence of only eight months of
imprisonment. As the account below indicates, the case warrants more thorough
investigation.
110 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
47 Human Rights Watch July 2007
In this case, some local youths had established a roadblock and were
demanding
small sums of money from drivers of vehicles, ostensibly to fund repairs
to that
stretch of road. A police officer from Polsek Waghete demanded that they
present to
him the following day a letter from the village chief authorizing them to
collect a toll.
Early the following morning, two of the youths, [names withheld], obtained
the letter
from the village chief and departed for Waghete together with an unknown
number of
others to have it authorized by the military (Koramil) and police (Polsek)
who shared
adjoining compounds. Upon presenting the letter to the relevant officer,
other police
arrived and ripped the letter to pieces.
The youths then attempted to flee and the police pursued them. One of the
youths
was captured and beaten. Hearing the commotion, members of Koramil, Timsus
753
emerged from their barracks and joined the police in beating the youth.
Precisely what happened next is not clear. Eyewitnesses told Human Rights
Watch
that, shortly after the beating began, a police officer fell into a sewage
ditch, got up,
drew his pistol and shot two bullets, hitting one of the youths in the
right side of the
stomach, and another youth in the right foot, and that TNI members and
other police
also opened fire. Mozes Douw, a 16-year-old school student was shot and
killed at
the scene. From the accounts, it is unclear how many youth were present at
the time
and whether or to what extent they may have physically threatened police.
One eyewitness told Human Rights Watch:
On January 20 at 7:30 a.m., I was with some of my friends at the
Waghete terminal to load things onto a truck to Nabire. At that time I
saw a youth being beaten by police along with members of Timsus 753
[TNI] on the roof of the police station. When we saw police and TNI
members beating another youth outside the Waghete police station, I
said to my friends, ‘Let’s go and see who they’re attacking. Let’s see if
he is one of us.’ In the commotion, Danton Budi Arif Situmean [police
officer], was hit and fell. He took out his pistol and fired two shots, the
first straight in front of me and the other towards a person standing
behind me. I didn’t know who that person was, but the distance
Out of Sight 48
between me and him was just around 50 centimetres. At the time of
the second shot it was around 8 a.m. So I didn’t know who had been
shot because they were behind me.111
Danton Budi Arif Situmean chased but did not catch one of the youths who
was a
victim of the shooting and who fled the scene. The same witness to the
initial
shooting assisted this youth with shooting injuries.
Although [name withheld] suffered a bullet wound, he managed to get
away from the area. [Name withheld] also suffered a bullet wound and
ran soaked [in blood] onto the road to Wakai. We took him directly to
the community health clinic in Waghete. After we had taken him, we
saw members of the community throwing rocks and sticks in the
direction of the Timsus 753 troops who had opened fire on the youths
who were fleeing the police station. I returned to the police station and
by standing on a bridge at the entry to the station could see through
the window. I saw three people, one wearing a white T-shirt with the
number 14 on it.
I turned to look at the road and saw a youth, Mozes Douw, walking
along. Then I heard the sound of shooting coming from the police
station. I heard Mozes Douw say ‘I have been shot with bullets’ and
clasp his waist, bending down. Then I heard the sound of two more
shots from the same direction, which hit him in the shoulder. Mozes
Douw immediately fell, without calling out
this shooting occurred at 9
a.m.112
An independent autopsy upon the body of Mozes Douw confirmed that he was
killed
by gunshot wounds fired from a range of 10-75 meters.113
111 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
112 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
113 Autopsy Report of Mozes Douw by Dr. Jhon Manangsang, Enaroltali,
January 25, 2006.
49 Human Rights Watch July 2007
The killing of Mozes Douw and the shooting of the two other youths drew an
angry
response from local residents. On January 24, 2006, members of the community
confronted a joint delegation of DPRD members, TNI officers, and the
police at the
Timsus TNI office in Enarotali.114
The response of the authorities was initially promising. The DPRD
announced that
two teams would be established to investigate the shootings, one to
investigate the
site, the other to liaise with TNI in Jakarta. The police and TNI conceded
responsibility
for the shooting incident, promising that action would be taken against those
culpable. Statements from the head of Kapolres and Timsus 753 provided
promises
that the case would be investigated and responsible personnel charged.
The following day two officers believed responsible were named; TNI
officer Second
Lieutenant Situmeang, who was alleged to have shot two of the youths, and
police
officer Ronald Isac Tumena, at that time believed to be responsible for
shooting
Mozes Douw.
However, since then no police have been disciplined or charged in relation
to the
incident. Second Lieutenant Situmeang, subsequently identified as the officer
responsible for the shooting of Mozes Douw, was sentenced by a military
tribunal to
eight months in prison.115 Komnas HAM Papua also conducted an
investigation into
the incident and reported it to their central office. However, no further
public actions
have yet resulted.
Police Killing of Man in Wamena
This case occurred in 2006 [exact date withheld], also in the Jayawijaya
Region, in a
village [name withheld] in Wamena. The victim had been drinking with two
friends at
his house for several hours. His wife asked him to buy something from a
local shop.
On the way back from the shop, the victim reportedly made a lewd and
suggestive
comment to three women returning to their houses, one of whom was the wife
of a
police officer. She called her husband and informed him of the victim’s
insulting
114 “Enraged Papuans Protest Shooting”, the Jakarta Post, January 24, 2006.
115 “Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions” International Crisis
Group Briefing Paper, 53,
September 5, 2006, p. 9.
Out of Sight 50
behavior. That police officer and two other officers immediately drove to
the victim’s
house, broke down the door, and searched for him. The victim’s wife
recounts what
she saw and heard:
I saw the police come to the house. I knew my husband was drunk and
thought that was why they wanted to arrest him. I warned my husband
and he went to another room. There were three police. Their names are
[withheld]. They arrived by motorcycle. At the time there were three of
us in the house; Robi, my husband, and me. One of the police wore
police uniform and held a gun. The other two wore civilian clothing.
Robi [a friend of the victim’s present at the house] escaped from the
house, leaving just myself and my husband. One of the police
questioned ‘Mrs. is your husband here?’ I didn’t respond. After that
they broke the door to the house and began looking for my husband.
They locked the door from the inside so I could not enter the house. In
a state of uncontrolled anger they looked for my husband but they did
not find him. They then searched from room to room. They found him
underneath the bed. They yanked him out and punched and kicked
him without control. The police officer holding the gun beat him on the
left side of his chin using the rifle butt. They continued kicking his chin
and face. Blood came out from his nose and mouth and wouldn’t stop.
>From outside I heard him yelling out ‘Please Mama.’ His left jaw was
broken and he died right there at the house.
After the torture that caused his death, the three police came out of
the house and their words to me were, ‘We will take him to the police
station and detain him in a cell.’ One member of the police went to the
police station in Jayawijaya to rouse a mobile patrol and the other two
members of the police guarded the victim. They saw that [my husband]
had died and his body was taken to the hospital for certification.116
116 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
51 Human Rights Watch July 2007
Police Beating of Man in Apalapsili
In 2006 [exact date withheld] in a village located in Apalapsili District,
Jayawijaya,
[exact location withheld] police officers sought to enforce a civil debt
of two pigs
owed by a farmer, to another man. The farmer received a summons from the
police to
appear at the police station. On August 22, 2006, he went to the police
station, as
did the other party. A police officer, named Mufti [name changed to
protect the victim]
ordered him to bring two pigs to pay the other man the following day. The
farmer
complained that he did not have two pigs to pay, but his protest was not
accepted.
The following day the farmer went to the police station with some close
family
members, but without the pigs. Negotiations with the police and the other
party were
proceeding when Mufti arrived in civilian clothing with a number of other
police and
asked where the pigs were. When it was apparent that the farmer had not
brought
the pigs, Mufti assaulted him and threatened his family at gunpoint. The
farmer told
Human Rights Watch:
He said three times, ‘Do you want to pay now or not?’ He pointed his
gun at my family again. He ordered me to put my hands on the table.
He used a rubber baton to beat my hands repeatedly until they were all
broken. I did not have strong bones, and all my fingers were broken.
All were smashed. I was immediately dizzy. After that my family took
me to the medical clinic for treatment, but they could not handle my
serious case and so I went to Wamena for treatment. There they had to
amputate some of my fingers. Now I only have three fingers left on my
left hand that still function. My right hand is useless. I can no longer
work in the garden. I am confused about what will become of me
now.117
The farmer reported his mistreatment to the police in Apalapsili. Human
Rights
Watch has not been able to confirm whether the authorities had taken any
action on
his complaint at the time of this writing.
117 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 52
TNI Abuses
Human Rights Watch’s research in the Central Highlands also uncovered several
cases of abuses by TNI forces, some in their official capacity, and others
in their
private capacity but with reason to believe that their status as TNI
members would
protect them and give them immunity. The cases suggest that brutality is
still all too
common among soldiers in the Central Highlands and that soldiers who abuse
civilians continue to feel confident that they are above the law and will
suffer no
adverse consequences for their actions.
TNI Beating of Two Men
A man in Wamena was involved in a private dispute with two drivers concerning
payment for the delivery of rice to him. After earlier threatening to
report him to the
police if he did not pay, in 2005 [date withheld], the two drivers went to
a house in
Wamena where the man was visiting a friend, bringing some intelligence
officers to
“assist” them in enforcing the debt. The intelligence officers reportedly
hit both the
victim and his friend with an iron bar, despite the fact that the friend
was not party to
the dispute.
The victim told Human Rights Watch:
I opened the door and before I had a chance to say anything,
immediately the Intel Kodim [military intelligence] member threatened
me with a weapon. I said ‘Sit first please sir and let us talk and resolve
this problem well.’ However, he continued threatening me with the
weapon and then hit me with an iron bar which was approximately one
meter long. Then the other Intel police officer wearing civilian clothes
joined in. I was against the wall and they kicked me with their boots all
over my face until I could not get up. They continued threatening and
insulting me calling me words such as ‘pig’ and ‘idiot.’ I couldn’t count
the number of hits. I tried to call the Jayawijaya police station but my
mobile phone was confiscated by a member of the military intelligence.
I was continually beaten on my back with the bar. Finally we were
53 Human Rights Watch July 2007
taken to the police station. There we were not beaten and were able to
resolve the matter by paying Rp500, 000 [US$57].118
The two men were released from police custody at around 12p.m. The friend,
who
was attacked by the police only because he was present, required 18
stitches to his
head. He told Human Rights Watch:
I was sitting there and the military intelligence officer asked, ‘you are
friends with him [pointing at victim], no?’ I said this was true. After
hearing that, six people immediately started kicking me, two members
of Jayawijaya police intelligence, one member of the military
intelligence from battalion 1702, and the two drivers. That occurred on
Friday, [date withheld] at night. The one with the pistol kicked me in
the face everywhere until my eyes were damaged. Blood was flowing
from my face...the ground was covered in blood. They did not want to
stop. They continued punching my ears and nose until they bled. From
this beating I became dizzy. While I was still dizzy they continued to
stomp on me. After that I was taken outside to the garage. There I was
beaten again. They beat me so many times that I could not count the
number of blows. We were taken to the police station. In the police cell
I was still dizzy from the beatings
I was beaten around my eyes until I
needed stitches, 18 in total, nine on the inside and nine on the
outside.119
TNI beating of uncle of rape victim
In May 2005 a soldier raped a 16-year-old girl in Jayawijaya. (The case is
described in
detail in the subsection: “Violence against women and other violations of
women’s
rights,” below). The victim’s teacher then told the victim’s uncle about
the attack and
he traveled from Wamena to assess the incident and take action against the
reported
perpetrator. For his efforts, he too was beaten by the same perpetrator.
118 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
119 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
Out of Sight 54
The uncle told Human Rights Watch:
[Rape victim’s name withheld] is my niece. I was very angry when I
heard the story. I wanted to raise the case with the head of the village
in [location withheld] but I was scared that later the soldier [rape
suspect] would hear, so I remained silent
at the time I was on leave
and departed for the village. I caught a plane there
the problem had
occurred in May and I went there in August. When I got to [location
withheld] I asked the teacher for information. Evidently the information
I had heard was true and that night I met with the village chief. The
suspect and the village chief were close friends. After hearing that I
wanted to raise the case the village chief reported this to the suspect.
Very early, at around 5 a.m. the next day, I was sleeping when I heard
kicking at the door and a voice ordering me out of the house. I was
initially confused and wanted to run, but couldn’t. The suspect pulled
me by the arm outside. He kicked me. He punched me. He put his gun
to my ear and eyes. He said, ‘If you’re so brave, then you can deal with
me!’ I was bleeding heavily and the people whose house I was staying
in came out
but they were scared too, so they all disappeared.
Two friends of the soldier stood on the road near the yard of the house.
They had heard the news and wanted to support their army friend. No
other people came to the house. He beat me until I was almost dead.
After I was beaten, the suspect repeated his threat, saying ‘If you are
brave enough to take me on, then I will murder you.’ I was sick for
more than one week...I did not want to tell my story because I was
afraid I would be murdered there. In [location withheld] people can’t
blame the military even if they are wrong. If they accuse them they
come and beat them.
.I was scared to report him to his commander
in case he killed members of my family. I left my family there and
remained silent.120
120 Human Rights Watch interview (name and location withheld), 2006.
55 Human Rights Watch July 2007
TNI Assault in Jayawijaya
In 2005 [date withheld] in a village in Jayawijaya, a man was hurrying to
the medical
clinic to get eye medication for his newly born child when he met with a
uniformed
TNI member [name withheld to protect victim’s identity] he was already
acquainted
with, based at the Koramil. The soldier immediately asked the victim to
contribute a
pig to help pay for his upcoming wedding ceremony. The victim told Human
Rights
Watch:
I responded ‘Why marry so fast? Try to be patient.’ Immediately upon
hearing these words, the TNI slapped me five times across the face. I
was angry and responded ‘Brother, why did you hit me?’ and he
respo